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The fiduciary relationship is a legal relationship that describes those interactions in which one 
party is entrusted to exercise discretionary power on behalf of another’s significant practical 
interests. Over the past several decades, as bioethicists have begun to use the fiduciary 
relationship in their ethical analyses, it has proven to be a powerful tool for providing clarity 
to complex ethical issues. But the exciting promise of the fiduciary relationship as a framework 
for bioethical analysis is threatened by at least two major conceptual problems: moral-legal 
equivocation and paternalism. Legal-moral equivocation refers to the problem of assuming the 
normative demands of a legal relationship are also normatively demanding in a moral 
relationship. Put simply, it assumes the legal “ought” is also a moral “ought.” The cogent use 
of the fiduciary relationship in ethical analysis therefore requires some justification as to why 
the fiduciary obligation should be considered a moral obligation. Paternalism refers to the 
worry that the fiduciary relationship is paternalistic and therefore an inappropriate model for 
the healthcare professional-patient relationship, with its ethos centred on promoting patient 
autonomy. Chapter 1 addresses the problem of equivocation by arguing that the fiduciary 
relationship is a moral relationship. By tracing the history of the fiduciary obligation, I argue 
that it is a moral obligation that fosters social harmony by enabling individuals to trust or 
depend on one another in those interactions where one undertakes to act on another’s behalf. 
Chapter 2 addresses the problem of paternalism, arguing that the fiduciary relationship is 
essential to promoting autonomy. I adopt Matthew Harding’s analysis of Equity’s role in 
promoting autonomy (by maintaining socially important institutions) and apply it to the 
fiduciary relationship. However, I also go beyond Harding’s analysis, adopting a relational 
theory of autonomy I argue that fiduciary power is “relational capacity” that makes certain 
autonomous ends possible. Finally, in Chapter 3, I illustrate the practical utility of the fiduciary 
relationship by using it as framework for conceptualizing and addressing the ethical issues in 
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Summary for Lay Audience 
The fiduciary relationship is a legal relationship that describes those interactions in which 
one party is entrusted to exercise discretionary power on behalf of another’s interests. In 
recent years, the fiduciary relationship proven to be a powerful tool for providing clarity to 
complex bioethical issues. But the exciting promise of the fiduciary relationship for 
bioethical analysis is threatened by at least two conceptual problems: moral-legal 
equivocation and paternalism. Legal-moral equivocation refers to the problem of assuming 
that the normative demands of a legal relationship are also morally normative. The cogent 
use of the fiduciary relationship in bioethical analysis requires some justification as to why 
the fiduciary obligation is a moral obligation. Paternalism refers to the worry that the 
fiduciary relationship is paternalistic and thus an inappropriate model for the healthcare 
professional-patient relationship, with its ethos of promoting patient autonomy. Chapter 1 
addresses the problem of equivocation by arguing that the fiduciary relationship is a moral 
relationship, fostering social harmony by enabling individuals to trust or depend on one 
another in those interactions where one undertakes to act on another’s behalf. Chapter 2 
addresses the problem of paternalism, arguing that the fiduciary relationship is essentially 
autonomy promoting; adopting a relational theory of autonomy, I argue that fiduciary power 
is “relational capacity” that makes certain autonomous ends possible. In Chapter 3, I 
illustrate the practical utility of the fiduciary relationship by using it as framework for 
conceptualizing and addressing the ethical issues in a controversial clinical trial, known as 








Chapter 3 of this dissertation has been adapted and expanded from a previously published co-
authored article.1  
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 Austin R. Horn, Charles Weijer, Jeremy Grimshaw, Jamie Brehaut, Dean Fergusson, Cory E. Goldstein, and 
Monica Taljaard, “An ethical analysis of the SUPPORT trial: addressing challenges posed by a pragmatic 
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The divorce between legal concepts and their philosophical foundations renders the 
former susceptible to manipulation and misuse as they lose their connection to their 
philosophical and doctrinal foundations and subsequently become more and more 
unintelligible.2 
—Leonard I. Rotman 
In the Nichomachean Ethics Aristotle famously states that human flourishing (eudaimonia) 
requires “self-sufficiency.” Nevertheless, Aristotle recognized that self-sufficiency 
requires more than the philosopher’s solitary exercise of reason.3 He clarifies that by self-
sufficient “we do not mean that which is sufficient for a man [sic] by himself.”4 Self-
sufficiency, in other words, does not mean complete independence from the support, 
guidance, or influence of others. Rather, self-sufficiency, and thus human flourishing, also 
requires various external goods. The most important of these external goods are human 
relationships, such as those with family, friends, and even various professionals. As 
Aristotle himself poignantly puts it: 
[N]o one would choose the whole world on condition of being alone, since man is 
a political creature and one whose nature is to live with others. Therefore even the 
happy man lives with others; for he has the things that are by nature good […] 
Therefore the happy man needs friends.5 
 
2 Rotman, “Understanding Fiduciary Duties and Relationship Fiduciarity,” McGill Law Journal/Revue de 
droit de McGill 62, no. 4 (2017): 975-1042. 
3 Aristotle, The Complete Aristotle, Apple Books, published by eBooks@Adelaide, 3041 
(http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/a/aristotle/), 
4 Aristotle, The Complete Aristotle, 3031 (emphasis added). Please assume a “sic” throughout, wherever 
the inappropriate use of gendered (particularly male) pronouns are used within quotations. In my own 
writing, I will make mixed use of gendered (he/she) and nongendered (they/them) pronouns throughout. 
5 Ibid., 3292–94. 
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Aristotle recognized 2500 years earlier the essential role that our relationships play in the 
quest for self-sufficiency—or rather, for “self-governance” or autonomy.6 Put simply, 
relationships, on the Aristotelian account, are essential for autonomy.  
Aristotle’s insights about the relational requirements of human autonomy and human 
flourishing (eudaimonia) are as true today as they were then. We depend upon others in 
myriad different ways. Members of human societies have always depended on certain 
foundational social relationships, such as those between parents and children, spouses and 
families, friends and allies, healers and the sick, leaders and followers. However, as our 
societies become more complex and technologically advanced, various forms of 
knowledge, skill, and expertise have become increasingly compartmentalized. Obtaining 
even the most basic goods depends on a complex web of human interactions, each stage 
involving a specialized set of knowledge or skills. To be sure, there is unlikely that any 
facet of our lives is left untouched by the support, care, and guidance—or lack thereof—of 
others. It is upon this elaborate system of social and economic cooperation, and 
corresponding mutual dependence, that complex modern societies are built.  
Arguably, among the most important of these social and economic relationships are those 
that have been characterized as “fiduciary.” A fiduciary relationship is a legal relationship 
defined broadly as those interactions in which one party (the fiduciary) is entrusted or 
undertakes to exercise discretionary power on behalf of another’s (the beneficiary’s) best 
interests.7  The fiduciary relationship is characterized by a “structural inequality” between 
the power of the fiduciary to affect the beneficiaries interests and the dependence of the 
beneficiary on that power.8 The inequality inherent to the fiduciary relationship renders the 
beneficiary vulnerable to the fiduciary’s potential misuse, abuse, or neglect of her 
 
6
 The etymology of “autonomy” is derived from the Greek “autonomia”—“auto” and “nomos”—which 
literally means “self-law.” In other words, to be self-ruling, to be one’s own lawmaker, or to “self-govern.” 
7 Paul B. Miller, “A Theory of Fiduciary Liability,” McGill Law Journal 56, no. 2 (November 30, 2010): 
235–288, https://doi.org/10.7202/1002367ar.  
8
 Miller, “A Theory of Fiduciary Liability.”  
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discretionary powers. Hence, as a “prophylactic” against any potential exploitation, the law 
demands of the fiduciary a strict duty of loyalty to promote her beneficiary’s best 
interests—among other duties such as confidentiality, candor, and care.9 The legal 
fiduciary obligation of loyalty is quite exacting. For instance, it prohibits the fiduciary from 
entering into even potentially conflicting relationships or from profiting from their 
privileged capacity qua fiduciary.10 Legal remedies for the violation of this duty are also 
comparatively unforgiving.11 The demanding nature of the fiduciary obligation, along with 
the severe penalties for its violation, speaks to the importance the law places in the 
continued integrity, or viability, of this important legal relationship. Examples of fiduciary 
relationships include those between parent and child, physician and patient, lawyer and 
client, chief executive officer and shareholder (or stakeholder), and many others.12 Some 
have even argued that the state is a fiduciary to its citizenry.13  
The fiduciary relationship has enjoyed increased philosophical and jurisprudential 
attention over the past several decades. As the legal contours of this relationship have 
become more well-defined through fiduciary jurisprudence and academic debate, a greater 
number of persons and entities have been found by both legal scholarship and the courts to 
owe fiduciary obligations. The courts have thus had to consider whether all of these 
 
9
 Although the exact number and type of fiduciary duties is contested. 
10
 It is standard practice in jurisprudence to use the term “law” to refer specifically to the common law, as 
distinct from Equity. However, unless other stated, I will use “law” more broadly to refer to legal 
institutions generally, as contrasted with morality. Where I specifically mean the common law, as distinct 
from Equity, I will use the phrase “common law.”  
11
 For example, the disgorgement of ill-gotten profits and the creation of a constructive Trust, among 
others. Note that I will capitalize “Trust” when referring to the legal relationship, or institution, created by 
(at least in the common law tradition) English Equity. I will reserve lower case “trust” for broad moral and 
philosophical ideas about a particular way in which individuals relate to one another (i.e., in trust 
relationships).  
12
 Not all common law jurisdictions recognize the same relationships as fiduciary. Australia, in particular, 
is quite restrictive and does not consider the physician-patient relationship to be fiduciary.   
13




relationships are in fact “fiduciary.”14 In recent decades, questions about the nature and 
application of the fiduciary relationship have given rise to a rich debate among jurists, 
philosophers, and other legal scholars in the growing jurisprudence on fiduciary law. These 
questions include those about the meaning, scope, obligations, and legal taxonomy (e.g., 
its relation to other areas of the law, such contract or tort) of the fiduciary relationship, to 
name just a few. 
Concurrent with the rise of fiduciary jurisprudence in the law has been the increased 
interest in, and application of, the fiduciary relationship to the ethical problems of research 
and medical ethics. Many bioethicists have taken seriously the finding by (most) common 
law courts that the physician-patient relationship, in particular, is fiduciary. In other words, 
an increasing number of bioethicists have found in the fiduciary relationship a useful 
framework for conceptualizing the kinds of ethical issues that arise between healthcare 
professionals and their patients. By “framework” here I simply mean that the fiduciary 
relationship denotes a unique mode of human interaction whose express purpose is to 
enable one individual to trust or depend on another to act on behalf of their interests, and 
to remain loyal to those interests in doing so.15 This mode of interaction, or relationship, 
has a certain structure (i.e., inequality between power and dependence), which gives rise 
to other features (e.g., a vulnerability to exploitation), and ultimately to various rules and 
obligations (e.g., loyalty, candor, care, etc.) which function to protect or maintain the 
viability of the fiduciary relationship itself. As a framework, the fiduciary relationship has 
proven promising for clarifying a number of seemingly intractable ethical debates, such as 
those about commercial surrogacy, conscientious objection, and the ethical conduct of 
innovative research methodologies.16  
 
14
 In the law, such considerations usually involve whether there are any overriding “policy” considerations 
(i.e., beyond mere application of legal theory or tests) for recognizing a particular relationship as fiduciary. 
For example, in recognizing a strict fiduciary obligation of the state to the general citizenry would likely 
overwhelm the courts with legal actions claiming breach of the state’s duty of loyalty.  
15
 I will flesh this idea out in more detail in Chapter 1. 
16
 See Carolyn McLeod, Conscience in Reproductive Healthcare, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, May 
2020); Emma A. Ryman, “Fiduciary Duties and Commercial Surrogacy,” (Doctoral Dissertation, Western 
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For example, Charles Fried (a jurist) was among the first to recognize and apply the 
fiduciary relationship to the interaction between physician and patient, from which he drew 
important legal as well as ethical implications for conducting research with patient 
populations.17 In particular, Fried reconceptualized the perennial problem of 
randomization in clinical trials through a fiduciary lens. Using a fiduciary framework, Fried 
argued that the ethical problem posed by randomization, an essential component of a subset 
of clinical trial design, is that it conflicts with a physician’s fiduciary obligation to use their 
discretionary judgment in pursuit of patients’ best interests. Reframing and reclarifying the 
problem posed by randomization in this way also paved the way for an ethical resolution 
to this problem that is still influential today: namely, the suggestion that enrolling patients 
in a randomized clinical trial is consistent with a physician’s fiduciary obligation to 
promote the patient’s best interests, so long as the therapeutic merits of all arms of the trial 
are in a state of “clinical equipoise,” or uncertainty.18 In other words, so long as the body 
of professional knowledge from which physicians’ (qua professionals) discretionary 
judgment is derived is in a state of uncertainty as to the preferred treatment, the physician 
does not violate her fiduciary obligation by recommending the patient enroll in the trial.19 
Since Fried’s seminal analysis, many bioethicists have found in the fiduciary relationship 
a useful ethical framework that provides much-needed clarity to a wide array of bioethical 
conundrums, such as those previously mentioned. The application of the fiduciary 
relationship to these and other ethical issues implies that it is also a moral and not simply 
legal relationship.  
 
University, 2017), Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository 4728, https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd/4728, 
respectively; and Chapter 3 of this dissertation. 
17
 Charles Fried, Medical Experimentation: Personal Integrity and Social Policy: New Edition, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2016). 
18
 The history and contemporary application of equipoise will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2 of 
this dissertation. For more on the history, nature, and contemporary application of clinical equipoise see 
Austin R. Horn and Charles Weijer, “Clinical Equipoise,” Encyclopedia of Global Bioethics 1 (2015): 1–
11. 
19




This dissertation is motivated by the promise of the fiduciary relationship to address 
complex bioethical issues, particularly in the realms of medical and research ethics. 
However, in order to provide a firm conceptual foundation for the widespread application 
of the fiduciary relationship as a tool of bioethical analysis, I explore and address reasons 
why bioethicists might be skeptical about fully embracing the fiduciary relationship as an 
ethical framework for the physician-patient relationship. The reasons I identify are twofold.  
The first problem is what I call the problem legal-moral equivocation. Generally speaking, 
“equivocation” refers to the misleading exploitation of the ambiguity of a concept to draw 
certain conclusions (which are, as a result, often invalid). A classic example involves 
equivocation between legal “laws” and the so-called “laws” of nature, which can be found 
in the following fallacious argument: “[L]aws imply lawgivers. There are laws in nature. 
Therefore, there must be a cosmic lawgiver.”20 The conclusion is invalid because it turns 
on two different meanings of “law” in this case. The equivocation to which I am referring 
vis-à-vis the fiduciary relationship turns on the ambiguity between the different meanings 
of “normative”—or perhaps more accurately, the two different domains in which the 
concept “normative” operates. On the one hand, the law normatively prescribes certain 
behaviour for legal reasons (e.g., the threat of punishment). Morality, on the other hand, 
also normatively prescribes certain behaviour, based on moral reasons (such as the desire 
to do, or be, “good”). Legal-moral equivocation, then, turns on the ambiguity of 
“normative” insofar as it assumes—without argument or justification—that the sense of 
“normative” in the legal sphere can be straightforwardly applied to, or has implications for 
the “normative” of the moral or ethical sphere. Put simply, it supposes that the normative 
prescriptions derived from a legal relationship are also normatively prescriptive for a 
moral relationship.  
Yet surely just because one has, as a matter of legal fact, a certain obligation in law, one 
does not (necessarily) also have a moral obligation as well. As an example, I may have a 
 
20




legal obligation to do my taxes, but it does not necessarily follow that I also have a moral 
obligation to do so. At the very least, more needs to be said to motivate the specifically 
moral “ought” in this case, such as having a moral obligation to contribute to the common 
good that is served by paying my taxes. Accordingly, more needs to be said to motivate the 
claim that the normative prescriptions of the fiduciary relationship, at least qua legal 
relationship, ought also to apply to and guide ethical practice. Indeed, Miller (a legal 
scholar) is careful to define the fiduciary relationship as “a distinctive type of legal 
relationship.”21 Clearly aware of this type fallacious reasoning, Miller couches his 
arguments concerning fiduciary duties and remedies purely in “juridical” terms, explicitly 
disavowing moral or ethical justifications.22  
The question therefore arises, if the fiduciary relationship is purely a construct of the law, 
why think that its prescriptions ought to have any bearing whatsoever on the ethical 
problems of bioethics? Why think that the fiduciary relationship, qua legal institution, is 
(also) a moral relationship? Indeed, the law has a number of “legal fictions,” so called as 
they are created to solve technical or policy problems in law. For example, treating 
corporations as legal “persons,” is a legal fiction.23 The fiction involves that idea that the 
corporation exists separately from those of its individual members. Granting corporations 
many of the legal rights and duties of human persons is (ostensibly) practical and expedient 
in commercial transactions (e.g., by enabling corporations to enter into contacts) and also 
protects its individual members from some legal and financial liabilities. However, 
corporations are clearly not real persons. The worry, then, is that the fiduciary relationship 
is simply a creation of the law, like a legal fiction, and its application (without justification) 
to the ethical problems of bioethics is therefore unfounded.  
 
21
 Miller, “Fiduciary Liability,” 235 (emphasis added).  
22
 Paul B. Miller, “Justifying Fiduciary Duties.” McGill Law Journal/Revue de droit de McGill 58, no. 4 
(2013): 969-1023. 
23
 Lon Luvois Fuller, “Legal fictions,” Illinois Law Reveiew 25 (1930): 363. 
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Some bioethicists do indeed appear hesitant to explicitly name the fiduciary relationship in 
their ethical analyses, preferring instead to use related or overlapping ethical concepts such 
as trust, loyalty, and promise. There are of course different possible reasons for this 
apparent reluctancy to use the language of “fiduciaries,” beyond worries about 
equivocation. Perhaps, these bioethicists simply do not want to presume knowledge of a 
technical legal term among their readers, for instance. Still, their hesitancy could—and 
perhaps ought—to be owing, in part or in whole, to worries about legal-moral equivocation. 
To illustrate, consider that it is not uncommon in some bioethical analyses to conflate the 
trust relationship with the fiduciary relationship, when it is clearly the latter that is being 
invoked. The reason for mentioning trust may be that the fiduciary relationship often 
involves trust, and the trust relationship is one that falls squarely within the ethical domain. 
The following is a salient example of this type of trust-fiduciary conflation: 
[T]he truster (in this case, the patient) trusts the trustee (the physician) to protect 
and promote a significant practical interest (the patient’s health). The truster cedes 
control of the significant practical interest, and as a result, the trustee has 
discretionary power over the interest at stake.24 
Here the authors unmistakably describe a fiduciary relationship—yet they use the language 
of “trust.” In fact, this definition that purports to be of a trust relationship is taken almost 
verbatim from Paul Miller’s own influential definition of the fiduciary relationship, albeit 
with the words “truster” and “trustee” in place of beneficiary and fiduciary, respectively.25 
As Miller defines it, the fiduciary relationship is “one in which one party (the fiduciary) 
enjoys discretionary power over the significant practical interests of another (the 
beneficiary).”26 And yet the authors of the above quotation—who include Miller 
himself!—profess to describe a trust relationship. Why? One plausible answer is concerns 
about legal-moral equivocation (of which Miller himself is clearly cognizant).  
 
24
 Charles Weijer, Paul B. Miller, and Mackenzie Graham, “Duty of Care and Equipoise in Randomized 
Controlled Trials,” in The Routledge Companion to Bioethics, ed. John D. Arras, Elizabeth Mary Fenton, 
and Rebecca Kukla, (New York: Routledge, 2015), 201. 
25
 Miller, “Justifying Fiduciary Duties,” 1016. 
26
 Miller, “Fiduciary Liability,” 262. 
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Conflating the fiduciary relationship with other moral relationships does not alleviate the 
problem of legal-moral equivocation, it merely obfuscates it. The trust relationship, for 
one, is clearly not synonymous with the fiduciary relationship, as the following three 
reasons make plain. First, a trust relationship need not involve an imbalance (structural or 
otherwise) of power between the truster and the trustee. Trust can doubtless occur (and 
may even be easier) in positions of relative equality. Second, trust relationships do not 
require the truster to entrust a “significant practical interest” to the trusted. While trust can 
involve important interests of this kind, trust can clearly involve more trivial interests as 
well. For example, I might trust my partner to pick up a (nonessential!) ingredient for our 
dinner on the way home from work. Finally, and relatedly, nor does trust necessarily 
involve substantial “discretionary power.” While Annette Baier, in her seminal paper on 
trust, argues that trust does require discretionary power, other philosophers have since 
questioned how meaningfully “discretionary” many forms of trust actually are.27 This 
insight is perhaps most relevant to relationships that are entirely agentive. For example, I 
might entrust you to mail a letter for me according to clearly specified parameters, leaving 
you no room for meaningful “discretionary power,” and thus merely trusting that you will 
do so (while not forcing you to do it or knowing that you are somehow forced). The latitude 
for judgement or discretion in such cases is severely curtailed, rendering any remaining 
discretion somewhat trivial. Of course, trust will often be present in healthy fiduciary 
relationships, and many, if not most, trust relationships will involve a significant degree of 
authorized discretionary power. But this does not imply that the two relationships are 
synonymous or, for that matter, interchangeable. In the case above where they are used 
interchangeably, there is in fact a conflation going on, one that could be motivated by a 
worry about legal-moral equivocation. At any rate, equivocation ought to be a worry among 
bioethicists and others who intend to use the fiduciary relationship as an ethical framework, 
since it is, as Miller notes, “a distinctive type of legal relationship.” Extra-legal application 
of the fiduciary relationship requires justification and therefore remains a conceptual hurdle 
to its widespread use.  
 
27 See Karen Jones, “Trust as an Affective Attitude,” Ethics 107, no. 1 (October, 1996), 8 note 3.  
10 
 
The second problem is about paternalism. Specifically, the worry that the fiduciary 
relationship is paternalistic. Like the fiduciary relationship, paternalism involves acting on 
behalf, and in the presumed interests, of another. Medical paternalism, for example, is 
based on the rationale that the physician “knows best” because of his or her professional 
knowledge or expertise. On this model, the physician holds all the power and is justified in 
making unilateral decisions concerning the patient’s medical interests, even contrary to the 
patient’s expressed wishes. The history of professional medical ethics describes a series of 
troubling (and often tragic) abuses of patient welfare and autonomy based on this “doctor 
knows best” rationale. The infamous Tuskegee Syphilis is just one of many such 
examples.28 In response to the abuses perpetrated against patients based on the paternalistic 
model of the physician-patient relationship, contemporary bioethics has since moved 
toward a “patient-centred” model to healthcare decision-making. This alternative is 
intended to empower patients to take an active role in the pursuit of their healthcare 
interests and thereby promote patient autonomy.  
The worry, in short, is that the fiduciary relationship is paternalistic and therefore is an 
inappropriate model for the physician-patient interaction. Indeed, the fiduciary relationship 
does appear to share many of the hallmarks of paternalism. Fiduciaries use their 
knowledge, skill, or expertise to act in the interests, and on behalf of, their beneficiaries. 
The fiduciary relationship is characterized by a structural inequality between the power of 
the fiduciary to affect the beneficiary’s interests and the dependence of the beneficiary on 
that power. Hence, insofar as the fiduciary relationship shares these fundamental 
characteristics with paternalism, its use as an ethical framework for the relationship 
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between healthcare professionals and their patients would—rightly—appear wrongheaded 
to contemporary bioethicists concerned to protect patient autonomy. At the very least, these 
characteristics ought to give bioethicists pause when considering the fiduciary relationship 
as a candidate ethical model, or framework, for conceptualizing ethical issues arising in 
medical or research ethics. 
As of yet no one, to my knowledge, has effectively addressed these two conceptual hurdles 
to applying the fiduciary framework to ethical problems of bioethics.29 While some 
bioethicists have argued (along with many common law courts) that the physician-patient 
relationship is in fact fiduciary, none have provided sustained theoretical and specifically 
moral justification for applying this apparently legal relationship to the ethical domain.30 
Similarly, while some bioethicists have argued that the fiduciary relationship is not 
paternalistic,31 none have made the stronger claim that the fiduciary relationship is 
essential to promoting autonomy. This stronger stance, which I take in this dissertation, 
responds to the threat of paternalism most effectively by saying that the fiduciary 
relationship is essentially the opposite of a paternalistic relationship: it is critical to 
autonomy. 
This dissertation aims to alleviate these concerns about equivocation and paternalism by 
first uncovering the moral history of the fiduciary relationship (antecedent to its status as 
a legal institution) and second, by providing a theoretical moral grounding for the fiduciary 
relationship in its role in promoting autonomy. In this way, I hope to remove two 
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conceptual hurdles to the widespread application of the fiduciary relationship to the ethical 
problems of bioethics, and thereby foster greater clarity to ethical issues that arise in the 
context of the healthcare professional-patient relationship. 
There are three chapters to this dissertation all of which are loosely related to the others 
and together comprise an overarching narrative. Chapters 1 and 2 provide mutually 
reinforcing arguments and therefore can be considered companion pieces. As explained 
below, Chapter 1 addresses the problem of equivocation through a historical lens, while 
Chapter 2 builds upon and reinforces the argument of Chapter 1, though concerns itself 
primarily with the problem of paternalism by locating the moral purpose of the fiduciary 
relationship in promoting autonomy. Chapter 3 applies the theory laid out in the preceding 
two chapters to an important contemporary problem in research ethics. Nevertheless, each 
of the three chapters can be read independently of the others, as each encompasses its own 
self-contained argument. 
Chapter 1 takes up the problem of equivocation. It provides a moral ground for the fiduciary 
relationship by tracing its historical origins to a moral obligation; namely, the obligation 
that when one undertakes to act on behalf of another’s interests, one must do so with utmost 
fidelity, or loyalty, to that other’s interests. I illustrate how this moral obligation has 
enjoyed a roughly 3000-year history, existing across both time and cultures as (variously) 
a moral norm, religious command, and legal rule. I suggest that, in each historical instance, 
the fiduciary obligation effectively enables individuals to trust or depend on one another in 
the context of socially and economically important relationships in which one undertakes 
to act on behalf of another, thereby fostering greater cooperation and social harmony. I 
then describe how the fiduciary obligation entered English medieval law through the courts 
of Equity. In doing so I suggest that English Equity’s interest in, and institutionalization 
of, the fiduciary relationship is merely the latest instance of more or less continuous 
attempts by diverse societies throughout history to protect this important moral 
relationship.32 This historical analysis of the fiduciary relationship mitigates concerns 
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about legal-moral equivocation by suggesting that the fiduciary relationship is in fact a 
moral relationship.  
Chapter 2 takes of the problem of paternalism by arguing that the fiduciary relationship is 
essentially autonomy promoting. I begin by drawing from Matthew Harding’s account of 
Equity’s interest in governing and maintaining “institutions,” or what he calls frameworks 
for human action. Harding argues that Equity is “normatively justified” in maintaining 
socially and economically important institutions insofar as doing so is consistent with the 
law’s liberal “facilitative project” aimed at promoting autonomy. Harding argues that 
Equity promotes autonomy by individuating and maintaining institutions as distinct 
“options” from which individuals can choose in the process of self-determination. I apply 
Harding’s analysis to the fiduciary relationship, arguing that the fiduciary relationship is 
one such institution that Equity has taken an interest in governing and maintaining, 
providing further theoretical support to the historical analysis provided in Chapter 1. 
However, I argue that Harding’s (Razian) conception of autonomy does not account for the 
ways in which autonomy is fundamentally relational; that is, how relationships with others 
both foster and impede our ability to self-govern and thus to be autonomous. I therefore go 
beyond Harding’s account by arguing that the fiduciary relationship is essentially 
autonomy promoting; that is, beyond its mere role as a distinct “option” from which 
individuals can choose in the pursuit of their self-directed plans. I argue that when we adopt 
a relational theory of autonomy, it becomes clear that the fiduciary relationship is critical 
to both the development of “autonomy skills” (as in the parent-child relationship) as well 
as to the ongoing exercise of autonomy. Finally, I employ Paul Miller’s influential account 
of the fiduciary relationship to argue that “fiduciary power” is a relational capacity through 
which individuals are able to exercise their will. Moreover, that this relational capacity is 
often essential to meaningful self-governance. In this way, I respond to the problem of 
paternalism by arguing that the fiduciary relationship is essential to the promotion of 
autonomy and, thereby, not paternalistic. Moreover, building on the thesis of Chapter 1, I 
 
so, I intend to disambiguate this legal jurisdiction from lower case “equity,” which I reserve for broad 
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argue that way in which the fiduciary relationship fosters social harmony in coextensive 
with the way in which it promotes autonomy, which becomes clear when we adopt a 
relational theory of autonomy.  To the extent that the fiduciary relationship is often 
essential to autonomy, worries about paternalism ought to be alleviated.  
Finally, in Chapter 3, I illustrate the utility of the fiduciary relationship for providing ethical 
clarity to a recent controversy in research ethics. The SUPPORT trial was a pragmatic 
comparative effectiveness randomized clinical trial (ceRCT), an innovative research 
methodology designed to be conducted under real-world clinical conditions. The 
SUPPORT trial compared two “standard of care” oxygen saturation ranges on preterm 
infants on outcomes of blindness and death. Infants were randomized to either “low” or 
“high” saturation ranges, both of which (purportedly) fell within the full standard of care 
range. The outcome of the trial showed that for every case of blindness prevented (for 
infants in the low oxygen arm) there were two infant deaths. Controversy erupted when it 
was discovered that neither blindness nor death—the primary study outcomes—were 
disclosed as “research risks” to the study participants. Debate about the SUPPORT trial 
was highly polarized, yet (as I point out) largely ad hoc. I demonstrate how applying a 
fiduciary analysis can be powerful tool for systematically identifying and appropriately 
conceptualizing the ethical issues that arise in the SUPPORT trial, and perhaps in 
pragmatic trials generally, offering much-need clarity to a difficult and emotionally 
charged debate.  
In summary, in this dissertation I identify and aim to mitigate two important conceptual 
hurdles to the widespread application of the fiduciary relationship in bioethical analysis: 
viz., equivocation and paternalism. I do so, first, by uncovering the moral history of the 
fiduciary obligation prior to its legal instantiation, suggesting that concerns about legal-
moral equivocation are misplaced. Secondly, I respond to the problem of paternalism by 
arguing that the fiduciary relationship is often essential to promoting autonomy. Moreover, 
I suggest that the essential role the fiduciary relationship plays in promoting autonomy 
provides it with a firm foundation in morality. Finally, by applying a fiduciary analysis to 
a complex and controversial contemporary bioethical case study, I illustrate the utility of 
the fiduciary relationship as a framework for thinking clearly and systematically about the 
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relevant ethical issues that may arise between healthcare professionals and their patients. 
However, insofar as there are other philosophical issues with applying a fiduciary analysis 
to bioethical problems (beyond equivocation and paternalism) this dissertation does not 
address every obstacle to its ethical application. Nevertheless, by addressing two such 
major issues, proposing a foundation for the fiduciary relationship in morality, and 
demonstrating its utility for ethical analysis, I hope to aid in laying the theoretical 




Chapter 1  
1 A Moral and Legal History of the Fiduciary Relationship  
In this chapter, my aim is to address the problem of legal-moral equivocation. I do so by 
tracing the history of the fiduciary relationship from its origins in ancient moral, religious, 
and legal thought to its adoption by the Medieval English courts of Chancery, and later 
English Equity—from which we gain our modern understanding of the fiduciary 
relationship qua legal relationship.33 I suggest that the fiduciary relationship is defined by 
an underlying fiduciary obligation: namely, the normative demand that when undertakes 
to act on behalf of another’s significant practical interests, one must do so with utmost 
fidelity, or loyalty, to that other’s interests. Moreover, I argue that the fiduciary obligation 
arose and developed alongside increasingly complex human civilizations, responding to a 
problem “etched in human nature”:34 viz., how to trust, or at least reliably depend upon, 
others who undertake to act on behalf of our interests? By way of this historical analysis, 
I intend to argue that the fiduciary relationship is, first and foremost, a moral relationship. 
By “moral” here I simply mean that widespread social adherence to the normative demands 
of the fiduciary obligation is essential to human cooperation and, ultimately, social 
harmony. Uncovering the history of the fiduciary relationship reveals the important moral 
role the fiduciary obligation, and thus the fiduciary relationship, has played in fostering 
social harmony since the emergence of complex human societies. Insofar as the fiduciary 
relationship is in fact a moral relationship (indeed, one that grounds the legal relationship) 
worries about legal-moral equivocation simply dissolve. Applying the fiduciary 
relationship to the ethical problems of bioethics therefore need not raise concerns about the 
illicit or unjustified importation of normative obligations from the legal into the moral 
domain. The fiduciary relationship is a moral relationship and thus its application to ethical 
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issues that arise between healthcare professionals and their patients, in particular, is 
justified.  
I am not the first to recognize the moral dimension of the fiduciary relationship. A number 
of other scholars have identified various moral corollaries of the fiduciary obligation 
throughout the course of human civilizations. In section 1.1, I briefly outline some of these 
views and suggest a unifying theme among them. As just alluded to above, I suggest that 
in each historical instance in which evidence of the fiduciary obligation can be found, it is 
invoked in an effort to address a specific problem inherent to human action: again, how 
can one trust or at least reliably depend upon another to act on behalf of one’s interests? 
By synthesizing these disparate accounts, I suggest that the fiduciary relationship, and 
specifically its defining obligation, functions as a moral obligation insofar as it fosters 
broadscale human cooperation, greater social harmony and, ultimately, individual human 
flourishing. In other words, without the kinds of social and economic cooperation that the 
fiduciary relationship makes possible, individuals would be simply incapable of engaging 
in many kinds of human interactions that make a worthwhile life possible.35 
In section 1.2, I illustrate how the fiduciary obligation has been present throughout the 
course of human civilizations, from the Code of Hammurabi to its eventual birth in 
Medieval English law, to which we owe our contemporary understanding. The historical 
account provided in section 1.2 is broken into two subsections: sections 1.2.1 and 1.2.2. 
Section 1.2.1 traces the fiduciary obligation from Ancient Mesopotamia to the age of the 
Roman Empire. I highlight evidence of the fiduciary obligation in moral, religious, and 
legal thought, including in: the Ancient Babylonian laws of agency, bailment, and 
negligence; Ancient Chinese law and philosophy; the religious edicts of the Old and New 
Testaments; provisions in Islamic and Jewish law; and, finally, in Roman law. Against this 
background, section 1.2.2 illustrates how the fiduciary obligation became an equitable 
principle of the courts of Chancery, an early court of English Equity. In this section, I 
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provide a brief historical account of how Equity arose in tandem with the legal Trust, out 
of which evolved our modern understanding of the fiduciary relationship (i.e., as an 
institution of Equity). I describe how Chancery came to view itself as serving an equitable 
jurisdiction in supplement (and superior) to the Common Law. This history is intended to 
suggest that the fiduciary obligation’s eventual entry into English law through the courts 
of Equity is merely contemporary Western society’s latest attempt to protect and enforce 
this important moral obligation, which has existed across cultures for millennia, always 
with the aim of promoting greater social and economic cooperation and thus social 
harmony. I also suggest that it is perhaps unsurprising that the fiduciary obligation should 
gain a foothold in the law—qua equitable principle—through Chancery. Given the moral 
purpose the fiduciary relationship serves, it seems appropriate that a jurisdiction, which 
came to view itself as responsible for exercising principles of fairness and equality, became 
the eventual vehicle by which the fiduciary obligation entered our modern legal system.  
Finally, in section 1.3 I raise and respond to two objections. The first objection concerns 
the nature of the historical narrative I will have provided. It is a matter of debate among 
jurists and legal philosophers as to whether the courts of Equity in fact occupy a unique 
jurisdiction vis-à-vis the Common Law, whether procedurally or substantively. To the 
extent that my argument depends on the claim that Equity plays a unique role as an 
equitable supplement to the Common Law, I am vulnerable to the criticisms of those who 
claim otherwise. Accordingly, I outline one such view and discuss its implications for my 
thesis. Second, I respond to a criticism that might be put forward by bioethicists, in 
particular. Bioethicists critical of the fiduciary relationship as a framework for the 
healthcare professional-patient interaction might ask the following: if the fiduciary 
relationship is as important as I make it out to be, morally speaking, then why has it not 
received more attention by moral philosophers? The critique suggests that if the fiduciary 
obligation were in fact an important moral obligation, then moral philosophers would have 
paid more attention to it. I respond to this objection by pointing out that the fiduciary 
obligation has received more attention from moral philosophers than might immediately 
be evident. Finally, I conclude this chapter by summarizing the implications of the history 
and arguments I have presented for the problem of legal-moral equivocation.  
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1.1 A Problem “Etched in Human Nature” 
As defined in the Introduction, the fiduciary relationship refers to those interactions in 
which one party (the fiduciary) is entrusted to exercise discretionary power on behalf of 
another’s (the beneficiary’s) best interests.36 The fiduciary interaction is defined by the 
fiduciary’s obligation to use the discretionary power with which she has been entrusted 
with utmost fidelity, or loyalty, to the beneficiary’s interests. As also mentioned in the 
Introduction, both common and civil law jurisdictions recognize numerous relationships as 
fiduciary. These include relationships between parent and child, physician and patient, 
lawyer and client, financial advisor and advisee, chief executive officer and shareholder, 
among many others.37 The fiduciary relationship is characterized by the “structural 
inequality” between the power of the fiduciary to affect the beneficiaries interests and the 
dependence of the beneficiary on that power.38 This structural inequality renders the 
beneficiary vulnerable to exploitation through the fiduciary’s misuse, abuse, neglect, or 
exploitation of her discretionary power.39 Many jurists and legal philosophers agree that it 
is in response to the beneficiary’s inherent vulnerability that fiduciary duties arise.40 
Fiduciary duties, along with the corresponding remedies for their violation, are sometimes 
said to serve a “prophylactic” function.41 Fiduciary duties and liabilities guide and deter 
fiduciaries from taking advantage of their privileged capacity qua fiduciary, or from simply 
failing to perform their fiduciary mandate, through the imposition of certain obligations 
(together with the threat of harsh punishments for failing to live up to the demands of those 
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obligations). Among the most important of these obligations is the fiduciary’s duty of strict 
loyalty to promote her beneficiary’s interests. Indeed, some jurists and legal philosophers 
argue that the duty of loyalty is constitutive of, or synonymous with, the fiduciary 
relationship itself.42 
Today the fiduciary relationship is largely understood to be a legal relationship, which is 
to say, a creature of English Equity, or of legal systems descended therefrom.43 As such, 
its duties and liabilities are thought to be correspondingly legal in nature. The fiduciary 
obligation of loyalty has been quite exacting, requiring of fiduciaries an unusual degree of 
selflessness in the pursuit of their beneficiaries’ best interests. But the norms and values 
inherent to the fiduciary relationship—selflessness, loyalty, trust, and others—have 
obvious moral connotations. Perhaps unsurprisingly then, a growing minority of jurists and 
philosophers have argued that we ought to consider the moral dimensions and corollaries 
of the fiduciary obligation. Accordingly, in this section I provide a brief survey of some of 
these views. I argue that a unifying thread can be found in the way the fiduciary obligation 
appears serve an important moral function in each; namely, by enabling individuals to trust 
or depend on one another, promoting mutual cooperation and fostering greater social 
harmony.  
Among the first to recognize the broader applicability of the fiduciary relationship, beyond 
the law of Trusts (from which the contemporary fiduciary relationship has its roots), was 
jurist Austin Scott.44 Scott defined a “fiduciary” as “a person who undertakes to act in the 
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interests of another person.”45 Employing this broad definition, Scott identified numerous 
fiduciary relationships, some of which were atypical at the time of his writing.46 However, 
beyond simply expanding the legal scope of the fiduciary relationship, Scott went further 
by recognizing the fiduciary obligation in certain moral relationships as well. For instance, 
Scott identifies the fiduciary obligation in a moral-religious context in his analysis of the 
New Testament’s sixteenth chapter of the Gospel according to Saint Luke, known 
colloquially as the “Unjust Steward”: 
There was a certain rich man, which had a steward; and the same was accused unto 
him that he had wasted his goods.  
And he called him, and said unto him, How is it that I hear this of thee? give an 
account of thy stewardship; for thou mayest be no longer steward.  
Then the steward said within himself, What shall I do? for my lord taketh away 
from me the stewardship: I cannot dig; to beg I am ashamed.  
I am resolved what to do, that, when I am put out of the stewardship, they may 
receive me into their houses.  
So he called every one of his lord's debtors unto him, and said unto the first, How 
much owest thou unto my lord?  
And he said, An hundred measures of oil. And he said unto him, Take thy bill, and 
sit down quickly, and write fifty.  
Then said he to another, And how much owest thou? And he said, An hundred 
measures of wheat.  
And he said unto him, Take thy bill, and write fourscore. And the lord commended 
the unjust steward, because he had done wisely: for the children of this world are 
in their generation wiser than the children of light.47 
Upon learning of his master’s intention to fire him (apparently owing to an earlier failing) 
the titular Unjust Steward exploits his capacity as his master’s steward to confer a favour 
upon himself with his master’s debtors by relieving them of large portions of their debts. 
Scott argues that the Steward is a fiduciary to his master: he undertakes to act on behalf of 
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his master’s interests. As Scott says, “it was his duty in dealing with this master’s affairs 
to act solely in the interest of his master.”48 Accordingly, the Steward owes a duty of loyalty 
to his master’s interests in discharging his role as fiduciary, in this case, in securing debts 
owed to his master. Instead, the Steward uses his privileged capacity as his master’s 
fiduciary, or steward, to secure his own interests. It is precisely the violation of his fiduciary 
obligation to his master that renders the Steward “unjust” in this case. The “injustice” in 
this case is clearly not (or at least not only) the violation of a legal law, but as the context 
of this biblical passage suggests, it is (also) a violation of a moral-religious law. Hence, 
Scott suggests that in contravening the normative demands of the fiduciary obligation, the 
Steward also violates a moral obligation.  
Scott is not the only one to identify the moral dimensions of the fiduciary relationship. As 
briefly mentioned, Frankel begins by noting the striking parallels between the Ancient 
corollaries of the fiduciary obligation, along with various norms and rules that give life to 
it, with those of today’s fiduciary duties and rules.49 Frankel says that these parallels are 
unsurprising, given that the fiduciary obligation was, and remains, an important moral 
obligation that guides a critical mode of human interaction: namely, where one undertakes 
to act on behalf of another’s interests. 
[O]verlaying all [fiduciary] rules is a theme of morality and fairness—protection 
of entrustors from serious injury from the relationship. And while law may have 
been rigid, strict and specific, the roots of ancient and religious laws have 
permeated fiduciary law, and have not relinquished their hold even today.50 
Frankel suggests that the fiduciary obligation serves a moral function by enabling 
individuals to engage in a certain type of relationship of trust and dependence, which 
underpins ancient and modern fiduciary laws alike, while also accounting for the 
remarkable similarity between the two. The similarity exists because the moral problem, 
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in response to which the fiduciary obligation arises, is as relevant today as it was 3000 
years ago. The problem, again, concerns how to trust or depend on another who undertakes 
to act on our behalf. Our manifest interdependence leaves us vulnerable to exploitation at 
the hands of others in whom we have placed our trust, or upon whom we depend. Given 
that countless important social and economic interactions require entrusting others to act 
on our behalf, how can we reliably trust or depend on those others to act in our interests? 
As Frankel points out, this problem is not unique to modern societies; rather, “it seems that 
throughout the centuries the problems that these [fiduciary] laws were designed to solve 
are eternal, etched in human nature, derived from human needs, and built into human 
activities.”51 The fiduciary obligation mitigates this problem by prescribing a strict duty of 
loyalty to the beneficiary’s interests. The societal importance of adhering to this obligation 
is reflected, as we will see, in moral, religious, and legal thought throughout the history of 
human civilizations.  
It is worth noting here that the fiduciary duty of loyalty does not imply that a fiduciary 
must act entirely selflessly vis-à-vis all of her beneficiary’s interests. In Chapter 2, I discuss 
in detail the unique nature of fiduciary power which, according to Miller’s influential 
account, is (among other things) specific. Specificity implies that the fiduciary exercise her 
powers of discretion on behalf of her beneficiary’s significant practical interests, which 
includes matters of personality, welfare, and right. Without belaboring the point too much 
here, the fiduciary’s obligation to her beneficiary is delimited to a specific subset of 
interests. For example, a parent (qua legal and, as I argue, moral fiduciary) would not be 
in violation of her fiduciary duty to act on behalf of her child’s “best interests,” should she 
decide to coach her child’s opposing hockey team. While coaching the opposing team is 
clearly not in her child’s “best interests,” broadly construed, it is nevertheless compatible 
with the parent’s specific fiduciary mandate to act on behalf of her child’s significant 
practical interests. In this case, the child’s welfare interests include basic physical 
necessities such as food, clothing, and shelter, as well as psychological needs like a sense 
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of security, love, and emotional support. Personality interests might include fostering the 
relevant cognitive and emotional skills necessary for a sense of agency or self-actualization 
in adulthood, such as self-awareness, confidence, and empathy. Indeed, one can imagine, 
for the sake of argument, that in coaching the opposing hockey team, the parent-fiduciary 
both remains involved in and supportive of her child’s welfare and personality interests, 
say, by providing space for her child to gain a sense of independence and perhaps empathy 
as well (i.e., let us suppose, by humanizing—as opposed to “othering”—the opposing 
team).52 Nevertheless, even circumscribed in this way, the fiduciary obligation is quite 
demanding. But it is precisely the exacting nature of the fiduciary obligation that makes it 
possible for individuals to trust or reliably depend on one another in the context of this 
unique mode of human interaction and commensurate with it immense social and economic 
importance.  
Legal scholar, Leonard Rotman, agrees.53 Rotman argues that the purpose of the fiduciary 
obligation is to protect “important social and economic interactions of high trust and 
confidence that create an implicit dependency and peculiar vulnerability of beneficiaries to 
their fiduciaries.”54 Societies characterized by a high degree of specialization of 
knowledge, skill, and expertise require involved systems of cooperation, and thus make 
interdependence foundational to its structure and functioning. According to Rotman, 
[f]iduciary interactions rank among the most valuable in society by enhancing 
productivity and knowledge, facilitating specialization, and creating fiscal and 
informational wealth. To protect them, fiduciary law subordinates individual 
interests to its broader social and economic goals. Relationships, rather than 
individuals, are the primary concern of the fiduciary concept.55 
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According to Rotman, the fiduciary obligation therefore prescribes “other-regarding 
behaviour [and thereby] allows certain individuals to trust that their interests will be cared 
for by others in various forms of fiduciary associations.”56 Rotman therefore echoes the 
view that the fiduciary obligation enables individuals to trust and depend on one another 
when one undertakes to act on behalf of another.  
Taken together, Scott, Frankel, and Rotman suggest that the moral dimension, or purpose, 
of the fiduciary obligation is to enable individuals to reliably trust or depend upon one 
another in those modes of interaction that we have come to call “fiduciary.” In the next 
section, I provide historical support this theoretical claim. By tracing the fiduciary 
obligation throughout history, I suggest that for thousands of years, it has served to bolster 
trust and preserve the integrity of a mode of human interaction that today we recognize as 
the fiduciary relationship. The obligation thus mitigates that problem “etched in human 
nature” by allowing for greater cooperation and social harmony. 
1.2 The Fiduciary Obligation from Ancient Thought to 
English Equity 
A brief history of the fiduciary obligation provides some support for the contention that it 
existed first as a moral principle. Again, the idea of “moral” I have in mind here is the 
extent to which adherence to the normative demands of the fiduciary relationship is critical 
to fostering social harmony. The fiduciary relationship promotes social harmony by 
making trust, cooperation, and mutual dependence possible in that important subset of 
human interactions: namely, those relationships in which one undertakes to act on behalf 
of another’s interests.57 The history that follows therefore attempts to illustrate that in each 
historical instance in which evidence of the fiduciary relationship can be found, it is 
 
protection of fiduciary relationships” (988). As we will see in chapter two, Matthew Harding adopts a 
similar view.  
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 Ibid., 987. 
57
 Moreover, as I argue in Chapter 2, such relationships are essential to individual self-governance or 
autonomy and, thereby, human flourishing. 
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employed to achieve these manifestly moral ends: to foster trust and dependence in this 
unique and essential mode of human interaction and, thereby, foster greater social 
cooperation, harmony and, ultimately, individual human flourishing.  
Since Scott’s preliminary analysis, other scholars across a range of disciplines have 
identified evidence of the fiduciary obligation dating back millennia. What follows is a 
cursory glance at a few of the many historical examples of the fiduciary obligation (and its 
corollaries) throughout history, from its presence in Ancient thought to its eventual 
adoption into English law.58  Through this whirlwind tour through history, I hope merely 
to illustrate that long before the fiduciary relationship became the legal institution that we 
recognize today, it enjoyed a prior life over thousands of years as a moral principle 
underlying and informing moral, religious, and legal thought. In doing so, I hope to provide 
historical support to my thesis that the fiduciary obligation is a moral principle that predates 
its genesis in English law.  
1.2.1 The Fiduciary Obligation from Hammurabi’s Code to Roman 
Law 
Some of the earliest known examples of the fiduciary obligation are evident in the 
Babylonian Code of Hammurabi (c. 1700 BCE). Hammurabi, the sixth king of Babylon 
and the first king of the Babylonian empire, was responsible for the Code, which is among 
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 It perhaps goes without saying that it is (unfortunately) beyond the scope of this Chapter (and, indeed, 
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my purposes here to provide a cursory illustration of how what we would today recognize as the fiduciary 
obligation has informed moral, religious, and legal thought at various times and in various cultures 
throughout history. Moreover, I am simply unable to delve into how something like the fiduciary obligation 
might be evident in all cultures or world views including those of Indigenous peoples (making it a truly 
universal moral principle). While Indigenous world views are no doubt markedly heterogenous (there 
simply is no pan-indigenous law), it is perhaps fair to say many of them are grounded in principles of 
relationality, such as respect, dignity, loyalty, and mutuality between the human, natural, and spirit 
domains. Hence, I suspect that a corollary to the fiduciary obligation might also found there as well. It 
would be exciting and interesting to discover, for example, a fiduciary relationship between certain 
Indigenous people and the land, the former having various fiduciary responsibilities, such as a duty of care, 
to the latter—not unlike broad Judeo-Christian mission to serve as fiduciary to God (discussed below).  
27 
 
the earliest known examples of formal (written) law.59 At the end of Hammurabi’s reign 
(c. 1750 BCE) the 282 laws were collected and inscribed on a diorite stela (a stone slab) in 
the temple of Marduk, the national god of Babylon.60 The Code of Hammurabi was used 
to settle matters of crime (assault, theft), family (marriage and divorce), and economic 
matters (property, tariffs, trade and commerce) in the Babylonian courts.61 The laws 
themselves have a clear moral-religious basis. Derived from the commandments of the 
Babylonian deities, they prescribe appropriate conduct within various social and economic 
interactions, with an aim to fostering social harmony. As Frankel explains: 
Hammurabi’s Code’s introduction or preamble refers to the Gods in the Babylonian 
pantheon and recognizes the notions of good and evil; right and wrong. The Code 
reflects a desire to protect the weak and the oppressed, and the mission “to further 
the welfare of the people.”62 
The Babylonian legal code was derived directly from moral-religious doctrines about how 
individuals ought to behave, understood in terms of good and bad, right and wrong—that 
is, morally. Frankel explains that moral “themes of fairness, prohibition of corruption, 
ethical behavior, and consideration of the common good reverberate in this ancient 
fiduciary law.”63  
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Hammurabi’s laws governing the behaviour of agents entrusted with property provide the 
first clear evidence of the fiduciary obligation.64 The agency laws of the Code of 
Hammurabi evolved in tandem with growing trade and commerce in Ancient 
Mesopotamia.65 With increasingly complex social and economic relationships came 
normative principles governing correct behaviour in the context of those relationships. For 
instance, a tamarkum, or principal merchant, would entrust goods or money for trading 
with a samallum, or agent. The vital economic importance of trade made the integrity of 
such relationships worth protecting. The tamarkum’s vulnerability to exploitation was 
therefore mitigated by the Code’s imposition of heavy responsibilities on the agent, akin 
to those of fiduciaries.  
Also embodying the fiduciary obligation was the Code’s inclusion of laws regulating 
bailment, or “when an owner of personal property (the bailor) temporarily transfers the 
property to another person (bailee).”66 Hammurabi’s laws placed strict liabilities, similar 
to today’s fiduciary liabilities, on bailees in cases of fault or negligence. For example, a 
bailee who negligently caused the death of the bailor’s animal was required to replace it; 
or in the event that the animal was injured the bailee would be required to pay (often harsh) 
damages.67 Moreover, Hammurabi’s Code contains negligence rules similar to modern 
negligence laws. If a sailor, for example, entrusted with sailing a boat full of goods to a 
destination was to negligently damage the boat or the goods, he would be required to 
compensate for the lost or damaged goods.68  
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The fiduciary’s duty of loyalty has ancient origins as well, evident in early Trust law. 
Indeed, Hammurabi’s laws imposed draconian punishments for the violation of a Trustee’s 
duty of loyalty: 
[Hammurabi’s laws] provided that a man’s hand will be cut off if the man was hired 
to manage another person’s farm and stole seed grain or fodder. […] If a herdsman, 
hired to take care of cattle or sheep, falsely accounted for the natural growth of the 
herd or fraudulently sold the newborn cattle or sheep, the herdsman had to pay the 
owner ten times the owner’s loss of the newborns.69 
Again, these seemingly harsh liabilities and their remedies resemble (at least in force or 
intent) those of contemporary fiduciaries, such as disgorgement and constructive trust 
remedies. The onerous nature of fiduciary liabilities appears to be commensurate with the 
societal importance placed on these types of interactions—namely, where one undertakes 
to act on behalf of another’s significant practical interests. It would therefore seem that 
even in ancient Mesopotamia, as today, harsh penalties serve a “prophylactic” function, 
disincentivizing the violation of fiduciary duties and thus protecting the integrity of the 
fiduciary interaction.70  
This narrative is given further support by the contemporaneous and (likely) independent 
evolution of the fiduciary obligation in the Ancient East. Evidence of the fiduciary 
principle can be seen, for example, in the Ancient Chinese law of the Qing Dynasty (1644–
1911 BCE). Chinese rulers were deemed to have a moral fiduciary responsibility to 
maintain harmony between the human and natural worlds. Moreover, in the Ancient 
Chinese teachings of Confucius (500 BCE) one of the three basic questions of self-
examination asks whether one has lived up to the moral demands of the fiduciary 
obligation: “In acting on behalf of others, have I always been loyal to their interests?”71 
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The fiduciary obligation is still recognized in Chinese law today.72 Although the fiduciary 
relationship is today thought to be derived from English law, evidence of the fiduciary 
obligation outside of Western thought, and the Western legal tradition in particular, 
provides further support for the idea that the interpersonal and societal problems it serves 
to mitigate are truly pancultural, perhaps lending it a semblance of the universality 
traditionally associated with other moral rules or principles. As Rotman argues, the raison 
d’etre or purpose of the fiduciary obligation is to enable individuals to engage in 
relationships of “high trust and confidence”—and the need to do so is clearly not one 
required only by Western societies.73  
As we saw above in Scott’s New Testament analysis of the Unjust steward, traces of the 
fiduciary obligation can also be found in the moral-religious commands present in biblical 
writings. Beginning with the Old Testament, “the Lord told Moses that it is a sin not to 
restore that which is delivered unto a man to keep safely, and penalties must be paid for 
the violation (Leviticus 6: 2–5).”74 In other words, it is a moral-religious violation (i.e., a 
sin), with corresponding penalties, to fail to appropriately care for another’s property. This 
divine command has clear similarities with the obligations of Trustees, and thus fiduciaries, 
as well; namely, that when a fiduciary-Trustee undertakes to hold, manage, or dispense 
Trust assets (such as property), she must do so with strict loyalty to the beneficiary’s 
significant practical interests with respect to those assets.  
The New Testament has other illustrations of the fiduciary obligation as well. St. Luke, for 
instance, refers to it most clearly in the following decree: “No servant can serve two 
masters” (Luke 16:13).75 Indeed, the commandment that “no man can serve two masters” 
has often been cited as the moral-religious underpinnings of the fiduciary obligation by the 
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English courts of law since the seventeenth century.76 As Joseph Johnson notes, this 
biblical precept has been invoked by English courts particularly when one of those two 
masters is oneself, stressing the importance of the selfless, other-regarding demands of the 
fiduciary obligation.77 Moreover, Frankel goes as far as to suggest that the moral-religious 
roots of the fiduciary obligation are illustrated in the broad Judeo-Christian mission to serve 
as fiduciary to God, or as steward to God. The moral agent is seen as acting on behalf of 
God and (presumably) in God’s interests. Frankel argues that, “within this creative-
redemptive-consummative framework, business people in the Bible have fiduciary duties 
to God and others.… In Christian theology, Christ is the perfect fiduciary. He is the selfless 
steward who lays down his life for others.”78 Of course, as mentioned, the fiduciary 
mandate is often delimited to specific interests (among other caveats), and thus does not 
require fiduciaries to be completely selfless, as Christ appears to have been. (However, in 
this example, it might be argued that complete selflessness was part of Christ’s unique 
fiduciary mandate).  
Mary Szto unearths similar examples of the fiduciary obligation in Jewish law:  
Fiduciary duties in the biblical tradition begin in the Genesis creation account. The 
human mission on earth is to be a fiduciary, a steward of God’s and other’s 
property. Israel is a fiduciary. So is Jesus Christ … [A]fter creating the world, God 
appoints man and woman as agents. They steward the world, exercise dominion, 
and are fruitful.79 
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In Leviticus 19:14 the bible also states that, “You shall not curse the deaf nor place a 
stumbling block before the blind; you shall fear your God—I am your Lord.”80 In his 
analysis of this passage, Hershey Friedman says that, 
[t]he blind was interpreted to include [the] ignorant and unknowing…. Thus, one 
should not advise another party that it is in his interest to sell his field in order to 
buy a donkey, when his true intention is to buy the field for himself. By concealing 
the ulterior motive of his advice, he has violated the principle.81 
According to Jewish law then, an advisor has a fiduciary obligation of loyalty to her 
advisee’s interests; if the advisor misleads the advisee, she may be liable to pay remedies 
for breach of fiduciary duty.82 
As another example taken from (middle) Eastern thought, the Sharia, or Islamic law, also 
recognizes and regulates fiduciary relationships. Similar to the moral-religious 
underpinnings of the Babylonian Code, the Sharia is derived from “Divine Islamic Law,” 
taken from the Koran.83 The fiduciary obligation can be seen again in the Sharia’s laws 
governing agency. If an agent is “careless about looking after the property” to which she 
has been made Trustee, or “treated in a manner which was different from the one allowed 
by the principle,” then the agent is responsible for it.84 Yet again we see fiduciary liabilities 
that parallel those of contemporary jurisprudence: if an agent uses the property for her own 
benefit, violating her fiduciary duty of loyalty (trespass), she will be liable to pay strict 
remedies that reflect her failed responsibility. Similarly, the Trust (waqf) is also an 
important institution in Islamic law, even serving as an alternative to corporations.85 
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Frankel suggests that Muslims may have chosen the Trust over the corporation because it 
better accords with Islam’s communal vision: “the ancient origin of the institution of 
[T]rust, [stems from] its positive commitment to God and community.”86 Again, this seems 
to echo the Judeo-Christian conception of an individual’s mission as fiduciary, or steward, 
to God.  
Finally, the Islamic Trust, or waqf, was actually adapted from the Roman Law of the 
Twelve Tables (448 BCE), from which evidence of the fiduciary obligation can also be 
found.87 Frankel explains that Roman Law,  
required thieves to make restitution payments to their victims starting at double the 
value of the stolen goods. The value of the payment due would increase depending 
on the circumstance in which such stolen goods were found or confiscated. In 
England, prior to the Middle Ages, elaborate and detailed systems of victim 
compensation were developed by the Anglo-Saxons, placing the victim’s right to 
compensation at the forefront of punishment considerations.88 
Here we see again the strict liabilities to which agents and Trustees are held in the event 
that they breach their fiduciary obligation. Evidence that Roman jurists incorporated the 
specifically moral dimensions of fiduciary obligation into law is illustrated most notably 
in the mandatum. The mandatum was a relationship that involved an undertaking by the 
mandatory (agent) to act for the benefit of the mandator (principal).89 Cicero hints towards 
the link between the moral aspect of a breach of Trust and the legal consequences: 
In private business, if a man showed even the slightest carelessness in his execution 
of trust [mandatum]—I say nothing about culpable mismanagement for his own 
interest or profit—our ancestors considered that he had behaved very dishonorably 
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charge was believed to be every bit as shameful as conviction for an offense such 
as theft.90 
The idea that the violation of the fiduciary obligation is “dishonourable” and “shameful” 
has clear moral connotations. Further still, Cicero says that one who betrays the Trust, “is 
undermining the entire basis of our social system.”91 In other words, adherence to the moral 
demands of the fiduciary obligation, like other moral obligations, is necessary for social 
cooperation and harmony. Accordingly, the violation of the fiduciary obligation—
understood here as a moral obligation—invites social disapprobation and subsequent moral 
denunciations, such as “dishonourable” and “shameful.” While one might also experience 
various forms of social disapproval or ostracism for breaking purely legal rules (e.g., a 
bylaw against smoking in certain public spaces), such violations tend not to attract the same 
kind of moral disgust, and we would therefore not (at least not accurately) attach moral 
epithets such as “dishonourable” and “shameful” to those who are (mere) rule-breakers.  
By way of summary, we have seen in this section that the fiduciary obligation has a long 
history in ancient moral, religious, and legal thought. By briefly surveying various 
illustrations of the fiduciary obligation throughout history, I have attempted to show that 
in each historical instance in which evidence of the fiduciary obligation can be found, it 
appears to be invoked as a response to that problem “etched in human nature”: namely, 
how to trust or depend on another who undertakes to act on one’s behalf. Insofar as the 
fiduciary obligation enjoys near omnipresence across times and cultures, and has as its 
“raison d’etre” the promotion of greater social cooperation and harmony, I argue that it is 
a moral demand, albeit variously enforced and protected by societal norms, religious 
commands, and legal rules.92 
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1.2.2 The Fiduciary Obligation and the Principles of Equity 
With this background laid, we are now in a position to visit the historical circumstances 
that led to the fiduciary obligation’s entrance into Medieval English law (through 
Chancery) from which we (in the West and legal systems derived therefrom) gain our 
contemporary understanding of the fiduciary relationship. Providing this more recent legal 
history is important for my overall thesis because it describes the circumstances in which 
the fiduciary obligation (as a moral obligation) entered English law and thus influenced 
how we (in the West) understand it today. In other words, with the background laid in the 
previous section, we can now appreciate that the adoption of the fiduciary obligation by 
English law (and the legal systems derived from it) is just another historical illustration, or 
instance, of Western’s society’s enforcement and protection of this important moral 
obligation. To reiterate, the moral and societal importance of the fiduciary obligation is 
owed to the way in which it mitigates the problem of trust and dependence inherent to an 
essential mode of human interaction. The fiduciary relationship is a moral relationship 
because it promotes greater social cooperation and harmony by enabling individuals to trust 
and depend on one another in this type of relationship. This is important for responding to 
the problem of legal-moral equivocation as it makes clear that the fiduciary relationship is 
in fact a moral relationship; accordingly, there is no such equivocation involved in using 
the fiduciary relationship as a framework for conceptualizing the ethical issues that arise 
in medical and research ethics.  
The fiduciary relationship, as we know it today, is an institution of English Equity and 
comes from the modern Trust. A Trust is a legal relationship whereby a settlor (the 
individual who establishes the Trust) entrusts a Trustee to hold or manage Trust assets 
(e.g., property, financial assets, etc.) for the sole purpose of furthering the best interests 
(vis-à-vis the specific Trust assets in question) of a named beneficiary of that Trust.93 As 
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we briefly saw in the introduction to this chapter, more recent (legal) histories of the 
fiduciary relationship describe how the fiduciary obligation began in the Trust and was 
later expanded to other relationships, such as the physician-patient relationship.94 
However, the history of the English Trust is intricately bound up with the development of 
English Equity itself. Hence, to understand how the fiduciary obligation arose and became 
an institution of Equity (through the Trust), one must also understand the historical 
evolution of Equity. This section therefore describes the circumstances by which the 
fiduciary obligation became a principle of Equity and thus became the legal institution that 
we recognize today.   
The English Trust had an early medieval predecessor in a device of known as the “Use.” 
As a framework or mode of interaction in which one undertakes to act on behalf of another, 
evidence of the fiduciary obligation can also be found in the Use. The Use was devised 
under English feudalism, whereby vassals (tenants) were granted Use of a lord or noble’s 
property, known as the “feif.” Under the Use, “a feoffor gave legal title to property to a 
‘feofee of uses,’ for the benefit of the feoffor or a third party (the ‘cestui que use’).”95 In 
fact, before a lord could grant Use of his property to another, the prospective tenant had to 
officially become a “vassal” through a formal ceremony, during which the would-be vassal 
paid “homage” (i.e., reverence and submission) to his lord through an act of fealty. 
Interestingly, the etymology of “fealty” comes from the Latin fidelitas, from which we 
derive fidelity, or loyalty, such as that owed by a vassal to his feudal lord.96 As mentioned, 
fidelitas is also the root of the word fiduciary, with its defining obligation in loyalty, or 
fidelity, to the beneficiary’s interests. As the progenitor of the Trust, then, it is perhaps 
unsurprising to see evidence of the fiduciary obligation in this early feudal arrangement. 
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94
 As already mentioned above, the Australian courts are a notable exception. 
95
 Ibid., 281 (emphasis added). 
96
 Carl Stephenson, Mediaeval Feudalism, (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1942). 
37 
 
Indeed, the Use was itself influenced by the canon law doctrine utilitas ecclesiae, dating 
back to the ninth century. As Frankel explains: 
The term “ad opus” in 9th century England “referred to a fiduciary relationship in 
favor of a beneficiary with no legal enforcement.” The term “[U]se” was drawn 
from Gallic “al os” and “ues” in the Laws of William the Conqueror and the 
Domesday Book and became “use.” In addition, the French term “cestui a qui oes 
le feffement fut fait” became “cestui que use,” a term for a beneficiary. Thus, the 
[U]se was drawn from secular sources (Roman and Salic law) and religious sources 
(including the Franciscans, who popularized it).97 
Hence, both the secular and religious sources of the Use appear to also include reference 
to the fiduciary obligation. The sixth century Salic law concerning the “reliable” or “trusted 
person,” for instance, stipulated that, “a trusted person (Salman or Treuhand) could become 
a [T]rustee by receiving ‘property from a grantor on behalf of beneficiaries.’”98 The 
fiduciary obligation that underlies the English Use and, as we will see shortly, the modern 
Trust, therefore may have originated as early as the sixth century in Salic law.99 
Regardless, by the ninth century onward the fiduciary principle became integral to feudal 
vassal-lord relations, based as they were on mutual trust and loyalty.100 Like the ancient 
norms and rules that operationalized the fiduciary obligation before it, such as those in 
Hammurabi’s Code or the Roman Law of Twelve Tables, the Use evolved in England 
during the Middle Ages in response to specific problems: 
For example, vows of poverty prohibited Franciscan Friars from owning land. 
Therefore, charitable persons transferred houses to trusted persons for the use of 
the Friars. The trusted persons were bound by good conscience to devote the houses 
they legally owned, to the exclusive use of the beneficiaries ... Church doctrine of 
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utilitas ecclesiae allowed clerics to possess stewardship or beneficial ownership of 
church property for personal use...101 
The Use was also important during the Crusades between the eleventh and thirteenth 
centuries. Crusaders would often entrust “use” of their property to a feofee of uses while 
away at war, with the expectation that it would be given back to them upon their return (or 
given to an appointed “beneficiary” in the event of their death). The Use’s underlying 
fiduciary obligation was therefore adopted to solve the same perennial problem that arises 
when one person entrusts another to act on behalf of her interests: namely, the problem of 
trust and dependence.102  
But the Use eventually came to be employed as a means to evade certain legal obligations, 
such as feudal taxes, services, and private debt. For example, lords and tenants alike could 
avoid paying feudal dues or services by transferring the legal title for another’s “use.”103 
Upon a tenant’s death the law stated that a landlord was entitled to certain property taxes 
before the land passed to an heir. Moreover, in the event that no heir existed the immediate 
landlord was entitled to the property under the doctrine of escheat. Escheat is an Equitable 
doctrine that requires lands to revert back to the lord following the death of a tenant without 
an heir or if the tenant is otherwise required to forfeit their lands.104 The doctrine of escheat 
was therefore a mechanism by which the Crown, being the supreme feudal lord, 
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consolidated lands. However, tenants could avoid the doctrine of escheat by entrusting their 
lands for another’s use. The result was that the Crown was no longer able to consolidate 
lands, as assigning a feoffee of uses prevented the land from reverting back up the chain of 
lords and tenants to the Crown (i.e., following the death or forfeiture of tenant lands). By 
transferring title to another individual, or group of individuals for common use, tenants 
could therefore effectively evade both feudal taxes and the doctrine of escheat (e.g., by 
ensuring there was always an heir). Debtors could do the same and thereby avoid repaying 
their debts.105 Recognizing the Use was responsible for a significant loss of Crown revenue 
and property, King Henry VIII abolished the Use in 1535 under the Statute of Uses, 
effectively converting all Uses into legal estates. As a result, the original owners lost the 
legal title to their property.106 This prompted the former feoffors, or the “true” owners of 
the entrusted property, to seek rectification for this perceived unfairness, or inequity, by 
petitioning the King or Queen (when the Sovereign was a Queen) to override this Common 
Law ruling.107 But understanding why feoffors were able to seek rectification by making 
an appeal to the King—that is, outside of the Common Law—for these perceived injustices, 
requires some understanding the origins of Equity itself.  
After the creation of the Common Law courts (i.e., the courts of Common Pleas, King’s 
Bench, and Exchequer of Pleas) between the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the King 
nevertheless retained “residuary power” to do “equal and right justice and discretion in 
mercy and truth” to his subjects wherever the Common Law proved “deficient,” or contrary 
to equity.108 Initially, the exercise of the King’s residuary power was expected only in rare 
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or extenuating circumstances, but by the end of the thirteenth century many petitions, or 
“bills,” were being presented to the king, “asking for his grace to be shown in respect of 
some complaint,” such as those eventually put forward by feoffors who had lost title to 
their lands under the Common Law’s Status of Uses.109 As we will see shortly, these 
petitions foreshadowed the rise of the courts of Equity as a jurisdiction separate from, and 
ultimately superior to, the Common Law.110  
Petitions seeking redress outside the Common Law were precipitated in part by various 
“technical failures” or “mischiefs in the law,” to which the early Common Law was 
especially susceptible.111 The Common Law court procedures were circumscribed by the 
writ system, as well as “the forms of pleading, the rules of evidence, the varying reliability 
of sheriffs, and the uncertainties of jury trial.”112 The restrictive nature of the early writ 
system of the Common Law, in particular, made pursuing certain forms of complaint, or 
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obtaining specific remedies under that system, quite limited.113 This gave rise to an 
increasing number of petitions to the King directly, in hopes that he would exercise his 
residuary power by hearing their cases and deliver justice according to the dictates of 
“good conscience”—that is, according to principles of fairness, or equity. It was in this 
capacity that feoffors petitioned the King to rectify the alleged misappropriation of their 
lands. 
But it was actually one of the King’s representatives, the Lord Chancellor, who eventually 
came to oversee the majority of these petitions.114 The court of the Lord Chancellor (or 
simply Chancery, as it came to be known) was tasked with exercising on the King’s behalf 
his residuary power to do “equal and right justice” to his subjects wherever the Common 
Law yielded, or was expected to yield, an alleged “inequity.”115 At the outset, Chancery 
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was not a separate court of law but rather a department of the King’s Council.116 The 
Chancellor’s function was not to adjudicate or deliver justice himself, “but rather to 
facilitate its achievement in other [Common Law] courts, to serve as a convenient clearing-
house for all kinds of business transacted elsewhere.”117 The jurisdiction thus remained 
that of the King’s Council. It was only through a “kind of fiction” that the Chancellor was 
deemed to represent, “the king and his council in Chancery.”118 As John Baker explains: 
The chancellor received no patent or commission defining his authority, he held 
office at the king’s pleasure, and he took no part in the ordinary administration of 
justice as an assize judge. His powers derived from his custody of the great seal and 
from his pre-eminent position in the King’s Council.119 
Initially, then, the Chancellor was “an officer of the state and a minister of the Crown.”120 
Irrespective of this initial “fiction,” however, as petitioning the King through the 
Chancellor became common practice, complainants increasingly requested a specific 
remedy from the Chancellor directly, whether or not the case was pending in the Common 
Law courts. Eventually, instead of acting as a “clearing-house,” redirecting cases to the 
relevant Common Law courts, the Chancellor began to grant “decrees,” which were 
binding only to the relevant parties; that is, unlike judgments at Common Law, decrees 
were not “judgments of record” and thus did not (at least initially) serve as precedent for 
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future cases.121 At first, these decrees were issued in the name of the King’s Council, but 
by the 15th century the Chancellor was issuing decrees of his own authority.122 
In delivering its decrees, Chancery was not beholden to the language of the Common Law 
and instead rendered judgments in the name of “good conscience,” as informed by broad 
principles of equality or fairness—that is, of “equity.” For a creditor, promisee, or Trustee 
to take unfair advantage of strict Common Law rules was a matter of equity. In such cases, 
complainants would appeal to what would become Chancery’s professed equitable 
jurisdiction. As Baker again explains: 
The Chancery approached matters differently [than the Common Law]. In 
exercising his informal jurisdiction the chancellor was free from the rigid 
procedures under which inconveniences and injustices sheltered, because he was 
free to delve into the facts at large. His court was a court of conscience, in which 
defendants could be coerced into doing whatever good conscience required, given 
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all the circumstances of the case. Such a court obviously proceeded in a very 
different fashion from the Common Pleas.123 
It was for this reason that Chancery would often receive petitions when a Common Law 
ruling yielded or was expected to yield an inequity, or when no cause for action or remedy 
existed at all.124 The paradigm example of such “mischiefs in the law” is the debtor who 
was made to repay his debt twice because he lost or simply failed to obtain a written receipt 
where the Common Law required written proof of payment.125 In such cases, complainants 
had no recourse to justice in Common Law, but could appeal to Chancery where parties 
could be made to do “whatever good conscience required.” Hence, it was as the King’s 
representative, tasked with exercising the King’s residuary power to do equal and right 
justice to his subjects according to principles of equity that Chancery gradually evolved 
into its own court of Equity. 
Following the Statute of Uses in the sixteenth century, the court of Chancery tended to 
issue its decrees in favour of the “feoffors” in their petitions to the King (through 
Chancery). As Frankel puts it, “[t]he trusted persons’ duties constituted a social practice, 
which the equity courts enforced on the grounds of trust and confidence related to good 
conscience.”126 Over time, recognition of such claims created one of the first principles of 
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Equity, along with its corresponding institution: namely, the Trust. Chancery considered it 
a principle of equity, as determined by good conscience, that when one party undertakes to 
hold or manage property for the benefit of another, she must do so with utmost good faith, 
confidence, and fidelity to that other’s interests. Along with the Trust came the fiduciary 
obligation, which governs all those interactions where one party undertakes to act on behalf 
of another’s interests. It would appear then that together with the Trust, the fiduciary 
obligation was among the first principles, if not the first principle, of Equity. Indeed, it is 
for this reason that Rotman calls the fiduciary obligation the “most doctrinally pure 
expression of [E]quity.”127 Echoing this sentiment, Johnson says in the following passage: 
As the medieval use developed into the modern law of trusts, the ancient rule 
encompassed in the fiduciary principle that no man can serve two masters was 
enforced by courts of equity in England and later in the United States.128  
Hence, it was through the modern Trust, as an institution of English Equity, that the 
fiduciary obligation became enshrined into modern English law, and out of which the 
fiduciary relationship evolved into the legal institution we (in the West and legal systems 
derived therefrom) recognize today.  
In summary, the fiduciary obligation long pre-dated its adoption by Chancery and its 
institutionalization in English Equity. The fiduciary obligation existed for thousands of 
years as a moral obligation that appears to arise in response to a perennial problem inherent 
to an important type of human interaction: namely, how to trust or reliably depend on 
another who undertakes to act on behalf of our interests. Along the way, we have seen that 
the fiduciary obligation has informed ancient religious edicts and legal rules which 
endeavour to mitigate that same problem. The fiduciary obligation eventually gained a 
foothold in modern English law through the courts of Chancery. Following the creation of 
the Common Law courts the King retained an obligation to do “equal and right justice” to 
his subjects. Claimants took advantage of this “residuary power” by petitioning the King 
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to oversee their cases when Common Law remedies were deemed unfair or simply non-
existent. The restrictive nature of the writs available in the early Common Law made such 
petitions more and more frequent. Eventually overwhelmed with petitions, the King 
delegated this task to his councilors. The Lord Chancellor and his clerks in Chancery came 
to oversee the majority of these claims. Notably, before the mid-sixteenth century, the 
Chancellor was often a Bishop or other high-ranking religious figure and, in his advisory 
role to the King, was known as the “Keeper of the King’s Conscience.” Chancery thus 
sought to deliver justice according to “good conscience,” as informed by equitable 
principles. With its long history in ancient moral, religious and legal thought, the fiduciary 
obligation comprised part of the Chancellor’s “good conscience.” It was through its 
decrees, specifically to those that eventually gave rise to the Trust, that Chancery adopted 
the fiduciary obligation as a principle of equity.  
The upshot of the historical narrative I have sketched here is that the fiduciary relationship, 
as informed by its defining obligation, existed prior its entry into English law as a moral 
relationship. The fiduciary obligation has seemingly existed wherever complex human 
societies have developed, serving to mitigate a problem inherent to a specific type human 
interaction: namely, the problem created by both the need to reliably trust or depend on 
others to act in our interests and the vulnerability that arises from such dependence. The 
fiduciary obligation mitigates this problem by prescribing certain other-regarding 
behaviour (e.g., utmost loyalty) in the context of such relationships. The fiduciary 
principle, like other moral principles, is therefore a requirement of morality, and has been 
understood as such. 
1.3 Two Objections and Replies 
In this section, I raise and respond to two possible objections. The first objection concerns 
the historical account I have provided, specifically about the role and nature of Equity. It 
is a matter of heated debate among jurists and legal philosophers as to whether Equity in 
fact occupies a unique role or jurisdiction vis-à-vis the Common Law. To the extent that 
the historical account I have provided commits me to one side of this debate, I am 
susceptible to its criticisms. The implication of this criticism for my purposes is that it is 
not really clear that the fiduciary obligation, as an apparent innovation of Equity, entered 
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the law as a moral supplement to the Common Law. In other words, critics argue that 
Equity was never tasked with providing a moralizing role on the Common Law; or as 
Rotman puts it, critics reject that the application of situation-specific equitable principles 
“humanizes and contextualizes the law’s otherwise antiseptic nature, which makes the law 
more just.”129 This claim therefore undermines the historical claim I made about how the 
fiduciary obligation entered English law, namely, via Equity’s supplementary moralizing 
function vis-à-vis the Common Law. In other words, the objection casts doubt on the 
suggestion that Equity, tasked with exercising broad equitable principles, adopted the 
fiduciary obligation as a pre-existing moral principle. Notwithstanding the moral 
corollaries of the fiduciary obligation in Ancient and Medieval thought, it remains plausible 
that the fiduciary obligation (at least as articulated by Western legal traditions) is in fact a 
creature of the law. If the fiduciary relationship as we understand it today (in the West) is 
a legal construct, then worries about equivocation concerning its application to the ethical 
domain remain unresolved.  
I begin by briefly outlining this debate. I then discuss the implications of this objection for 
my argument. I argue that the success of my historical argument that the fiduciary 
obligation is a moral obligation that existed antecedent to its birth in English law, does not 
critically depend on which English legal jurisdiction (Equity or Common Law) adopted 
that moral principle and subsequently enshrined it in legal doctrine. Put simply, I argue that 
the success of my historical argument does not hinge on the outcome of the fusion debate 
about the nature of Equity and the Common Law. Although this discussion may be of 
interest primarily to jurists and legal philosophers interested in Equity and fiduciary 
relationships, to the extent that the purpose my historical argument is to locate the 
foundations of the fiduciary relationship in morality, it ought to be of interest to moral 
philosophers and bioethicists as well.  
The second objection falls squarely within the domain of moral philosophy and bioethics. 
It runs as follows: if the fiduciary relationship is such an important moral relationship, then 
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why has it received so little attention by moral philosophers, until recently? The implication 
here is that the fiduciary relationship is not in fact a moral relationship; if it were, it would 
long since have been analyzed by moral philosophers. I respond to this objection, twice: 
first, by showing that its central claim is somewhat mistaken; and, second, by conceding 
the point somewhat, and offering an explanation as to why the fiduciary relationship may 
appear, at first glance, to have received short shrift by moral philosophers. 
1.3.1 First Objection 
As briefly mentioned, the first objection takes issue with the role or purpose I have assigned 
to Equity. I have suggested that the early courts of Chancery, through the exercise of 
equitable principles, have (at least historically) functioned as a kind of moral supplement 
to, or constraint on, the Common Law. I have suggested that Equity contextualizes the 
Common Law in those cases where it would yield an injustice, or unfairness, in a particular 
case. For example, while the Common Law would require the debtor who failed to obtain 
a written receipt after the original payment (where the Common Law requires written proof 
of payment) to pay the debt twice, Equity would look to the facts of the case and do 
whatever “good conscience” (equity or fairness) requires. But the idea that Equity came to 
play this constraining, supplementary, or contextualizing role on the strict application of 
laws is the subject of an ongoing debate. Modern jurists and legal philosophers debate 
about whether there is any substantive distinction between Equity and the Common 
Law.130 Insofar as I subscribe to the view that Equity occupies a unique equitable 
jurisdiction, whose express purpose is to be a moral constraint on the law, then I have made 
myself vulnerable to the criticisms of those who claim, as Justice Maitland famously did, 
that Equity is simply,  
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that body of rules administered by our English courts of justice which, were it not 
for the operation of the Judicature Acts, would be administered only by those courts 
which would be known as Courts of Equity.131  
In other words, the jurisdictional separation between Equity and the Common Law is 
merely a historical accident and thus there is nothing inherent to Equity, procedurally or 
substantively, that could not be (or is not already) done by the Common Law courts; and 
this includes the exercise of so-called equitable principles. 
For my purposes, the objection discredits an important link in the chain of historical events 
I have presented here. I have argued that the fiduciary obligation’s entry into English law 
is merely its most recent actualization in a system or body of norms and rules in a long 
history of similar such attempts to operationalize this important moral obligation. 
Specifically, I argued that it was through the exercise equitable principles that Equity acted 
as a moral constraint on the Common Law, making it the appropriate vehicle by which the 
fiduciary obligation, qua moral obligation, entered the law. The claim that Equity does not, 
in fact, serve this function therefore undermines the coherence of this narrative, if only 
minimally, by casting doubt on the mechanism (i.e., Equity) by which the fiduciary 
obligation entered the law.  
Fortunately, the debate about Equity and that Common Law does not, as far as I can tell, 
present a serious difficulty for my claim that the fiduciary relationship is a moral 
relationship that gained a foothold in the law through the exercise of equitable principles. 
At bottom, the success or failure of this argument does not rest on which jurisdiction 
exercised those principles or performed equity’s substantive role (if any). Indeed, I argued 
that it is a matter of historical contingency that the fiduciary relationship is a legal (and not 
simply moral) relationship at all, regardless of the jurisdictional avenue by which its 
underlying moral obligation was introduced into English law. If the fiduciary relationship 
had never become an institution of English law and had simply remained a moral obligation 
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(governed variously by certain nonlegal norms and rules), then it would not be necessary 
to show that the fiduciary relationship is not a purely legal relationship. The problem of 
legal-moral equivocation would not even arise. I do think, however, that Equity was the 
predictable avenue for the fiduciary obligation to enter the law, given its historical role 
(however contingent) as an equitable, and sometimes moral, supplement or constraint on 
the law. But for my purposes it is immaterial which legal jurisdiction—Equity versus the 
Common Law—performed this important equitable function. Apart from creating the 
positive law, had the Common Law also made use of equitable principles to constrain, 
supplement, or reform the law, the details of the historical narrative I have told might be 
slightly different, but the upshot of my argument would remain the same: the fiduciary 
relationship is a moral relationship that long predates its origins in English law. 
Indeed, regardless of whether there is any substantive role uniquely performed by Equity 
(e.g., as a moral constraint on the positive law) there appears to be a need for some vehicle 
or mechanism by which the law is judged to be just or unjust, right or wrong, and where 
necessary amended to bring it into alignment with objective morality. As Jurist Sheldon 
Amos puts it: 
The method of supplementing the prevalent legal system by a subsidiary system of 
less rigidity, and of greater capacity for fine moral discrimination, is almost 
universal and indeed necessary in all advanced countries if law is in any measure 
to carry out the dictates of justice.132 
Dennis Klimchuk appears to agree: 
On my reconstruction, it is a claim of Aristotle’s account of equity that a legal 
system cannot get by only with a set of rules that specify the rights and duties 
persons hold and bear. It will also need a set of rules that constrain the manner in 
which and the ends for the sake of which persons exercise their rights.133 
Finally, commenting on the fiduciary relationship, Rotman says that, 
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[a]s an instrument designed to facilitate the inclusion of social mores into law, the 
fiduciary concept occupies a role that has been fulfilled by different vehicles 
throughout history. It is […] one means by which law transmits its ethical resolve 
to the spectrum of human interaction.134 
Nevertheless, discussing the history of the fiduciary obligation’s entry into English law 
through Equity is still important for alleviating the problem of legal-moral equivocation. 
Most histories of the fiduciary relationship begin in Medieval English Equity, attributing 
its creation (as a legal institution) to that legal jurisdiction. What I have attempted to do 
here is provide a more comprehensive historical analysis of the fiduciary obligation, one 
that predates its origins in English law. By drawing attention to its various manifestations 
leading up to its entry into English law I have attempted to illustrate that the fiduciary 
relationship is not merely a creature of Equity. Moreover, understanding the role that 
Equity came to play (however historically contingent) as a moral supplement to the law is 
an important part of the fiduciary obligation’s moral history. Just as previous societies have 
attempted to operationalize and enforce the moral demands of the fiduciary obligation—
through moral, religious, and legal norms and rules—so too has ours, through the specific 
role that Equity has come to play in introducing moral norms and other societal values into 
law.  
1.3.2 Second Objection 
The second objection also questions the underlying moral nature of the fiduciary 
relationship, but it does so in a different way. It asks, if the fiduciary relationship is such 
an important moral relationship, why then has it not received more attention in moral 
philosophy? Surely if the fiduciary relationship was in fact a moral relationship, it would 
have been identified and received substantial ethical analysis long before now. Moral 
philosophy has long recognized other moral relationships, such as parenthood, friendship, 
business, professional and political relationships. Moral philosophy has also given much 
attention to relationships that tend to overlap with the fiduciary one, such as relationships 
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that involve trust, loyalty, or promises.135 But there is very little sustained ethical reflection 
on the fiduciary relationship itself. So, doesn’t this show that there is something wrong 
with the claim that, at bottom, the fiduciary relationship is moral in nature?  
In response, one might try to suggest that moral philosophers have analyzed the fiduciary 
relationship by analyzing relationships that overlap with it substantially, such as those of 
trust and loyalty. Yet, as mentioned, the fiduciary relationship is not reducible to these 
other relationships. For instance, fiduciary relationships often involve trust. But while trust 
may be an important and desirable feature in most fiduciary relationships, it is not therefore 
identical with it. As discussed in the Introduction, trust relationships do not necessarily 
contain certain defining features of the fiduciary relationship, such as a structural 
imbalance of power and dependence, the pursuit of significant practical interests, or 
(arguably) the exercise of meaningful discretionary power. Indeed, the fiduciary 
relationship can arguably persist in the complete absence of trust. For example, a patient 
might fail to trust her physician, but nonetheless remain the physician’s beneficiary, which 
means that the physician’s fiduciary obligation to her patient’s best medical interests does 
not simply dissolve when the patient fails to trust her physician.136 Conversely, one might 
fundamentally distrust the fiduciary relationship, as an institution, and merely be forced to 
rely or depend on it (say, for lack of options). Loyalty, too, is perhaps a constant feature of 
fiduciary relationships, but is clearly not reducible to it. Many loyalty relationships plainly 
lack other essential features inherent to the fiduciary relationship. For example, I might be 
loyal to my favourite sports team, but this does not imply that I am therefore a fiduciary to 
that team; that is, I am not, by virtue of my loyalty, in a relationship that requires me to 
exercise my discretion on behalf of the team’s significant practical interests. Nor do 
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relationships of loyalty necessarily share the same structural features of the fiduciary 
relationship, such as the inherent inequality of power and dependence.  
If the fiduciary relationship is not reducible to any of these similar or overlapping moral 
concepts, and it is (as I claim) a moral relationship, why then has it not received its own 
substantial ethical analysis before now? In response to this criticism, I want to point out 
first that the fiduciary relationship has been the subject of some ethical analysis, and not 
only recently. In fact, the fiduciary relationship has received considerable attention by 
moral philosophers and others, albeit perhaps not always by that name. 
As we saw above, historically, many moral or religious thinkers pondered relationships 
that were essentially fiduciary. Many societies recognized the vital social and economic 
importance of the fiduciary relationship and sought to formalize certain duties intended to 
ensure the continued integrity, or ongoing viability, of this relationship. From the laws 
concerning agency and bailment in Hammurabi’s Code, to the Old Testament’s religious 
command that “no man shall serve two masters,” to the moral teachings of Confucius, and 
finally to today’s fiduciary laws and the burgeoning ethical discourse in bioethics,  we see 
that the fiduciary relationship has received considerable attention.137 Indeed, the fiduciary 
relationship’s status as arguably one of the most important social and economic 
relationships in complex interconnected societies is precisely what explains the persistent 
attention it has received over the course of modern human history.  
Secondly, the fiduciary relationship has in fact received sustained ethical analysis within 
moral philosophy and applied ethics, sometimes under the guise of other ethical concepts 
or relationships and often with a focus on a particular kind of fiduciary relationship (e.g., 
between parent and child). Perhaps the most prominent examples exist in parenthood 
ethics, professional and business ethics, and healthcare ethics.   
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In parenthood ethics, ethicists often discuss the fiduciary obligation in terms of parental 
responsibility, such as the responsibility of parents to promote the “best interests” of their 
child. Parental ethical responsibilities are often said to involve the same selfless and other-
regarding norms and rules, such as the loyalty and care characteristic of the fiduciary 
obligation. Parents are also clearly tasked with exercising a significant degree of 
“discretionary power” in pursuit of their child’s best interests. Subsequently, the parent-
child relationship is understood to share the same structure as the fiduciary relationship, 
by virtue of the inequality between parental (fiduciary) discretionary power and the 
dependence of the child (beneficiary) on that power. For example, Brighouse and Swift 
provide a fiduciary analysis of the parent-child relationship: 
The parent is charged with responsibility for both the immediate well-being of the 
child and the development of the child’s capabilities. This is the fiduciary 
relationship emphasized by the child-centered argument for parental power. The 
child has immediate interests in being kept safe, enjoying herself, being sheltered 
and well nourished, having loving relationships with others, and so on. She has 
future interests in many of these same things, but also in becoming the kind of 
person who is not entirely dependent on others for having her interests met and the 
kind of person who can judge well and act on her interests. The parent’s fiduciary 
obligations are to guarantee the child’s immediate well-being and to oversee and 
ensure her cognitive, emotional, physical, and moral development.138 
Similarly, in professional ethics, Michael Bayles defines the professional as fundamentally 
a “fiduciary.” Bayles argues that professionals are often “knowledge workers” with 
extensive training in a specific skillset or expertise and thereby entrusted with exercising 
their professional judgment or discretion (based on that knowledge) on behalf of their 
client’s interest.139 Michael Bayles also discusses fiduciary obligations of professionals to 
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their clients, such as confidentiality, loyalty, and care.140 Lastly, William May has claimed 
that the professionals owe fiduciary-like obligations to the public.141  
Relatedly, in business ethics the duties of chief executive officers (CEOs) to remain loyal 
to the interests of their shareholders (and perhaps to “stakeholders” as the debate goes) are 
a central theme. In fact, in a seminal paper, famed economist Milton Friedman argued 
against corporate social responsibility based on the claim that CEOs have an overriding 
“fiduciary” and ethical obligation to increase profits for their shareholders.142 Employees 
are also sometimes said to have fiduciary ethical (as well as legal) obligations of loyalty, 
qua agents of their employers—especially when it comes to protection of intellectual 
property rights or other trade secrets.143  
In healthcare ethics, Carolyn McLeod has argued that physicians are fiduciaries to both the 
public and their patients. In the former case, physicians act as gatekeepers to the access of 
health-related public goods, such as abortion and medical assisted death. In the latter case, 
the physician-patient relationship bears all the hallmarks of a fiduciary relationship and is, 
therefore, fiduciary.144 Similarly, Chalmers C. Clark has grounded the physician’s “duty 
to treat” in emergency situations (such as bioterrorist attacks, HIV infections, and 
pandemics) in a duty of loyalty to public health interests.145 For instance, Clark argues that 
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a “broad conception of a fiduciary duty to treat survives within an implicit social contract 
that exchanges professional trust for the social bequest of professional autonomy.”146 
It is clear, then, that the fiduciary obligation has received considerable attention and ethical 
analysis before now. As we have now seen, not only can evidence of the fiduciary 
obligation be found in moral, religious, and legal discourse of the past few millennia, it has 
also become the subject of more recent ethical discourse, especially in the so-called 
“applied” areas of professional, business, and healthcare ethics.147 One might ask why 
scholarly interest in the fiduciary relationship, as a moral relationship, has been confined 
largely to applied ethics? One reason might be that philosophers who do normative ethics 
(and are primarily concerned with universal moral principles) have little reason to home in 
on fiduciary relationships, because they are narrower in scope than other moral 
relationships, such as trust. Others perhaps, like some applied ethicists, may write about 
fiduciary relationships but elect not to use the term “fiduciary” in their analyses. As 
mentioned in the Introduction, some bioethicists in medical and research ethics do not 
invoke the “fiduciary relationship” by name, possibly because they assume that such a 
relationship is, as Miller argues, “purely legal in nature.” Philosophers and ethicists 
therefore may prefer to couch their ethical analyses in more familiar moral vernacular, such 
as loyalty, trust, promising and the like. But by revealing the fiduciary obligation to be a 
moral obligation that protects those socially and economically important interactions in 
which people undertake to act on behalf of one another, I hope to have removed this barrier 
to discussing fiduciary relationships openly in ethics and to applying the fiduciary 
framework specifically to pressing problems in bioethics. 
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This chapter focused on the problem of legal-moral equivocation: viz., the worry that the 
fiduciary relationship is a purely legal relationship (i.e., an artifact or construction of law), 
and therefore the normativity of this relationship is relevant only in the legal domain. I 
suggested in the Introduction that the problem of legal-moral equivocation is a conceptual 
threat to the widespread adoption and application of the fiduciary relationship in bioethics, 
along with its attendant benefits for ethical analysis. I have therefore sought to mitigate this 
worry by illustrating that the fiduciary relationship is, in fact, a moral relationship. I have 
argued the fiduciary relationship is moral insofar as its defining obligation is essential to 
social harmony. By serving as an obligation that regulates human behaviour in those modes 
of interaction in which people undertake to act on behalf of others’ significant practical 
interests, the fiduciary relationship makes it possible for individuals to trust, or at least 
reliably depend, on one another in those contexts. This ability is crucial to social and 
economic cooperation in complex human societies characterized by the 
compartmentalization of knowledge, skill, and expertise. I traced the fiduciary obligation 
through history in an effort to illustrate that where historical evidence of the fiduciary 
obligation can be found, the obligation has been invoked to solve the problem of trust and 
dependence, and thereby promote greater social cooperation. With this background laid, I 
then described the events that led to the fiduciary obligation becoming a principle of 
English Equity, from which we gain our modern (Western) understanding of this important 
relationship. I argued that these events can be understood as Western society’s most recent 
attempt to operationalize the moral demands of the fiduciary obligation, as has been done 
for millennia before. I also suggested that given the moral nature of the fiduciary 
relationship, it is perhaps appropriate or expected that it should gain entry into English law 
via Equity, given the latter’s historical role as one important mechanism by which moral 




Chapter 2  
2 Paternalism, Autonomy, and the Fiduciary Relationship 
This dissertation aims to address two important impediments to the widespread adoption 
and application of the fiduciary relationship in bioethical analysis: namely, legal-moral 
equivocation and paternalism. The previous chapter sought to address the former problem. 
By tracing the history of the fiduciary obligation, I sought to illustrate not only that 
fiduciary relationship long predates its origins in Medieval English law, but that it has been 
a constant feature of human civilizations. Its presence across time and cultures, I argued, 
is attributable to the way in which it responds to the problem of trust and dependence that 
arises when one individual undertakes to act on behalf of another’s significant practical 
interests. More specifically, by enabling mutual dependence and cooperation across a 
diversity of human interactions within complex societies characterized by the 
compartmentalization of knowledge, skills, and expertise, the fiduciary obligation is an 
important moral obligation that serves to promote social harmony. As a moral obligation 
that governs a socially and economically important type of relationship, I showed how the 
fiduciary obligation has been present in moral, religious, and legal rules throughout history. 
Finally, I suggested that the fiduciary obligation’s status as a legal institution in 
contemporary Western English law is merely the latest attempt in a long line of such efforts 
to operationalize and enforce the demands of the fiduciary obligation, given its social 
importance. 
This chapter takes up the problem of paternalism, or more specifically, the worry that the 
fiduciary relationship is paternalistic and therefore a discredited ethical framework for 
healthcare professionals and their patients. But by building on the historical argument of 
the previous chapter, I argue that the fiduciary relationship is essentially autonomy 
promoting. To the extent that I show the fiduciary relationship to be essentially autonomy 
promoting, worries about paternalism dissolve. I argue that when we understand autonomy 
as fundamentally relational—namely, that our ability to pursue our chosen plans, projects, 
or causes is inextricably bound up with, and dependent upon, our relationships with 
others—how the fiduciary relationship promotes autonomy becomes clear. Given, again, 
the interconnectedness of complex societies through the ever-increasing 
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compartmentalization of knowledge, skill, and expertise, fiduciary relationships are 
important social and economic relationships that make possible the pursuit of interests 
necessary for meaningful self-governance.  
In Chapter 1, I argued that the fiduciary relationship is moral because of the essential role 
it plays in fostering social harmony. Chapter 2 essentially builds upon and further fleshes 
out this argument by suggesting that being able to trust and depend on fiduciaries is 
essential to an individual’s ability to be self-governing. Therefore, by making trust and 
dependence possible, the fiduciary relationship not only fosters social harmony through 
promoting societal cooperation, it also does so by allowing for the pursuit of self-directed 
ends that are critical to autonomy. Together, then, Chapters 1 and 2 provide a full account 
of the moral foundation of the relationship: namely, the fiduciary relationship is an 
important moral relationship insofar as it fosters social harmony by ensuring that the 
necessary “background conditions”—i.e., certain important relationships—are secured for 
the exercise of meaningful autonomy. In this way, Chapter 2 may be viewed as a 
companion piece to Chapter 1, as it builds upon and reinforces arguments presented in that 
chapter. However, the arguments proffered here also stand alone, and can therefore be read 
independently of Chapter 1.     
In arguing that the fiduciary relationship is essentially autonomy promoting, and thus not 
paternalistic, I engage with Matthew Harding as my main interlocutor. Harding argues that 
among the primary roles of Equity is to take an interest in maintaining socially important 
“institutions,” or simply, relationships.148 Specifically, Harding argues that through 
judicial governance, Equity maintains various institutions as distinct “options” from which 
individuals can choose in ordering their interactions with one another. By governing 
institutions, and thus maintaining options of choice, Harding says that Equity thereby 
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promotes autonomy. I begin, first, by applying Harding’s analysis of the way Equity 
promotes autonomy through its governance of socially important institutions, to the 
fiduciary relationship. As we saw in Chapter 1, the fiduciary relationship is one such 
institution that Equity has taken an interest in governing and maintaining. Harding’s 
analysis thus provides some support for the argument in Chapter 1 that the fiduciary 
relationship is an important moral relationship, which English law (through Equity) 
subsequently sought to protect and operationalize through its governance. However, more 
importantly for my purposes in this chapter, applying Harding’s analysis to the fiduciary 
relationship suggests that this relationship is not paternalistic insofar as it serves a distinct 
“option” among various frameworks, or “modes of human action,” from which individuals 
can choose in the process of self-governance.  
However, I argue that the fiduciary relationship promotes autonomy beyond its role as a 
mere “option” that people can choose in governing their interactions or in the pursuit their 
autonomous ends. Instead, I suggest that the fiduciary relationship is essential to promotion 
and realization of autonomy promoting. In making this argument, I go beyond Harding’s 
analysis by invoking a relational theory of autonomy, which is different from the (Razian) 
conception of autonomy adopted by Harding. I argue that when we use such a theory (a 
relational one), the essential role that fiduciary relationships serve in promoting autonomy 
becomes clear. Finally, drawing from Paul Miller’s specific account of the fiduciary 
relationship, I suggest that fiduciary power (the exercise of which the fiduciary relationship 
makes possible) is a relational means by which the beneficiary exercises her autonomy. 
Fiduciary relationships are a critical means by which individuals exercise their capacity to 
govern themselves. Moreover, the nature of our relational web constitutes the conditions 
under which we both develop autonomy skills at the outset (i.e., in childhood) and through 
which we continue to set and pursue our chosen ends as full-fledged autonomous agents.  
In short, by arguing that the fiduciary relationship is essentially autonomy promoting, in a 
relational sense, I aim to both mitigate the problem of paternalism and further flesh out the 
moral nature of the fiduciary relationship. I claim that this relationship is moral not only 
because it fosters broad societal cooperation—and thus social harmony—but also because 
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it makes possible the very conditions in which autonomous agents can pursue their self-
directed ends.  
2.1 Harding on Equity and Institutions 
All societies, from the simplest to the most complex, require varying degrees of 
cooperation and corresponding mutual dependence. As mentioned, with increased 
complexity comes increased compartmentalization of knowledge, skill, and expertise, 
requiring individuals to rely on others in myriad different ways. Particularly in complex 
modern societies, we find ourselves inextricably bound up with, and thus dependent upon, 
others for the unique, specific, and often vital role they perform in society. Recognizing 
the importance of our assorted interactions, Matthew Harding argues that Equity has taken 
on the role of governing and maintaining socially and economically important institutions 
in order to ensure their continued viability as distinct “options” from which individuals can 
choose in directing their lives. Institutions, as Harding defines them, are “arrangements or 
frameworks for human action that have some distinctive normative identity and are oriented 
to some purpose or goal.”149 Harding says that an institution’s “normative identity,” in 
turn, is constituted by an “irreducible core” of norms or principles and is what individuates 
one institution (i.e., a “mode” or “framework” for human interaction) from another.150 
Institutions are thus a subset of relationships that are defined by the purposes or ends they 
serve, together with the norms and principles that govern behaviour in the achievement of 
those ends, giving each relationship its unique “normative identity.”151 Harding says the 
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purpose of an institution also helps to define its normative identity by delimiting the kinds 
of norms likely to protect or maintain the integrity, or continued viability, of the institution. 
In other words, an institution’s underlying principle both defines its purpose and gives rise 
to certain norms and rules that function to protect the continued viability of the institution 
itself.  
For example, we saw in the previous chapter that the fiduciary obligation underlies the 
legal Trust.152 The fiduciary obligation informs both the purpose of the Trust and the norms 
and rules that serve to protect it. The fiduciary obligation states that when one undertakes 
to act on behalf of another, one must do so with utmost fidelity to that other’s best interests. 
The purpose of the Trust involves holding or managing Trust assets (e.g., property, 
finances, etc.) for the sole purpose of furthering the best interests (with respect to the 
specific Trust assets in question) of the beneficiary of that Trust. The purpose of the Trust, 
in turn, gives rise to various norms and rules—or, in this case, legal duties—meant to 
protect the integrity of the Trust relationship as a distinct “mode” or “framework” for 
human action. Trustees, for example, have a strict duty of loyalty to the beneficiary of the 
Trust. To illustrate, consider Keech v Sandford, a seminal case for both Trust and fiduciary 
law, describing the nature of fiduciary loyalty. An infant (Keech) had inherited a lease in 
an estate, which was entrusted to Sandford as Trustee until Keech came of age.153 
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However, the lease expired before Keech reached the age of majority. When Sandford 
attempted to renew the lease, the lessor refused (on grounds that he did not want to lease 
to a minor). Sandford subsequently renewed the lease for himself. The court held that the 
lease acquired by Sandford be given to Keech and, furthermore, that Sandford account for 
any profits (i.e., that any profits acquired as a result of Sandford’s acquiring the lease be 
transferred to Keech). The judge, Lord King LC, explained that unless the Trustees be held 
to a strict duty of loyalty to their beneficiary’s interests, “few trust estates would be renewed 
to cestui que use [i.e., the trust beneficiary].”154 A Trustee’s fiduciary duty of loyalty is 
intended to ensure that she respect the purpose of the Trust relationship—to further the 
specific interests of the Trust beneficiary—which helps to ensure the continued viability of 
the relationship itself as a unique mode or framework for human action.  
It is for this reason that Harding argues that Equity’s “interest” in institutions is to ensure 
that “institutions are formed, well-governed and viable.”155 More generally, Harding says 
that it “is an interest in ensuring that institutions flourish as arrangements or frameworks 
for human action.”156 Equity plays an important role in protecting, maintaining, and (where 
necessary) reforming important social and economic relationships, or institutions, so that 
they remain viable “modes” or “frameworks” through which individuals are able to 
interact. In other words, Equity is concerned to protect the viability of certain relationships 
of social or economic importance, and (as we will see shortly) Equity is “normatively 
justified” in doing so to the extent that the maintenance of such relationships promotes 
autonomy.  
As an example of Equity’s interest in institutions, Harding focuses on the charitable Trust. 
The judges of Equity (or rather, judges employing the doctrines and principles of Equity) 
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maintain an institutional type as a defined and demarcated object of choice for those who 
seek to utilise the law’s facilities in planning and ordering their affairs.”157 The charitable 
Trust is therefore not available as a framework for human action for the attainment of goals 
or purposes that do not count as “charitable.” As mentioned, the defining purpose of the 
Trust is the duty of the trustee to apply Trust assets for the benefit of the trust 
beneficiaries.158 Harding says that the purpose of the Trust gives rise to norms that give it 
a distinctive normative identity, and thus make it a unique “institutional type.” These 
norms, Harding suggests, include norms of stewardship, trustee accountability, and 
fiduciary responsibilities, “at least in cases where trustees exercise discretionary 
powers.”159  Harding explains that 
[u]nderpinning the [T]rust’s irreducible core, along with norms of stewardship, 
trustee accountability and fiduciary responsibility, is a distinctive sort of purpose, 
which helps to lend unity to the trust as an institutional type: the purpose of holding, 
managing and applying assets for the benefit of others.160 
In short, the “normative identity” of the Trust is made up of the purposes, norms, and 
principles that together constitute its irreducible core.  
How Does Equity Govern Institutions? 
But how exactly does Equity govern institutions? Alternatively, how does Equity maintain 
institutional types?  One way that Equity governs and maintains institutions is indirectly. 
Harding says that Equity governs institutions by imposing duties on those who are 
responsible for managing and directing those institutions. In the context of the Trust, this 
would include the duties and liabilities placed on Trustees as the “managers” of the Trust 
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relationship. Equity’s adjudication of institutional claims is therefore not primarily directed 
at the individual beneficiary but is instead concerned to ensure the continued viability of 
the institution, or relationship, itself. To illustrate, when a Trustee is found to be in breach 
of her fiduciary responsibilities, Harding says that the liabilities imposed by the judges of 
Equity are “not to meet the claim of any particular beneficiary; rather, it is a liability to 
preserve the integrity of the institutional structure within which beneficiary claims fail to 
be considered and dealt with.”161 This is not to say that Equity is indifferent to the claims 
of individual beneficiaries. As Harding himself points out, such a view would be incoherent 
given that the whole point of the institution of the Trust is to provide beneficiaries with 
 
161
 Ibid., 15. (Emphasis added). Leonard Rotman echoes this view; namely, that (specifically) fiduciary 
duties are aimed at protecting the “integrity” of the fiduciary relationship (and not primarily the individual 
beneficiary) when he says that, “while it may appear that the fiduciary concept exists to protect 
beneficiaries’ interests, that effect is merely ancillary to its protection of fiduciary relationships” (Rotman, 
Fiduciary Law, 988). Rotman goes on: 
Fiduciary interactions rank among the most valuable in society by enhancing productivity and 
knowledge, facilitating specialization, and creating fiscal and informational wealth. To protect 
them, fiduciary law subordinates individual interests to its broader social and economic goals. 
Relationships, rather than individuals, are the primary concern of the fiduciary concept (989, 
emphasis added). 
Lionel Smith agrees. Smith says that the fiduciary’s liability to account for profits (i.e., the “no-profit” rule) 
is better understood as institutionally directed, rather than in terms of remedial justice for an individual 
beneficiary (See Smith, “Deterrence, Prophylaxis and Punishment”). Harding says that if Smith is correct, 
a fiduciary’s liability to account for profits is not dependent on any wrongdoing but is instead a 
species of primary liability entailed in the sphere of fiduciary management, then that liability, just 
like the trustee’s liability to the common account, seems to have as its primary concern 
institutional integrity and not remedial justice. 
The rules of accountability of Trustees and fiduciaries are examples of “[E]quity taking an indirect interest 
in institutional governance through imposing rules that are designed to preserve the integrity and viability 
of institutional structures” (Harding, “Equity and Institutions,” 17–8). 
See also Paul D. Finn, “Contract and the Fiduciary Principle,” University of New South Wales Law Journal 
12, no. 1 (January 1, 1989): 76–97 (emphasis added); Finn says that, 
[t]he true nature of the fiduciary principle is revealed in this. It originates, self-evidently, in public 
policy. To maintain the integrity and utility of relationships in which the (or a) role of one party is 
perceived to be the service of the interests of the other, it insists upon a fine loyalty in that service. 
The fiduciary is not to use his position or the power or opportunity it gives him to serve an interest 
other than his beneficiary's—be this his own or a third party's (at 84). 
See also Robert Flannigan, “The Fiduciary Obligation,” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 9, no. 3 (October 
1, 1989): 285–322; Flannigan says, “the vital policy in this area is that the integrity of trusting relationships 
be protected” (at 297). 
66 
 
recourse to such claims. He nevertheless maintains that “[E]quity’s interest in beneficiary 
claims is via rules that have as their primary concern the structure of the [T]rust itself.”162  
Another way that Equity governs institutions is by looking to their purposes, which 
themselves give rise to managerial duties. As we saw above, the purpose of the Trust is to 
apply the Trust assets for the benefit of Trust beneficiaries.163 By governing institutions in 
light of their purposes, “[E]quity exhibits a concern that governance be faithful to 
institutional settings within which it takes place.”164 When instances of an institution are 
at odds with moral, social, or political norms, Equity can look to the purposes of those 
institutions to facilitate institutional change. The continued viability of institutions over 
time requires that they remain relevant to changing societal norms.165  
The cy-près doctrine for charitable Trusts is an example of the way in which Equity amends 
institutions to remain consonant with social values. The cy-près doctrine allows courts to 
apply Trust assets to purposes other than those for which the Trust was originally intended 
by the settlor. In order to invoke the cy-près doctrine, the settlor’s (suspect) charitable 
purpose must be “impossible, impracticable, or illegal” to carry out. In such cases, the 
courts have sometimes not only gone beyond the settlor’s original purposes, but even put 
Trust assets to purposes ostensibly at odds with the original purposes, where those original 
purposes fail to conform to prevailing social, moral, and political norms. 
For example, in re Dominion Students’ Hall Trust, Evershed J approved a scheme 
permitting the trustees of a racially discriminatory charitable trust to administer that 
trust on a non-discriminatory basis; in doing so, he noted that social understandings 
of racial discrimination had changed since the trust was first settled.166 
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The purpose of the charitable Trust is to further some public or social good. It goes without 
saying that a charitable Trust that is racially discriminatory is inimical to the public or 
social good. The cy-près doctrine therefore allows Equity to directly intervene in order to 
maintain the purposes of the charitable Trust qua institutional type. 
Justifying Equity’s Interest in Institutions 
It is perhaps now clear that Equity has been tasked in part with maintaining and, where 
necessary, reforming certain institutions. A related question thus arises concerning 
Equity’s justification for doing so. What justifies Equity in interfering in the ways in which 
capable and freely consenting individuals choose to interact with one another? For instance, 
in recent years there has been increased settlor demand for bespoke Trust arrangements, 
tailored to such a degree that many of the Trust’s core norms—including stewardship, 
trustee accountability, fiduciary responsibility—are minimized or eliminated altogether. At 
what point do bespoke Trust arrangements cease to resemble the original institutional type 
itself? In these instances, questions arise concerning whether Equity ought to intervene to 
maintain the Trust (defined by its irreducible core) as a unique institutional type and, 
furthermore, whether it is justified in doing so. As Harding points out, these questions 
become especially salient if we consider that the recrafting of institutions in this way 
actually appears to be in keeping with the law’s more general “facilitative project”: a liberal 
conception of law based on the facilitation of, or removal of impediments to, individual 
freedom. On this view, why not allow bespoke Trust or other institutional arrangements, 
in which core norms and purposes are jettisoned completely, if they serve the relevant 
individuals’ aims? Alternatively, why think the loss of certain institutions is a problem in 
which Equity is justified in intervening?  
According to Harding, the answer to these questions lies in Equity’s role in promoting 
autonomy. Harding takes as his starting point law’s foundation in a “particular version of 
liberalism,” which also informs its more general facilitative project.167 Harding says that 
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from a liberal point of view the justification for any state action, “lies in the contribution 
of that state action to an overall social, economic and political order in which people are 
able to live autonomous lives.”168 Hence, Harding argues that Equity, as an arm of the 
state, is justified in governing institutions insofar as it enables people to live autonomous 
lives. Aside from remedial justice, then, Equity also has a normative justification in 
facilitating and promoting (a liberal sense of) autonomy. Without Equity’s supervision and 
guidance (i.e., by governing, maintaining, and reforming institutions) Harding argues that 
such relationships would be diminished or eliminated altogether, ostensibly diminishing 
autonomy as a result. Hence, in order to facilitate relationships and thus promote autonomy, 
Equity is justified in governing institutions so that they remain “viable and succeed.”169  
Razian Autonomy 
But why suppose that certain institutions in particular are important for autonomy? On 
what conception of autonomy do institutions play a meaningful role in its promotion? To 
make this connection between institutions and autonomy, Harding adopts Joseph Raz’s 
conception of autonomy. Raz’s starting point, like Harding’s, is a version of “liberalism 
centred on the political ideal of autonomy.”170 Raz’s conception of liberalism is based on 
moral pluralism, which in turn grounds his conception of autonomy.171 Moral pluralism, 
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according to Raz, is “the view that there are many worthwhile and valuable relationships, 
commitments, and plans of life which are mutually incompatible, so that autonomous 
people can and should choose between them.”172 Given the multiplicity of morally 
worthwhile conceptions of the good, self-determination, and thus choice, is central to 
autonomy for Raz. As well, he says it is not enough for autonomy to have one’s choices 
dictated by one’s basic needs. Rather, autonomy requires “a range of meaningful options” 
from which one is able to choose in the process of self-governance. Among those 
meaningful options ought to be the ability to “develop relationships” and to commit to 
“projects, plans, and causes.”173 The measure of one’s autonomy depends on the degree to 
which those relationships and projects are chosen, or self-determined, by the autonomous 
individual. To have a “significant” degree of autonomy, then, one must have a choice 
among morally worthwhile possibilities, and not simply among basic needs. Importantly, 
Harding says this “requires that the state should make worthwhile options available and 
accessible to individuals.”174 Therein lies the connection between institutions and 
autonomy. 
Quoting Raz in The Morality of Freedom, Harding claims that autonomous persons must: 
possess and develop certain capacities and dispositions such as literacy, numeracy, 
and the cognitive ability to think about the choices that they make […] autonomous 
people must be free to some sufficient degree of coercion and manipulation in 
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deliberating about their options and choosing among them […] [and] people must 
have available to them a sufficient range of options from which to choose in 
realising a self-determining path in life.175 
With Raz, Harding argues that one of the roles of the state (through Equity, in this case) is 
to promote a significant degree of autonomy by individuating and maintaining institutions 
as distinct “options” from which individuals can choose. It is through various institutional 
types, like the charitable Trust, that individuals are able to pursue certain relationships, 
projects, plans, or ends. Insofar as these specific institutions make possible the fulfillment 
of particular ends or purposes, they remain important as “options” of autonomous choice 
in the general process of self-governance. 
We have now seen how this particular version of liberalism—namely, a Razian 
liberalism—justifies the state’s interest in governing and maintaining institutions. The state 
is justified in governing institutions insofar as it is founded on a version of liberalism 
concerned to promote autonomy through principles of moral pluralism. The state, through 
its governance of institutions, maintains meaningful “options” that are necessary for 
individuals to exercise their autonomy by choosing between morally worthwhile 
relationships, projects, plans or causes. This understanding of autonomy necessitates that 
options be individuated and maintained so that they remain distinct objects of choice; 
insofar as the (roughly Razian) liberal state is grounded upon a concern to promote 
autonomy in this sense, it is “normatively justified” in governing socially and economically 
important institutions.  
The Trust is just one example of an institutional “option” that Equity maintains in order to 
promote autonomy, by making possible certain forms of human action. We have seen how 
Trusts enable individuals to interact with respect to specific purposes, namely, those 
involving the management or application of Trust assets for the benefit of Trust 
beneficiaries. As a further example, Harding says the institution of private property has 
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value “insofar as it reflects the distinctive ways of valuing and regulating relations with the 
resources of the world.”176 Furthermore, Harding says that the law of contract, “may also 
have value insofar as it establishes distinct contract types that appeal and are available to 
differently situated people depending on their purposes and goals.”177 Insofar as equitable 
doctrines continue to guide the development or maintenance of these institutions, Equity 
plays a role in promoting autonomy by providing individuals with distinct options from 
which they may choose to relate to one another, or as the means to pursuing important 
projects, plans, or causes.178 As Harding puts it, Equity has an important function in  
“constituting, maintaining and refining options and in individuating those options so that 
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people may choose among them in self-determining ways.”179 Moreover, Harding says 
that, 
by taking an interest in the development, governance and reform of institutions, 
[E]quity contributes to the development and maintenance of individuated options 
that might be the subject of autonomous choice, whether these options be 
distinguished by their underpinning [i] values and commitments, [ii] the purposes 
and goals that they facilitate, or [iii] the modes of interaction that they enable and 
embody. And finally, to the extent that [E]quity makes that contribution, [E]quity, 
like the whole body of facilitative private law, seems appealing when measured 
against fundamental liberal commitments, at least from the perspective of a 
liberalism centred on the political ideal of autonomy.180 
In sum, from a liberal point of view centred on autonomy, there are reasons to maintain the 
distinctiveness of institutional types, which in turn justifies Equity’s critical role in serving 
that end—especially in the face of interests or forces that would render those institutions 
unrecognizable or otherwise blur the lines between them, undermining an important 
mechanism by which individuals are able to achieve their autonomous ends. 
2.2 Equity, Autonomy, and the Fiduciary Relationship  
From what has been said, it is perhaps already clear that the fiduciary relationship is an 
institution that Equity has individuated, maintains, and continues to govern.181 Indeed, 
Equity’s historical interest in the fiduciary relationship—and, specifically, the fiduciary 
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obligation—was a central theme of Chapter 1. Yet, beyond merely mentioning the 
fiduciary obligation as one (among other) core “norms” of the legal Trust, Harding does 
not discuss the fiduciary relationship as an “institution” itself. In fact, Harding’s 
identification of the fiduciary obligation as a “norm” of the Trust seems to suggest that he 
may not have considered the possibility that the fiduciary relationship is an institution in 
its own right. In my view this is an important oversight, because, as argued in the previous 
chapter, the fiduciary relationship is an important mode or framework of human action that 
makes possible the furtherance of a plethora of different purposes, projects, and ends 
critical to meaningful self-governance.  
In the second part of this chapter, then, I first extend Harding’s own analysis of Equity’s 
interest in institutions to the fiduciary relationship. I illustrate how Chapter 1 provides 
historical support for the claim that Equity has taken an interest in governing and 
maintaining the fiduciary relationship. In turn, Harding’s analysis mutually reinforces the 
central thesis of Chapter 1 by providing a theoretical rationale as to why the fiduciary 
relationship may have been taken up by early Chancery. I argue that the fiduciary 
relationship is clearly an “institution” (indeed, a paradigmatic one) that Equity has taken 
an interest in preserving and protecting. The history of how Equity came to recognize and 
eventually govern the fiduciary relationship provides a case example of Harding’s analysis 
of Equity’s interest in institutions. Harding’s argument suggests that the social and 
economic importance of the fiduciary relationship is what accounts for Equity’s interest in 
maintaining it as an institutional type, or distinct “option,” through which self-governing 
agents achieve meaningful purposes or ends. In this way, the fiduciary relationship 
promotes autonomy.  
Accordingly, extending Harding’s analysis to the fiduciary relationship has preliminary 
implications for both the problem of legal-moral equivocation and the problem of 
paternalism. First, by suggesting that Equity only intervenes to preserve and protect 
socially and economically important relationships, this analysis provides some support for 
Chapter 1’s argument that the fiduciary relationship is informed by an underlying moral 
obligation whose own importance is evidenced by its enforcement through moral, religious, 
and legal norms throughout history. Extending Harding’s analysis to the fiduciary 
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relationship therefore ought to help further alleviate concerns about legal-moral 
equivocation. Second, extending Harding’s analysis to the fiduciary relationship suggests 
that the latter plays a role in promoting autonomy, which mitigates the concern that the 
fiduciary relationship is paternalistic; viz., insofar as the fiduciary relationship is autonomy 
promoting, it is not paternalistic. I begin by briefly describing the problem of paternalism 
as it relates to the fiduciary relationship. I then go on to illustrate how Harding’s account 
of the way in which institutions promote autonomy may alleviate the concern that the 
fiduciary relationship is paternalistic.  
Extending Harding’s analysis to the fiduciary relationship does appear to mitigate the 
problem of paternalism; insofar as the fiduciary relationship promotes autonomy by serving 
as an option from which agents can choose to frame and govern their interactions with one 
another in the pursuit of their autonomous ends, this relationship is not paternalistic. 
Nevertheless, while I agree with Harding that the fiduciary relationship promotes 
autonomy in this way, his analysis fails to account for the way in which the fiduciary 
relationship is essentially autonomy promoting. By “essential” here I mean that fiduciary 
relationships play an important and often critical role in promoting autonomy, though 
perhaps not in every instance.182 I therefore do not claim that fiduciary relationships are 
necessary for autonomy in every case; however, I do think that, practically speaking, the 
multifarious fiduciary relationships in one’s life will be “essential,” or crucial, to the 
meaningful exercise of autonomy. In order to appreciate the essential role that fiduciary 
relationships play in promoting autonomy, we must go beyond Harding’s analysis 
generally, and his conception of autonomy in particular. We must think harder about the 
way fiduciary relationships themselves promote autonomy. I argue that Harding’s Razian 
conception of autonomy does not account for the ways in which our myriad relationships 
are essential to both the development of “autonomy skills” (as in the parent-child 
relationship) and the ongoing ability to govern ourselves. By adopting a more plausible 
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relational theory of autonomy, I argue that the fiduciary relationship is among the most 
important kinds of relationship that constitute the very “conditions” that make meaningful 
autonomy possible.  
First, by juxtaposing Razian autonomy with relational autonomy, I highlight how the 
former fails to explain how our various relationships play a crucial role in the development 
and ongoing exercise of our autonomy. I argue that when we recognize the relationality of 
autonomy, the essential role that the fiduciary relationship plays in enabling individuals to 
will (that is, to set and pursue certain projects, plans, or causes) becomes manifest. In 
making this argument, I employ Paul Miller’s influential “fiduciary powers” theory of the 
fiduciary relationship. I argue that fiduciary power is a relational capacity through which 
individuals exercise their will. 
I conclude by emphasizing that the fiduciary relationship is a moral relationship, grounded 
in its essential role in promoting autonomy. In this way, I take the forgoing two chapters 
to have mitigated both the problems of equivocation and paternalism. 
2.2.1 Equity’s Interest in the Fiduciary Relationship 
Recall, again, that institutions according to Harding are “arrangements or frameworks for 
human action that have some distinctive normative identity and are oriented to some 
purpose or goal.”183 An institution’s “normative identity” is constituted by an “irreducible 
core,” comprising moral norms, principles, and a defining purpose. An institution’s 
underlying moral principle often helps to define its purpose as well as the moral norms 
that, in turn, serve to protect and maintain that purpose and thus the integrity of the 
institution itself. Equity’s particular interest in these important social and economic 
institutions, or relationships, involves ensuring that institutions are “formed, well-governed 
and viable.”184 As we saw in the previous section, outside of remedial justice, Equity also 
has a “normative justification” in taking an interest in institutions to maintain their integrity 
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or viability. This normative justification is based in the law’s general facilitative project, 
grounded in a particular form of liberalism that seeks to promote autonomy. To facilitate 
autonomy, Equity governs institutions by individuating, maintaining, and (where 
necessary) reforming them so that they remain “viable and succeed” as distinct options 
through which autonomous agents can structure their interactions and ultimately achieve 
their autonomously chosen ends.  
As we saw in the previous chapter, the fiduciary obligation first gained entry into the law 
as a principle or norm of the legal Trust. However, the fiduciary relationship has since 
become an Equitable institution in its own right, enshrined through legal duties and 
liabilities. Indeed, the fiduciary relationship has arguably become the quintessential 
equitable institution, rivalled perhaps only by the Trust. But the fiduciary relationship has 
broader applicability, encompassing the Trust itself and cutting across other important 
institutions and thereby defying classic legal taxonomy in the process (to the dismay of 
some jurists).185 Questions concerning the scope, meaning, and demands of the fiduciary 
relationship in the context of these and other disparate interactions (e.g., from parents to 
Chief Executive Officers) have therefore often been left to the equitable domain. 
Extending Harding’s analysis of Equity’s interest in institutions to the fiduciary 
relationship makes it clear that the fiduciary relationship is indeed an “institution” and thus 
plays a role in promoting autonomy. To begin, the fiduciary relationship has a unique 
“normative identity,” oriented toward some purpose or goal, and made up of an “irreducible 
core” norms, values, and principles. As described in Chapter 1, the fiduciary relationship’s 
central moral obligation, or principle, is something like the following: in undertaking to 
act on behalf of another’s interests, a fiduciary ought to do so with strict fidelity, or loyalty, 
to the relevant interests of the beneficiary. From the fiduciary obligation, we get both the 
purpose of the fiduciary relationship and the norms and rules that function to protect it.  
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The purpose of the fiduciary relationship, according to Miller’s influential account, is to 
authorize “the exercise of discretionary power by the fiduciary over the practical interests 
of the beneficiary.”186 In other words, the purpose of the fiduciary relationship is to 
authorize another to exercise their discretion on behalf of one’s “significant practical 
interests.” According to Miller, a beneficiary’s interests are significantly “practical” where 
they implicate matters of personality, welfare, or right.187 Matters of personality refer to 
interests significant to one’s identity, such as the determination of one’s ends; matters of 
welfare include decisions bearing on one’s physical, psychological, or economic well-
being, such as health, paternal or financial care; and matters of right include decisions 
bearing one’s moral or legal rights, such as to be free from violence or coercion.188 The 
purpose of the fiduciary relationship is to enable another to exercise their (often 
professional) discretionary power to act on behalf and in the best interests of matters 
concerning one’s personality, welfare, or right.  
Fiduciary norms and rules, in turn, demand that the purpose of the fiduciary relationship 
be upheld. As we will see below, fiduciary duties ensure the proper exercise of fiduciary 
power, which in turn ensures the continued integrity, or viability, of the fiduciary 
relationship as a specific mode of human action.189 Miller argues that fiduciary norms and 
rules arise out of the fiduciary relationship’s “structural properties.” The structure of the 
fiduciary relationship is characterized by inequality, dependence, and vulnerability.190 
Miller says that “[w]henever one person enjoys fiduciary [discretionary] power over 
another, their relationship will be asymmetrical in respect of the power itself.”191 In other 
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words, the structure of the fiduciary relationship is asymmetrical vis-à-vis the exercise of 
discretionary power. Inequality reflects the structural asymmetry between power and the 
dependence. Dependence thus refers to the way in which the beneficiary relies upon the 
fiduciary’s appropriate exercise of her discretionary power. And vulnerability refers to the 
risk that the beneficiary takes in authorizing the exercise of fiduciary power: namely, the 
risk that the fiduciary will abuse, misuse, neglect, or otherwise exploit that power. 
Vulnerability follows from the risk that the fiduciary “will fail to meet the demands of 
fiduciary [discretionary] power.”192 These structural properties give rise to the norms and 
rules meant to protect the integrity of the fiduciary relationship. The inequality, 
dependence, and vulnerability that are built into the structure of the fiduciary relationship 
are therefore also what generate fiduciary duties. Equity’s “interest” in the fiduciary 
relationship may therefore be seen as an attempt to maintain the integrity, or continued 
viability, of this important mode of human action by enforcing the very norms and values 
that define and guide appropriate conduct within it. As we saw above, Equity often governs 
institutions indirectly, by imposing duties on those who are responsible for managing and 
directing those institutions. Fiduciary norms and values such as trust, confidence, care, 
loyalty, good faith, and responsibility give rise to duties or obligations intended to maintain 
the integrity of the fiduciary relationship qua institution or as a unique framework for 
human action through which individuals can pursue their significant practical interests.  
It would seem, then, that the fiduciary relationship is an “institution” as Harding defines it. 
But why think that the fiduciary relationship is among the institutions that Equity has taken 
an interest in governing? What evidence is there that Equity governs and maintains the 
fiduciary relationship?  
First, recall that Equity governs institutions both indirectly and directly. As just mentioned, 
it does so indirectly through the duties and obligations imposed upon the managers of those 
institutions. For example, a Trustee is the manager of the Trust, the assets of which the 
Trustee manages for the beneficiary’s benefit. In the fiduciary relationship the managers 
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are the fiduciaries themselves, such as parents, physicians, lawyers, financial advisors, 
etcetera. The obligations that Equity imposes on fiduciaries are those required to ensure 
the purpose of the fiduciary relationship—i.e., securing the beneficiary’s interests—is 
upheld. With the exception of loyalty, the type and number of fiduciary duties are 
somewhat contested, but often include the duties care and candour. Loyalty, for instance, 
demands that fiduciaries exercise their discretionary power with complete fidelity to their 
beneficiaries’ interests—or at least those “significant practical interests” specified as 
within the fiduciary mandate. This prevents fiduciaries not only from exploiting individual 
beneficiaries, but also from undermining the purpose, and thus integrity, of the fiduciary 
institution itself. Similarly, in the law there are also certain rules, such as the no-profit and 
no-conflict rules, that (some argue) serve a “prophylactic” function, prohibiting and 
deterring fiduciaries from profiting from their privileged capacity as fiduciaries and thus 
from undermining the purpose, and thus “viability,” of the fiduciary interaction itself.193 
Equity maintains the fiduciary relationship indirectly, then, by identifying and enforcing 
fiduciary norms and rules intended to protect its normative identity—the underlying 
principle, purpose, norms and values—of the fiduciary interaction, which includes 
ensuring that fiduciaries act in accordance with their obligations as fiduciaries.  
Equity also governs the fiduciary relationship directly through fiduciary jurisprudence. By 
looking to the fiduciary principle, the courts of Equity ensure that the fiduciary relationship, 
as an institution, remains faithful to its purpose while its animating norms and rules cohere 
with moral norms and social values. Part of Equity’s role in maintaining institutions is to 
ensure that their defining purposes—as informed by underlying principles—are not 
undermined, blurred, or otherwise rendered unrecognizable, ostensibly so that these 
institutions, or relationships, remain meaningful options from which autonomous agents 
can choose in governing their lives. Hence, in demarcating the fiduciary relationship from 
other institutions, such as contract, Equity maintains the fiduciary relationship as a distinct 
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“option” from which autonomous agents might choose to interact in an effort to pursue 
valuable relationships, meaningful projects, or other ends important to self-governance.  
The case law is rich with examples of Equity maintaining the boundaries of the fiduciary 
relationship. For instance, there have been numerous attempts to “contract-out” fiduciary 
norms and duties, including the quintessential fiduciary duty of loyalty. As we might 
expect, in light of Harding’s account, the courts of Equity have so far been unamenable to 
such efforts, opting instead to maintain the defining purpose of the fiduciary relationship 
along with the norms and rules that protect that purpose. In the seminal case, Meinhard v. 
Salmon, Equity can be seen as governing the fiduciary institution. In that case, Justice 
Cardozo, writing for the majority, famously stated: 
Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another, while the enterprise 
continues, the duty of the finest loyalty. Many forms of conduct permissible in a 
workaday world for those acting at arm’s length are forbidden to those bound by 
fiduciary ties. A trustee [i.e., fiduciary] is held to something stricter than the morals 
of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most 
sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. As to this there has developed a tradition 
that is unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of 
courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the 
“disintegrating erosion” of particular exceptions. Only thus has the level of 
conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that trodden by the crowd. 
It will not consciously be lowered by any judgment of this court.194 
Justice Cardozo maintains the fiduciary institution by looking to its purpose along with the 
norms and rules intended to maintain it. He was unwilling to jettison one of the defining 
norms of the fiduciary relationship, namely, the fiduciary’s duty of “finest loyalty” to the 
beneficiary’s interests. Moreover, Cardozo demarcates the fiduciary relationship from, 
specifically, the institution of contract. Fiduciaries, he says, are not merely agents to a 
contract, “acting at arm’s length,” they are, rather, “held to something stricter than the 
morals of the market place.” Even honesty alone, an important norm in contractual 
relationships, is insufficient in the context of the fiduciary relationship.195 Instead, 
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fiduciaries must display “the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive.” Justice Cardozo 
also gestures toward Equity’s “tradition” of maintaining the fiduciary relationship; he notes 
that Equity has exercised an attitude of “uncompromising rigidity” toward similar attempts 
to undermine fiduciary norms and purposes through a process of “disintegrating erosion” 
of exceptions. Equity can thus be seen here maintaining the fiduciary principle, along with 
its animating purpose, by ensuring that fiduciary norms and values remain “at a higher 
level than that trodden by the crowd.”196  
The application of Harding’s analysis to the fiduciary relationship and the arguments laid 
out in Chapter 1 mutually reinforce one another. On the one hand, Harding’s account of 
Equity’s interest in institutions provides theoretical support for the historical account 
provided in Chapter 1. It does so by providing a theoretical explanation for Equity’s 
historical role in governing the fiduciary relationship as we understand it today. The social 
and economic importance of the fiduciary relationship makes it a prime candidate for legal 
protection through Equity’s governance. By extending Harding’s analysis, we can view 
English Equity’s interest in the fiduciary relationship as the most recent attempt to enforce 
the demands of the fiduciary obligation and thus protect the integrity of the fiduciary 
interaction. On the other hand, Chapter 1 provides historical support for Harding’s 
theoretical analysis of Equity’s interest in institutions. Chapter 1 described the presence of 
the fiduciary relationship across times and cultures, operationalized through moral 
prescriptions, religious commands, and legal rules. This narrative conveys the societal 
importance of the fiduciary relationship and may now be understood, on Harding’s 
account, as providing the reason for Equity’s historical interest in it. In other words, on 
Harding’s view, the clear social importance of the fiduciary relationship accounts for 
Equity’s interest in individuating and maintaining it as a distinct “option” through which 
self-governing agents can choose to pursue valuable relationships, plans, projects, or other 
ends. Indeed, Harding himself notes that how exactly institutions become identified and 
individuated by Equity at the outset is a complex process that involves both “historical and 
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cultural factors.”197 The historical account provided in Chapter 1 may therefore be viewed 
as an attempt to elucidate some of the historical factors that led to the identification and 
individuation of the fiduciary relationship.  
2.2.2 Implications for Equivocation and Paternalism 
Extending Harding’s analysis of Equity’s interest in institutions to the fiduciary 
relationship has implications for both the problems of equivocation and paternalism. First, 
as we just saw above, it helps to mitigate the problem of equivocation by supporting the 
argument made in Chapter 1 that the fiduciary relationship is a moral relationship that 
existed long before Equity’s interest in it. Chapter 1 outlines the history of the fiduciary 
obligation as a moral obligation that responds to the problem of trust and dependence in 
those interactions where one undertakes to act on behalf of another’s interests and does so 
in a way that fosters greater social cooperation and harmony. Harding’s analysis of 
Equity’s interest in institutions suggests that it was the evident social and economic 
importance of the pre-existing fiduciary relationship that led to Equity’s eventual interest 
in ensuring its continued viability through its governance and protection. Put simply, the 
fiduciary relationship is not a creation of English Equity. Accordingly, the normative 
prescriptions of the fiduciary obligation are not purely legal in nature (at least in their 
foundation); rather, they are also moral prescriptions. This understanding of the fiduciary 
relationship ought to go some way toward mitigating the worry that applying the normative 
prescriptions of the fiduciary relationship to the ethical problems of bioethics involves an 
illicit equivocation between the normative “ought” of the law and that of morality.   
Harding’s analysis also has implications for the problem of paternalism. Before explaining 
why, let me review this problem as it pertains to bioethics specifically. As mentioned in 
the Introduction, the paternalistic model of the physician-patient relationship refers to a 
discredited model in which the physician makes unilateral, and even overriding, decisions 
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on the patient’s behalf. 198 It assumes that the physician, with her professional knowledge 
and expertise, knows what is in the patient’s best medical interests—irrespective of the 
patient’s expressed values, preferences, or beliefs. The history of medical and research 
ethics is rife with examples of ethical violations perpetrated and justified according to the 
“doctor knows best” rationale. Contemporary medical and research ethics has evolved out 
of, and largely in response to, the abuses, neglect, and exploitation that occurred under the 
paternalistic model. Accordingly, today medical ethics employs a patient-centred model of 
care that aims to foster patient autonomy in healthcare decision-making and other health-
related patient interests.199 Focused on patient autonomy, patient-centred care advocates 
for “deliberation” between healthcare professionals and their patients; deliberation 
involves not only providing patients with the information relevant to their situation, but 
also engaging in a dialogue whereby the healthcare professional can come to learn a 
patient’s values, preferences, and beliefs and thus better understand how she can most 
effectively realize her patient’s healthcare goals (and understand in the first place what 
those goals are). To be clear, on this model it is not the healthcare professional who 
chooses the best medical treatment for her patient based on the patient’s values, goals, 
etcetera; rather, the dialogue between the healthcare professional and her patient enables 
the professional to better understand her patient’s choices, and to act accordingly. Of 
course, the healthcare professional brings her professional knowledge and expertise to bear 
on this dialogue so that the patient can make informed choices about their health interests—
but it is ultimately the patient, not the professional, who decides. This patient-centred care 
model is reflected in recent strategic funding priorities by the Canadian Institute of Health 
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Research’s Strategy for Patient-Oriented Research and the U.S. Patient-Centered 
Outcomes Research Institute.200  
The problem of paternalism refers to the worry that the fiduciary relationship is a 
paternalistic framework for the relationship between healthcare professionals and their 
patients and is therefore something that most bioethicists would and should reject. 
However, the description above of the patient-centred model reveals that physicians can be 
fiduciaries without in fact being paternalistic. They can use their discretionary authority to 
guide their patients in making health care choices that serve their health care interests and 
also use it to effectuate those choices through the health care they provide.201  Fiduciaries 
who use their discretionary power in this way are not acting paternalistically. Harding’s 
analysis takes us further in implying that the fiduciary relationship is autonomy promoting. 
It suggests that institutions, like the fiduciary relationship, serve as “options” among 
various frameworks of action through which individuals can achieve their self-directed 
ends. In the healthcare setting, the healthcare professional-patient relationship makes it 
possible for patients to realize their health-related interests. It does so by suggesting that 
discretionary authority exercised by the fiduciary is an essential means by which the 
beneficiary is able to pursue her autonomously chosen ends. Through dialogue and joint 
deliberation, the fiduciary is better able to understand the beneficiary’s chosen plans or 
goals. The fiduciary can then use her (often) professional knowledge, skill, or expertise to 
effectuate those ends. Carrying out the beneficiary’s autonomously chosen plan of action 
will invariably require the fiduciary to exercise her discretion, but this fact does not thereby 
render the relationship paternalistic; indeed, it is precisely owing to the fiduciary’s specific 
ambit of discretionary power (e.g., over medical, legal, or financial interests) that the 
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beneficiary solicits a particular type of fiduciary to facilitate the realization of her self-
directed plans, projects, or causes.  
In the end, therefore, Harding’s account is helpful in mitigating the problems of both 
equivocation and paternalism. Nevertheless, I argue that it fails to account for the full 
extent to which the fiduciary relationship promotes autonomy. On Harding’s account the 
fiduciary relationship is rendered a mere means to autonomy via its role as an “option,” 
among many others, through which individuals can pursue their chosen ends. It is therefore 
not the fiduciary relationship per se that promotes autonomy; rather, it does so through its 
role as an option among a range of other options that promotes autonomy. This analysis is 
based on a Razian theory of autonomy, which, I argue, does not pay due attention to the 
essential role that relationships play in constituting the very conditions that make both the 
development and ongoing exercise of autonomy possible. By adopting a relational theory 
of autonomy, which places relationships at the centre of any understanding of autonomy, I 
argue that fiduciary relationship is not merely instrumentally autonomy promoting, but it 
is essentially so.  
2.3 Beyond Razian Autonomy 
We saw briefly above that Harding draws his understanding of autonomy from Raz. 
According to Raz, the liberal state plays a role in promoting autonomy by creating 
“options” that enable individuals to choose and pursue the life they have embarked upon. 
Raz begins from the assumption that self-governance requires more than meeting one’s 
“personal needs.” Personal needs are the conditions necessary to enable a person to live the 
life they have. Choices are dictated by personal needs “if all but one nontrivial option will 
sacrifice a personal need and will make impossible the continuation of the life the agent 
has.”202 Personal needs are not only the basic needs of survival but include the need to 
have a “morally worthwhile life.” The idea that autonomy requires more than the 
fulfillment of basic needs seems to be based on the intuitive idea that a “morally worthwhile 
 
202
 Raz, “Liberalism, Autonomy, and Politics,” 110. 
86 
 
life” involves more than mere subsistence. If one’s only “option” is between survival or 
death one’s autonomy is effectively meaningless; such a “choice” is more akin to duress or 
coercion, as if one is forced to “choose” with a gun to the head—only the “gun” in this case 
is, say, starvation. However, Raz suggests that one need not be facing a decision between 
life or death for one’s autonomy to be severely undermined. For example, he says that a 
pianist may lose the life she has embarked upon, if her fingers are irreparably broken. For 
the pianist, the “choice” between continuing her life as pianist or not, may be practically 
equivalent to a life-or-death decision; one can imagine that, for her, living a life without 
playing the piano—the life the pianist has embarked upon—is simply not worth living.  
But perhaps for these reasons, Raz says that autonomy is a matter of degree: one can be 
more or less autonomous. It is then perhaps fair to say that the concert pianist who can no 
longer play the piano nevertheless has more autonomy than someone whose sole 
occupation is to secure their next meal. Again, Raz says that to have a “significant degree” 
of autonomy requires more than the satisfaction of personal needs; significantly 
autonomous persons are those who “shape their life and determine its course.”203 In other 
words, to have significant autonomy requires having a range of meaningful options that 
enable one to be the self-determining author of their own lives. The liberal state thus 
promotes autonomy by creating and maintaining “options” that enable individuals to 
pursue a life that, for them, is worthwhile. In Raz’s own words: 
autonomous persons are not merely rational agents who can choose between 
options after evaluating relevant information, but agents who can in addition adopt 
personal projects, develop relationships, and accept commitments to causes, 
through which their personal integrity and sense of dignity and self-respect are 
made concrete. In a word, significantly autonomous agents are part creators of their 
own moral world. Persons who are part creators of their own moral world have a 
commitment to projects, relationships, and causes which affects the kind of life that 
is for them worth living. It is not that they may not sacrifice projects or causes they 
are committed to for good reasons, but rather that there are certain kinds of actions 
vis à vis their commitments which amount to betrayal, compromise their integrity, 
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sacrifice their self-respect, and in extreme cases render their life, i.e., the life they 
made for themselves, worthless or even impossible (in a moral sense).204 
Raz identifies at least three aspects of autonomy. The first is the (classic) capacity to form 
“informed and effective judgments.”205 This seems to imply more than having mere 
“capacity” to be held responsible for one’s choices, but to have the ability to undergo a 
process of higher-order critical reflection. The second is “relational,” by which he means 
that autonomous persons “are not subjected to the will of another.”206 Finally, the third 
aspect concerns the quality of the options open to the agent; specifically, “their choices 
must not be dictated by personal needs.”207 Related to the first, Raz says this in part 
requires that “[o]ne is a part author of one’s world only if in creating it one is not merely 
serving the will of another.”208 So a person who coerces another violates that person’s 
autonomy by forcing them to conform to their will. The coercer succeeds in forcing others 
by “restricting their options.”209 For this reason, Raz says that the more the third condition 
of autonomy is undermined (such as through coercion), the more one’s choices will be 
dictated by personal needs, and thus the less autonomous one will become. For Raz, to 
facilitate autonomy through moral pluralism, the liberal state plays a critical role in 
individuating and maintaining options that make a morally worthwhile life possible.  
Harding therefore appears to be correct in interpreting Raz as saying that the defining 
feature of Razian autonomy is having a choice among a range of “options.” Only by being 
free to choose among a meaningful array of options—enabling the pursuit of projects, 
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relationships, and causes that constitute one’s “moral world”—and thus to act beyond the 
mere satisfaction of personal needs, does one acquire a “significant” degree of autonomy. 
On Raz’s account, the fiduciary relationship is made a mere means to autonomy. It 
becomes an “option” that autonomous agents can choose (or not, presumably) in the 
authorship of their lives. However, as I will now argue, this theory of autonomy does not 
account for the vital role fiduciary relationships play in constituting the conditions that 
make meaningful autonomy possible. In this way, fiduciary relationships are not 
“optional”; rather, they are essential for the development and ongoing exercise of 
autonomy. The Razian conception of autonomy fails to acknowledge this critical feature 
of autonomy: namely, the way in which our various relationships constitute the very 
“background conditions” that make significant autonomy possible.  
2.3.1 Relational Autonomy 
“Relational” theories of autonomy are grounded in the recognition that relationships shape 
or create one’s ability to be a “self-governing” agent. Relational theories were first 
developed by feminist philosophers keenly aware of the oppressive effects that 
relationships can have on the autonomy of women and other subjugated members of a 
white supremacist patriarchal society.210 As Natalie Stoljar puts it, these theories began as 
an attempt “to answer the question of how internalized oppression and oppressive social 
conditions undermine or erode autonomy.”211 Relational autonomy emphasizes the 
importance of the “conditions” in which autonomy develops and is realized.212 These 
conditions include our various relationships with others, which have the potential not only 
to damage our autonomy, but to be supportive of it.213  
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Relational autonomy theorists begin their analyses in the same way that most moral 
philosophers do: namely, by defining autonomy as “self-governance.”214 However, 
feminist philosophers point out that self-governance is not the same as having complete 
control over our lives.215 Rather, self-governance involves acting on “reasons, values, or 
ends of our own.”216 These reasons, values, and ends can, and inevitably do, encourage us 
to depend on others. For example, in valuing love one chooses to depend on family, friends, 
or partners to secure this important need. Alternatively, one might also value financial 
stability, and so choose to depend on the advice, knowledge, or skill of a financial advisor 
for the best chances of achieving this particular end. The same is true of numerous other 
personal and professional relationships. McLeod and Ryman express this point well: 
So long as we rely on others for these things, however, we do not control what 
happens to us, not completely anyway. Rather, some of this control lies with other 
people: those who will shape how much we are able to flourish. It follows that 
autonomy is not about controlling things in our lives; autonomy and control are not 
identical.217 
Relational theorists thus reject the individualistic view of autonomy that assumes self-
governance requires near complete independence from the influence of others. Feminist 
philosophers have long been sceptical of this “atomistic” and naively idealistic (not to 
mention masculinist) understanding of autonomy: that is, the dubious understanding of the 
autonomous agent as completely self-sufficient, whose judgment and actions are 
unadulterated by others—as if it were possible to operate in a social vacuum. Feminist 
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philosophers have challenged this atomistic understanding of autonomy, arguing that 
“articulating the [social] conditions of autonomy is essential to understanding gender 
oppression and related concepts such as objectification.”218  
There are a number of different theories of relational autonomy. Broadly, relational 
theories of autonomy can be classified as (i) procedural or substantive, and (ii) causal or 
constitutive.219  Procedural theories parallel the literature on autonomy more generally, by 
focusing on the capacity to reflect on one’s motivations, values, and beliefs and make 
decisions based on those reflections.220 Procedural theories of autonomy are “content 
neutral” insofar as they are concerned with the process by which one comes to a decision, 
rather than the content of the decision itself. On this view, the choices of an individual of 
sound mind are autonomous, however oppressive in outward appearance (i.e., in content) 
those choices might be. Conversely, substantive theories are not content neutral, rather they 
are “value laden.” In other words, they subject the content of one’s decisions to normative 
constraints. There are both strong and weak substantive theories of autonomy. Strong 
substantive theories subject the contents of one’s decisions to direct normative 
constraints.221 For example, the preference to be enslaved cannot be autonomous on a 
strong substantive view, as (it goes without saying) slavery is normatively and morally 
repugnant. Weak substantive theories, on the other hand, “build in normative content, but 
do not place direct normative constraints on the content of agents’ preferences.”222 For 
example, a weak substantive theory might simply require that to count as autonomous, 
moral agents must exhibit moral attitudes of self-respect, or a robust sense of their own 
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self-worth.223 So long as they meet these constraints, they are considered “autonomous” 
on the weak substantive view. 
Causal relational theories of autonomy acknowledge the influence of social relationships 
and socio-historical circumstances on autonomy.224 Causal views take into consideration 
the vital role that relationships play in enabling and fostering autonomy. In other words, 
they emphasize that our relationships play a causal role in the development of our 
autonomy. Our relationships with parents, teachers, friends and loved ones can either 
support or undermine our autonomy as we grow into fully developed adults. In this way, 
social and historical conditions can promote or impede autonomy. It is important to 
emphasize that on the causal view of autonomy, our relationships and socio-historical 
circumstances affect the degree to which we develop into autonomous agents. Importantly, 
however, such relationships are not the focus of our ongoing exercise of autonomy.  
Constitutive relational accounts, by contrast, provide an analysis of autonomy in terms of 
how our interpersonal and socio-historical circumstances constitute the “defining 
conditions” of autonomy. In other words, these theories recognize the importance of social 
and economic relationships to the continued or ongoing exercise of autonomy—not just 
the development of autonomy (as in the causal view). For instance, bell hooks (among 
many others) points out that “white supremacist patriarchal society” systematically 
undermines the autonomy of women and people of color by severely constraining access 
to “external goods”—including social goods, such as affordable housing, quality 
education, employment, and healthcare—required for autonomous choice and action.225 
Limiting access to these external goods is incompatible with autonomy on some 
constitutive views. Stoljar explains that this is because autonomy is a “global” condition 
of moral agents, requiring that they have “de facto power and authority over choices and 
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actions significant to the direction of [their lives].”226 Severely constraining the external 
conditions of autonomy—such as critical social and professional relationships—removes 
the de facto power required for autonomy.227 However, other constitutive theorists focus 
more on “local” conditions of autonomy: namely, those conditions required for “choices, 
preferences, or desires at particular times to count as autonomous.”228 Still, what makes a 
relational theory constitutive is the claim that no matter how robust an agent’s 
psychological capacities are, if the relevant external conditions do not obtain at a given 
time, an individual’s choices will not be autonomous.229 The constitutive view therefore 
rejects the classic moral philosophical view that merely having the capacity for (or simply 
undergoing the process of) rational reflection, as in the procedural view, is sufficient for 
autonomy.  
While all theories of relational autonomy emphasize the critical role that our relationships 
play in autonomy, the theory I will adopt here is a procedural-constitutive theory: namely, 
one according to which being autonomous involves having both the capacity to undergo 
critical reflection on one’s motivations, beliefs, and values, and to have access to the 
“external conditions” that make possible the exercise of “de facto power and authority” for 
meaningful self-governance. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to engage in any 
substantive debate about the preferred or most plausible theory of relational autonomy; 
suffice to say, that I adopt the procedural-constitutive theory because I believe it is basically 
correct: not only does it account for the classical (and arguably intuitive) idea that 
autonomy requires certain mental capacities and processes of rational and critical 
reflection, but it also accounts for the ways in which our relationships are both causally 
formative for our autonomy and (as I argue below) essential for the ongoing “global” 
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exercise of autonomy. I will therefore use this theory to show why the fiduciary relationship 
is essentially autonomy promoting.230  
2.4 A Moral Ground for the Fiduciary Relationship 
I propose that when we understand autonomy relationally, together with the recognition of 
the crucial role that fiduciary relationships play in the satisfaction of important human 
needs and interests, then the way in which fiduciary relationships are essentially autonomy 
promoting becomes evident. All societies are made up of a web social, political, and 
economic relationships. Modern societies, in particular, are increasingly complex. With 
increased technological advancements and global interconnectedness comes increased 
compartmentalization of knowledge, skills, and expertise. As global citizens we trust and 
depend on others in a multiplicity of different ways, from securing the food we purchase 
at the grocery to the surgeons who perform our operations. The modern global world is 
made possible only through social cooperation and consequent mutual dependence at an 
immense scale. To “self-govern,” then, we simply must be able to trust or reliably depend 
on others.  
The fiduciary relationship, in particular, is an essential “mode of human action” by which 
we become, and continue to function as, autonomous agents. In the other words, fiduciary 
relationships are essential not only for developing the procedural capacity for autonomy, 
but also for its ongoing exercise. The parent- (or caregiver-) child relationship, for instance, 
is amongst the most important of fiduciary relationships for developing the capacities, or 
“skills,” necessary for autonomy. Parents, teachers, and other authority figures in a child’s 
life are responsible for helping children to develop the capacity for rational self-reflection 
required for procedural autonomy. Diana Meyers, who takes a procedural view, argues 
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that what she calls “autonomy competence” requires certain “agentic” or “autonomy 
skills.”231 Meyers says that, 
Autonomous people exercise a repertoire of skills to engage in self-discovery, self-
definition and self-direction, and [...] the authentic self is the evolving collocation 
of attributes that emerges in this ongoing process of reflection, deliberation and 
action.232 
Meyers suggests that, at a minimum, the “repertoire of skills” required for self-definition 
and self-reflection include the following: introspective skills, imaginative skills, memory 
skills, communication skills, analytical and reasoning skills, volitional skills, and 
interpersonal skills.233 Moreover, Meyers emphasizes the importance of critical thinking 
for autonomy competence:  
[O]ne must command critical thinking skills. Not only must one be alert for errors 
of fact and fallacies in reasoning, but one must also register emotional cues that 
signal confusion or danger. Still, extracting what is worthwhile from newly 
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encountered material is the key to enriching one's self-knowledge and to redefining 
oneself. Thus, one must be able to identify such ideas, incorporate them into one's 
own cognitive and emotional viewpoint, and apply them as one defines oneself.234 
Meyers says that, “[b]y exercising autonomy skills, such as the ones I enumerated 
previously, people gain authenticity or autonomy.”235 The parental (or guardian) 
relationship is critical to the development of these skills and thus of the child into a self-
governing and authentic individual.236 Moreover, parents are fiduciaries: they undertake—
indeed, are obliged both morally and legally—to act in the best interests of their children. 
They are tasked, in part, with helping their children develop the procedural capacity and 
skills to be autonomous. Performed well, their role is essential to the development of a 
child’s future autonomy.  
Fiduciary relationships are also necessary for the continued exercise of autonomy. As 
mentioned, the interconnectedness of complex societies has led to the 
compartmentalization of knowledge, skills, and expertise such that one must trust and 
depend on innumerable individuals to secure not only basic needs (such as food, clothing, 
education, and healthcare) but also the realization of life projects, plans, causes, and other 
autonomous ends. Many of these relationships are also fiduciary. Healthcare professionals, 
lawyers, financial advisors, chief executive officers, and perhaps even the state itself are 
fiduciaries tasked with exercising their judgment (usually based on a unique set of 
knowledge, skills, and expertise) on behalf of others.237 As was made clear in the previous 
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chapter, the presence of the fiduciary relationship throughout history and across cultures 
speaks to its profound social and economic importance. Societies throughout history have 
had a stake in protecting, governing, and maintaining the fiduciary relationship. Without 
access to at least some fiduciary relationships, and the ends they make possible, individuals 
would be unable to meaningful guide the direction of their lives. For example, without 
parents (or guardians) acting in a fiduciary capacity—loyal to the best interests of their 
child(ren)—the development of skills and processes essential for self-governance would 
be severely curtailed. The same is true for some fiduciary relationships in adulthood. 
Healthcare professionals and lawyers, for instance, make possible the pursuit of one’s 
chosen health or legal plans or goals, respectively. Without the professional knowledge 
and expertise of these individuals, along with the reliable expectation that these individuals 
can be trusted or depended upon to exercise their professional discretion on behalf of our 
best interests, it would be exceedingly difficult (if not practically impossible) to secure 
certain of these interests.238 Needless to say, without access to healthcare or legal justice, 
we would simply lack some of the most crucial relationships for the meaningful exercise 
of our autonomy.  
Razian autonomy does not appear to account for the ways in which relationships of any 
kind are essential to autonomy. Raz’s brief reference to the “relational” aspects of 
autonomy is entirely negative; he refers to the potential of our relationships to undermine 
our autonomy by coercively subjecting our will to that of another. True, Raz mentions the 
importance of pursuing “relationships” insofar as relationships constitute options in the 
authorship of one’s moral life. However, Raz does not mention the ways in which 
relationships can themselves be constitutive of our autonomy, in a positive and affirmative 
sense. Again, the constitutive view stresses the importance of having certain relationships 
for the ongoing exercise of autonomy. On this view, our various social and professional 
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relationships—from (as we saw above) parents, to lawyers, to healthcare professionals—
are among the “external goods” that constitute the (positive) conditions necessary to be a 
self-governing agent. Relationships are a “global” condition of autonomy, in that they are 
necessary for the exercise of “de facto power and authority over choices and actions 
significant to the direction of [our lives].”239  
Raz does recognize, however, that certain “natural conditions” can force people to make 
choices on the basis of personal needs, thus undermining their autonomy. It is here that Raz 
comes closest to acknowledging what relational theorists call the “conditions” that are 
constitutive of autonomy:  
The ideal of the perfect existentialist with no fixed biological and social nature who 
creates himself as he goes along is an incoherent dream. An autonomous personality 
can only flourish against a background of biological and social constraints which 
fix some of its human needs. Some choices are inevitably determined by those 
needs. Yet, harsh natural conditions can reduce the degree of autonomy of a person 
to a bare minimum just as effectively as systematic coercive intervention. 
Moreover, noncoercive interferences with a person’s life and fortunes may also 
reduce his or her autonomy in the same way as coercive interventions do. The only 
differences are that all coercive interventions invade autonomy and they do so 
intentionally, whereas only some noncoercive interventions do so and usually as a 
by-product of their intended results. They are not direct assaults on the autonomy 
of persons.240 
Still, Raz’s framing of relationships here is entirely negative; namely, he seems to 
acknowledge only the way in which relationships can be deleterious to autonomy. 
Moreover, he seems to shrug off this apparent autonomy-eroding effect of relationships by 
pointing out, again, that autonomy is a matter of degree. Raz suggests that no one is 
completely autonomous, because it is impossible to be entirely free from the dependence 
on, or influence of, others. Therefore, because relationships appear to equally undermine 
the maximum degree to which individuals can be autonomous, Raz concedes that not all 
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relationships are “regrettable.” Again, however, we see that Raz views relationships as 
entirely autonomy eroding, not promoting.  
Even putting aside the fact that Raz does not acknowledge the way in which relationships 
can function as positive mechanisms of self-governance, it seems to me that it would be 
anachronistic to suggest that Raz has in mind here the idea that our relationships constitute 
the conditions for autonomy, in the sense proffered by relational theorists. By the phrase, 
“background of biological and social constraints,” Raz is referring to “human needs,” and 
the way in which we are bound by those needs. Raz says that biological and social human 
needs (such as food, shelter, clothing, social connection, etc.) are the “natural conditions” 
that constrain or undermine autonomy, just as the coercive actions of some individuals can. 
Again, Raz does not appear to account for the ways in which human relationships are 
constitutive of autonomy, as some relational theorists do. To suggest that Razian autonomy 
accounts for the ways in which autonomy is relational by referring to his discussion of 
“human needs” and the way in which “natural conditions” can undermine autonomy would, 
I think, be an abuse of the principle of charity.  
However, Raz does go on to say that “inasmuch as the liberal concern to limit coercion is 
a concern for the autonomy of persons, the liberal will also be anxious to secure natural 
and social conditions which enable individuals to develop an autonomous life.”241 It might 
be argued, then, that to the extent that the “social conditions” of autonomy include 
relationships that can impede or promote autonomy, it is fair to say that Razian autonomy 
is compatible with relational theories of autonomy. But while the Razian account of 
autonomy may leave room for the conceptual work laid down by relational theorists, it 
clearly does not do the work of relational theorists. Raz does not acknowledge, identify, or 
discuss the many ways in which relationships are fundamental to the development of 
autonomy, as well as the social conditions under which autonomy can flourish.  
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As a Razian on autonomy, it is therefore doubtful that Harding recognizes the full 
importance that our relationships have as constituting the “conditions” of autonomy. 
Relationships are more than merely individuated “options” from which sovereign 
individuals might choose in curating an authentic self. Our interpersonal relationships 
make up the “external conditions” that constitute our autonomy itself; without these 
relationships, we would lack the conditions necessary for meaningful self-governance, and 
would thus simply fail to be autonomous. As will become clear in a moment, fiduciary 
relationships, in particular, along with the interests and ends they make possible are 
essential to autonomy. Only when we understand autonomy as both procedurally and 
constitutively relational does it truly become clear how fiduciary relationships promote 
our autonomy.  
2.4.1 The Fiduciary Relationship as Relational Capacity 
To understand how the fiduciary relationship is essentially autonomy promoting it will first 
help to get clearer on what exactly its defining features are. What does it really mean to 
say that a fiduciary is “authorized” to exercise “discretionary power” over the “significant 
practical interests” of the beneficiary? Drawing again from Miller’s influential analysis of 
the fiduciary relationship, I argue that part of the answer to this question lies in the nature 
and purpose of fiduciary power: namely, the fiduciary relationship makes possible the 
exercise of fiduciary power as a means—or capacity—by which the beneficiary is able to 
pursue, set, or determine her autonomous ends.242 Fiduciary power is therefore what I call 
a “relational capacity,” one that enables individuals (beneficiaries) to meet important 
needs and pursue meaningful projects and interests. Fiduciary power, and by extension the 
fiduciary relationship, enables individuals to pursue and procure important interests, 
without which they would simply fail to lead autonomous lives.  
We have already seen that the purpose of the fiduciary relationship is to enable interactions 
in which one party (the fiduciary) is authorized to exercise discretionary power over the 
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significant practical interests of another (the beneficiary). It is the fiduciary’s authority to 
exercise discretionary power that is peculiar to the fiduciary relationship.243 Fiduciary 
power is exercised on behalf of the beneficiary’s “significant practical interests.” Recall 
that a beneficiary’s interests are “practical” where they implicate matters of personality, 
welfare, or right.244  Personality refers to interests significant to one’s identity, such as the 
determination of one’s ends; welfare includes decisions bearing on one’s physical, 
psychological, or economic well-being, and right concerns decisions about one’s moral or 
legal rights.245 Clearly, practical interests comprise many of those interests that are central 
to self-determination and autonomous action.  
These “practical interests” are united in the following way. It is only through the 
authorization of the bearer of those interests (the beneficiary) that the fiduciary obtains the 
capacity to exercise discretionary power in relation to these specific interests. For this 
reason, Miller notes that fiduciary power is by nature authorized, relational, and 
specific.246 Let me elaborate.  
First, as an autonomous agent with the capacity to will and set ends for herself, the 
beneficiary grants the fiduciary the authority to use her discretionary power to further her 
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beneficiary’s authorization “legitimates conduct that would otherwise be illegitimate or 
positively wrongful.”248 Miller says that fiduciary power thus “alters the normative 
conditions under which people interact,” insofar as it “legitimates the subjection of the 
beneficiary’s capacity to set and pursue certain significant practical interests for herself to 
the will of the fiduciary.”249 In other words, the authorization of fiduciary power renders 
otherwise wrongful conduct—i.e., the subjection of one’s moral or legal capacity to 
another—permissible.  
Second, fiduciary power is relational insofar as it is exercised on behalf of the beneficiary. 
Miller says the relationality of fiduciary power is “substitutive.”250 In acting on behalf of 
the beneficiary’s interests the fiduciary “stands in substitution for that person within the 
ambit of the power” specified by the fiduciary mandate.251 The authorization of fiduciary 
power “legitimates a limited form of substitution of legal [and moral] personality.”252 It is 
the discretionary nature of fiduciary power, in particular, that has this substitutive effect 
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according to Miller. The fiduciary’s ambit for discretionary power means that she is not “a 
mere proxy.” Agents, with no or severely limited discretionary powers, act for their 
principals—not on their behalf. Conversely, fiduciaries literally act on behalf of their 
beneficiaries. The fiduciary acts in the beneficiary’s capacity by effectuating her will. In 
other words, at least within the scope of vested authority, the fiduciary “exercise[s] 
judgment in determining whether, when, and how it [i.e., fiduciary authority] is to be acted 
upon.”253  
Third, specificity reveals that the substitutive nature of fiduciary power is ultimately 
limited. The fiduciary does not, after all, “overtake the personality” of the beneficiary. 
Rather the fiduciary’s power is usually circumscribed to a specific mandate, capacity, 
interest, or end.  Fiduciary power thus remains a means by which the beneficiary 
effectuates her will. Hence, it is not entirely accurate to say that it is the fiduciary’s will to 
which the beneficiary subjects her own. Instead, the beneficiary authorizes the fiduciary in 
a limited capacity to execute her own will. As McLeod and Ryman point out, fiduciary 
discretion is not only exercised on behalf of the beneficiary’s will but also informed by 
discussions about the beneficiary’s values, beliefs, and interests. As we saw above, it is 
through dialogue and joint deliberation that the fiduciary is able to learn the beneficiary’s 
choice—or will—and use her (often professional) fiduciary power to carry out that decision 
and effectuate her will. Put simply, it is in relation to the beneficiary’s will that the 
fiduciary exercises her fiduciary powers. It is in this way that the fiduciary can be seen as 
a “relational capacity” through which the beneficiary carries out her will.254 
In sum, these features of fiduciary power—authority, specificity, and relationality—reveal 
the purpose for which the power is held, and thus the purpose of the fiduciary relationship 
itself: to serve as a relational means by the which the beneficiary pursues her autonomous 
will. As Miller puts it, “fiduciary power, and by extension the fiduciary relationship, thus 
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enables one person to act purposively on behalf of another.”255 Furthermore, Miller says 
that fiduciary power is derived from the “capacities constitutive of the legal [and moral] 
personality of another person, [and therefore] cannot but be understood as an extension of 
that other person’s personality.”256 Again we see that, as an extension of beneficiary’s 
personality, fiduciary power is a relational capacity through which she pursues her self-
directed projects, plans, or causes. 
When the nature and purpose of fiduciary power is considered in light of a relational 
constitutive theory of autonomy, the essentially autonomy-promoting function of the 
fiduciary relationship becomes clear. On a constitutive view of relational autonomy, certain 
relationships constitute the “defining conditions” of autonomy. We require access to 
myriad relationships to pursue important plans, projects, and causes essential to meaningful 
self-governance. Self-governance requires of autonomous agents that they have “de facto 
power and authority over choices and actions significant to the direction of [their lives].”257 
Given the nature of complex, interconnected global societies, this power requires that they 
have access to a variety of fiduciary relationships, from healthcare professionals who 
enable them to act upon health-related decisions, to governments who are tasked with 
effectuating their interests in liberty and security. Conversely, severely constraining these 
external conditions—i.e., relationships—undermines the de facto power required for 
autonomy.258 Without the aid and support of fiduciary relationships, in particular, we 
would simply lack some of the conditions necessary to secure important needs or to pursue 
identity-conferring projects. Fiduciary relationships are essential to enabling individuals, 
through the use fiduciary power, to maintain de facto power and authority over their 
significant practical interests by authorizing others, often with a specific set of skills or 
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knowledge, to carry out their autonomous decisions. Lastly, this vital purpose—of 
promoting autonomy—gives the fiduciary relationship a foundation in morality.  
2.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued that the fiduciary relationship is not only not paternalistic, it 
is essential to our autonomy. I began by outlining and then applying Harding’s analysis of 
Equity’s interest in governing institutions to the fiduciary relationship. I argued that the 
fiduciary relationship is in fact an “institution” as Harding defines it. I suggested 
furthermore that Chapter 1 provides historical support for the claim that Equity has taken 
an “interest” in the fiduciary relationship. I also argued that Harding’s claim that Equity 
only takes an interest in governing socially important institutions provides reciprocal 
theoretical support to the historica, argument in Chapter 1 that the fiduciary relationship 
predated, or existed prior to, its entry into English law through Chancery.  
Next, I applied Harding’s analysis to the fiduciary relationship, arguing that this 
relationship is not paternalistic. Adopting a Razian theory of autonomy, Harding argues 
that Equity promotes autonomy by individuating, maintaining, and reforming institutions 
so that they remain “viable and succeed” as distinct options through which self-governing 
agents can pursue their chosen projects, plans, or causes. Self-determination, according to 
Raz, requires agents to have meaningful choices among a “range of options” that enable 
one to embark upon, or continue to live, a “morally worthwhile life.” This requires choices 
among options beyond those allowing for the mere satisfaction of basic needs. Harding 
argues that Equity (as an arm of the liberal state) promotes autonomy by ensuring the 
continued viability of various institutions that function as “modes of human action” 
through which autonomous agents can achieve their ends. Having illustrated that the 
fiduciary relationship is in fact one such institution, I argued that—according to Harding’s 
own account—the fiduciary relationship is autonomy promoting, rather than paternalistic.  
Nevertheless, I went on to argue that Harding’s analysis does not go far enough in 
recognizing the full extent to which the fiduciary relationship promotes autonomy. I stated 
that this relationship is essential to autonomy, beyond its function simply as an “option,” 
among a range other options, from which individuals can choose in the satisfaction of their 
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ends. To make this stronger claim, I suggested that we reject Razian autonomy and adopt 
an (arguably) more plausible relational theory of autonomy. I argued that Razian autonomy 
fails to account for the essential role that relationships play in constituting the “conditions” 
that make autonomous action possible. Here, I endorsed a procedural-constitutive theory 
of relational autonomy. A procedural theory of autonomy accounts for the classical idea 
that autonomy requires certain cognitive capacities and rational processes. A constitutive 
theory of autonomy accounts for both the essential role that relationships play in the 
development of autonomy (in childhood) and the ongoing of exercise of autonomy (in 
adulthood). On a procedural-constitutive theory of autonomy, relationships constitute the 
“background conditions” that make self-governance possible. In other words, without 
various relationships (such as those with parents and professionals) our autonomy would 
be severely curtailed.  
It is therefore with a procedural-constitutive theory of autonomy in mind that I proposed 
we understand the autonomy-promoting function of the fiduciary relationship. I argued that 
fiduciary relationships comprise some of the most important relationships in the relational 
web that constitute conditions that make meaningful self-governance possible. Fiduciary 
relationships encompass a wide array of social and professional relationships without 
which we would simply be unable to be meaningfully self-governing. Parents (or 
guardians), as fiduciaries, are essential to enabling children to develop critical autonomy 
skills and capacities in adulthood. Even in adulthood, however, we continue to rely on a 
multitude of relationships to secure our ends and pursue meaningful projects, plans, or 
causes. In complex modern societies characterized by the compartmentalization of 
knowledge, skill, and expertise, many of these important fiduciary relationships are 
professional in nature; teachers, doctors, lawyers, financial advisors, and other 
professionals make possible the pursuit and satisfaction of our autonomous ends. Adopting 
Miller’s “fiduciary powers” theory, I argued that fiduciary relationships can be helpfully 
understood as a relational capacity through which individuals carry out their autonomous 
wills. Through dialogue and joint deliberation, the fiduciary comes to learn not only the 
beneficiary’s beliefs, values, and preferences, but also the beneficiary’s choices. In a word, 
the fiduciary uses the power conferred on her by the beneficiary in determining how best 
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to carry out the beneficiary’s will; by making it possible for the beneficiary to pursue her 
self-directed ends, the fiduciary relationship thereby promotes her autonomy.  
As mentioned, an important implication of this argument is that the fiduciary relationship 
is not paternalistic. Rather, to the extent that it is the very function, or raison d’etre,259 of 
the fiduciary to be a relational capacity by which autonomous agents (beneficiaries) are 
able to pursue their freely chosen ends, the fiduciary relationship is essentially autonomy 
promoting. Another implication of this argument is that, insofar as the fiduciary 
relationship is essential to autonomy, it is a moral relationship. In Chapter 1, I argued that 
the moral nature of the fiduciary relationship is grounded in the critical role it plays in 
fostering social harmony, by enabling individuals to trust or reliably depend on one 
another. The argument in this chapter could be viewed as fleshing out the argument of 
Chapter 1. The fiduciary relationship fosters broad societal cooperation, and thus ultimately 
social harmony, by making possible the conditions in which autonomy can flourish. When 
autonomy is understood relationally, it becomes clear that autonomy and social cooperation 
are inextricably linked, where one mutually reinforces the other. It is the nature and quality 
of our relationships that determines the degree to which we are both autonomous and are 
able to cooperate in harmony together. A society founded on cooperative relationships that 
enable individuals to pursue their self-directed ends, and to live an authentic and “morally 
worthwhile” life, will likely also be one in which individuals live in relative harmony. 
Jointly, Chapters 1 and 2 show that the moral grounding of the fiduciary relationship lies 
in the essential role it plays in promoting relational autonomy. 
This understanding of the fiduciary relationship helps to mitigate the problems of both 
legal-moral equivocation and paternalism. The worry about applying the normative 
prescriptions of the fiduciary relationship to the ethical problems of medical and research 
ethics is diminished once we recognize that this relationship is moral in nature. The worry 
that the fiduciary relationship is paternalistic, and therefore represents an inappropriate 
ethical model for the relationship between healthcare professionals and their patients, is 
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alleviated once we see the moral role that the fiduciary relationship plays in fostering 
autonomy. By mitigating these two problems, I hope to have removed two important 
conceptual hurdles to the widespread application of the fiduciary framework to the ethical 
problems of bioethics. In the next chapter, I illustrate the practical utility of this framework 






Chapter 3  
3 An Ethical Analysis of the SUPPORT Trial: Addressing 
Challenges Posed by a Pragmatic Comparative 
Effectiveness Randomized Controlled Trial 
In the forgoing two chapters, I argued that the fiduciary relationship is an important moral 
relationship, informed by an underlying moral obligation and grounded in the essential role 
that the relationship plays in promoting autonomy. I argued that when we understand that 
autonomy is fundamentally relational, the indispensable role that specifically fiduciary 
relationships play in enabling individuals to plan, set, and pursue their self-directed ends 
becomes plain.  
As societies increase in complexity, so too does the compartmentalization of knowledge, 
skill, and expertise, leading to profound interdependence and requiring involved systems 
and institutions of social and economic cooperation. It is an inescapable feature of human 
experience that we exist in relation to, and with, others. Indeed, on the procedural-
constitutive theory of relational autonomy I endorsed in the previous chapter, our 
relationships comprise the very background conditions that constitute autonomy itself. In 
other words, our autonomy is inextricably bound up with, and fundamentally dependent 
upon, our relationships with others. Without the care and guidance of parents, teachers, 
and caregivers in childhood, the “skills” and capacities necessary for autonomy would fail 
to develop properly, or even at all. In adulthood, our countless relationships, with family, 
friends, colleagues, professionals, and even with the state makes possible the ongoing 
pursuit and achievement of our self-directed ends.  
In modern complex societies, in particular, the relationality of autonomy has arguably 
taken on even greater significance, requiring us to trust or depend upon others with very 
specific areas of expertise or skillsets.260 These individuals, often professionals, act as 
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gatekeepers to important needs and interests essential to meaningful self-governance. 
Moreover, many of these individuals are fiduciaries: we authorize these individuals to act 
on behalf of, and in relation to, our specific “significant practical interests.” But the scope 
of this fiduciary power is delimited precisely in this way; namely, by its being authorized, 
relational, and specific. It is for this reason that I argued fiduciary power is a “relational 
capacity” by which a beneficiary is able to effectuate her will and pursue her significant 
practical interests. “Practical interests,” in turn, implicate interests crucial to autonomy, 
including interests in personality (e.g., identity), welfare (e.g., basic needs), and right (e.g., 
to equality). The role that fiduciaries play as both gatekeepers to those “significant practical 
interests” necessary for meaningful self-governance, and the way in which they function 
as a relational capacity by which individuals are able to pursue those interests, makes the 
fiduciary relationship essential to meaningful self-governance, or autonomy. Furthermore, 
by enabling individuals to trust or reliably depend on one another in the context of a specific 
mode of human action, fiduciary relationships also play an important role in fostering 
social harmony. I noted in the previous chapter that when we understand autonomy as 
relational it becomes clear that enabling individuals to trust and depend on one another in 
the pursuit of their self-directed ends, simultaneously fosters both social harmony and 
individual autonomy. Together, these functions provide a foundation for the fiduciary 
relationship in morality.  
Recall from the Introduction that this dissertation is motivated by the promise of the 
fiduciary relationship to provide conceptual clarity to the difficult ethical issues that arise 
between healthcare professionals and their patients. The fiduciary relationship has already 
proven auspicious in providing clarity to longstanding and sometimes heated bioethical 
debates, such as those pertaining to commercial surrogacy, conscientious objection, and an 
important ethical concept in research ethics known as “clinical equipoise.”261 Given the 
promise of the fiduciary relationship, this dissertation is also motivated to address two 
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apparent obstacles to its widespread acceptance and application within bioethics: namely, 
legal-moral equivocation and paternalism. I pointed out that equivocation and paternalism 
present two substantial conceptual hurdles to the cogent use of the fiduciary relationship 
as an ethical framework—specifically as applied to ethical issues that arise between 
healthcare professionals and their patients. I sought to address these problems in the 
previous two chapters by arguing, ultimately, that the fiduciary relationship is a moral 
relationship grounded in its essential role in promoting autonomy.  
In this chapter, I intend to put the fiduciary relationship to use in my own bioethical 
analysis. Specifically, my goals in this chapter are twofold. First, by applying a fiduciary 
analysis to a real-world debate about an ethically divisive randomized clinical trial (RCT), 
known as the SUPPORT trial, I intend to provide a meaningful contribution to a particular 
issue in research ethics. Second, in so doing, I aim to illustrate the practical utility of the 
fiduciary relationship for clarifying ethical problems that arise in the context of healthcare 
professional-patient relationships. I therefore hope to show how the fiduciary relationship 
can be used for thinking clearly and systematically about the different ethical roles and 
duties physicians and researchers have with respect to their patients and participants, 
respectively. For instance, when we identify an individual as a “fiduciary,” they are held 
to the demands of the fiduciary obligation, which, in turn, have their own ethical 
implications (such as the kind of behaviour that is either prescribed, or proscribed, with 
respect to the beneficiary’s interests). Alternatively, it can be equally helpful for systematic 
ethical analysis to determine who is not a fiduciary, and thus not subject to the demands of 
the fiduciary obligation. Accordingly, in this chapter, I argue that the ethical crux at the 
centre of the debate about the SUPPORT trial concerns the question of who is a fiduciary, 
who is not a fiduciary, and ultimately what that means for conceptualizing various aspects 
of the SUPPORT study protocol.  
Furthermore, as we will see shortly, the SUPPORT trial concerns not only parents or 
guardians, but also their (nonautonomous) premature infants as potential beneficiaries, and 
therefore constitutes a “hard case” for the application the fiduciary analysis I developed in 
the previous two chapters. I briefly noted in the previous chapter that, for the sake of 
simplicity, I would concern my analysis primarily with paradigm fiduciary relationships 
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in which the beneficiary is autonomous. In other words, my argument that the fiduciary 
relationship serves as relational capacity through which the beneficiary is able to pursue 
her autonomous ends requires that, at the outset, the beneficiary has the requisite capacity 
to authorize the fiduciary to wield her fiduciary power in the pursuit of the beneficiary’s 
self-directed ends. Infants, however, clearly lack the capacity to authorize the exercise of 
fiduciary power on their own behalf (although some children, not infants, may be said to 
have the capacity to deny or withdraw consent for certain treatments). Moreover, lacking 
autonomy, it is not clear that infants and children can even have “self-directed” ends. It 
would therefore appear that where the beneficiary lacks the necessary autonomy “skills” 
or capacities, the fiduciary relationship cannot be seen as an extension of the beneficiary’s 
will. Accordingly, I discuss the implications of this “hard case” for my analysis of the 
fiduciary relationship in this chapter.  
The bulk of the remainder of this chapter is taken from a previously published co-authored 
article, albeit with substantial updates and revisions to appropriately apply the analysis 
developed in the previous two chapters.262 Section 3.7, in particular, has been substantially 
updated and should therefore be understood as reflecting only my own views and analysis, 
not those of my co-authors. To signal that shift, in section 3.7 I abandon the first-person 
plural pronoun “we” (which I use throughout, save for this introduction) and adopt instead 
the first-person singular pronoun “I”.  
Section 3.1 begins by explaining the ethical problem posed by an innovative research 
methodology, known as the pragmatic comparative effectiveness randomized controlled 
trial (ceRCT), of which the SUPPORT trial is (purportedly) a token example. Section 3.2 
provides important background information including the motivation for conducting the 
SUPPORT trial, and the relevant details of the trial itself. Section 3.3 describes the ethical 
debate that followed the publication of the results of the trial, bifurcating the various 
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arguments into “defenders” and “critics” of SUPPORT. In section 3.4, we explain how the 
debate fails to identify the central ethical issue raised by SUPPORT. We argue that the 
central issue is whether we ought to conceptualize the SUPPORT trial interventions as 
clinical research or medical practice. Accordingly, in section 3.5, we provide a brief primer 
on the “research-practice” distinction and, specifically, the important role that the fiduciary 
relationship plays in demarcating clinical research from medical practice. With this 
groundwork laid, section 3.6 entertains the view that the SUPPORT trial interventions 
ought to be conceptualized as practice. However, in section 3.7, I reject this view and 
argue—using a fiduciary analysis—that the SUPPORT trial interventions ought to be 
conceptualized as research. We conclude, in section 3.8, by considering the implications 
of this analysis for similar ethical problems and by emphasizing the utility of the fiduciary 
relationship for providing conceptual clarity to complex bioethical issues, such as those 
posed by the SUPPORT trial.  
3.1 Pragmatic Comparative Effective Trials 
Pragmatic comparative effectiveness randomized controlled trials (ceRCTs) evaluate the 
effectiveness of one (or more) interventions under real-world clinical conditions.263 The 
results of ceRCTs are often directly generalizable to everyday clinical practice, providing 
information critical to decision-making by patients, clinicians, and healthcare 
policymakers. The PRECIS-2 framework identifies nine domains that serve to score a trial 
on a continuum between very explanatory to very pragmatic.264 According to the 
framework, pragmatic trials may have one or more of the following features: there are 
fewer eligibility criteria for participants, in an effort to mirror the target patient population; 
the implementation of study interventions occurs in real-world clinical settings; the 
 
263
 See Daniel Schwartz and Joseph Lellouch, “Explanatory and Pragmatic Attitudes in Therapeutical 
Trials,” Journal of Chronic Diseases 20, no. 8 (1967): 637–48; and Ian Ford and John Norrie, “Pragmatic 
Trials,” New England Journal of Medicine 375, no. 5 (2016): 454–63.  
264 Kirsty Loudon, Shaun Treweek, Frank Sullivan, Peter Donnan, Kevin E. Thorpe, and Merrick 
Zwarenstein, “The PRECIS-2 Tool: Designing Trials that Are Fit for Purpose,” British Medical Journal 




intervention and its delivery do not require specialized training for clinicians or staff, and 
thus allow for flexibility in how the interventions are delivered; there is no special strategy 
for monitoring protocol compliance; patient monitoring and follow-up occur as in routine 
clinical practice; outcomes are clinically meaningful and patient-oriented; and all 
randomized patients are included in the analysis.265  
The pragmatism movement in medical research has gained momentum in recent years 
owing to a multitude of factors, including: increased attention to waste in medical research; 
pervasive and persistent unexplained variability in clinical practice; high rates of 
inappropriate care; and increased healthcare expenditures.266 Historically, the majority of 
RCTs have been explanatory in design. Explanatory trials are often conducted under tightly 
controlled conditions—such as with strict recruitment and monitoring practices—in order 
to determine the efficacy of an intervention under ideal conditions. But treatments found 
to be efficacious in explanatory settings do not always prove effective in the real world. 
Accordingly, explanatory trials may fail to provide results that support decision-making by 
patients, healthcare providers, research funders, and policymakers and they may, thereby, 
merely contribute to research waste. Recently, there has been increasing recognition that 
the need for evidence to inform healthcare decision-making requires a shift to pragmatic 
ceRCTs. Reflecting this insight, ceRCTs have been identified as strategic funding priorities 
by the Canadian Institute of Health Research’s Strategy for Patient-Oriented Research, and 
the U.S. Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute.267  
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Of particular importance for healthcare decision-making are pragmatic ceRCTs that 
involve usual care interventions. Pragmatic ceRCTs of usual care interventions are a type 
of comparative effectiveness trial that evaluate the effectiveness of one or more 
interventions used routinely in medical practice, head-to-head. Usual care interventions, or 
medically recognized standards of care, “are treatments or procedures that have been 
accepted by medical experts as appropriate treatments or procedures for a given type of 
disease or condition, and are commonly used by healthcare professionals.”268 Comparative 
effectiveness RCTs involving usual care interventions offer an opportunity to improve 
healthcare by answering clinically relevant questions about the comparative effectiveness 
of treatments (or policies) used routinely in clinical practice. Through integration with cost-
effectiveness analyses, usual care ceRCTs can also inform decision-makers about treatment 
costs in the real world. Comparative effectiveness RCTs involving usual care interventions 
can therefore help to reduce variations in care, improve uptake of evidence-based practice, 
reduce treatment costs, and improve patient outcomes.  
All research involving human participants must conform to high scientific and ethical 
standards. Contemporary research ethics is founded upon four internationally accepted 
ethical principles: respect for persons, beneficence, justice, and respect for communities. 
These principles serve as the ethical foundation for global guidance documents and 
national regulatory frameworks.269 The principles aim, first and foremost, to protect the 
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liberty and welfare interests of individual patients. (Protections for communities are a 
recent innovation.) But the existing ethical and regulatory frameworks were developed 
with explanatory trials in mind. The traditional ethical framework assumes a clear 
distinction between research and clinical practice; the tightly controlled conditions under 
which explanatory trials are designed make the demarcation of the research components 
from practice components of the trial relatively straightforward. This is because the 
traditional research–practice distinction assumes the domain of clinical practice is largely 
autonomous and self-regulated; hence, not only is third-party review not necessary, but the 
norms of the physician–patient relationship prohibit such outside interference. Conversely, 
third-party review is both justified and necessary in the research domain.  
But with the move towards pragmatic ceRCTs, traditional ethical guidance is more difficult 
to interpret. Pragmatic ceRCTs intermingle interventions routinely used in clinical practice 
with research, and this belies a straightforward distinction between research and practice. 
The lack of guidance on interpreting internationally accepted research ethics principles in 
the context of ceRCTs of usual care interventions has left researchers and research ethics 
committees without a unified and systematic method of ethical analysis for these critically 
important trials. As a result, research participants are left vulnerable to the unavoidably 
capricious judgments of individual researchers and research ethics committees. This has, 
in turn, led to controversies in the wake of a few ceRCTs, resulting in unnecessary and 
costly delays. The absence of clear ethical guidance for ceRCTs therefore poses a practical 
threat to the conduct of this socially valuable research. 
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3.2 The SUPPORT Trial 
The Surfactant, Positive pressure, and Pulse Oximetry Randomized Trial (SUPPORT) 
provides a timely and poignant example of the kinds of ethical controversies to which 
ceRCTs give rise. Premature infants are at a substantial risk of mortality and morbidity, 
including retinopathy of prematurity—an important cause of blindness—and neurological 
impairment.270 Due to the incomplete development of their lungs, premature infants 
commonly receive supplemental oxygen. The historical use of supplemental oxygen in 
neonatology dates back to the early 1940s.271 In those early years, unrestricted or “liberal” 
use of supplemental oxygen (up to 100% inspired oxygen) resulted in drastic reductions in 
rates of mortality; however, underdevelopment of the lungs and eyes renders oxygen 
uniquely toxic to preterm infants. Unrestricted oxygen use has since been associated with 
various morbidities, such as retinopathy, neurological impairment, and lung toxicity.272 
Over the past seven decades, numerous studies—both randomized and nonrandomized—
have been conducted in an effort to determine the optimal oxygen saturation range that 
reduces both mortality and morbidity. On the one hand, some studies suggest that the 
incidence of retinopathy may be lower in preterm infants exposed to reduced levels of 
oxygenation than in those exposed to higher levels of oxygenation.273 On the other hand, 
studies have also indicated that reduced levels of oxygenation may lead to increased rates 
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of mortality.274 A 2009 Cochrane Review concluded that “the question of what is the 
optimal target range for maintaining blood oxygen levels remains unclear, [and thus] 
further research should be undertaken to resolve this important clinical question.”275 The 
range of oxygen saturation used routinely in neonatology intensive care units at the outset 
and during the course of the SUPPORT trial fell within a range between 85% to 95%.276  
Nonetheless, as justification for their study design, the SUPPORT trial authors say that it 
was “becoming common practice to use lower target ranges of oxygen saturation with the 
goal of reducing the risk of retinopathy of prematurity.”277  
Owing to this uncertainty, and the purported trend in clinical practice at the time, the 
SUPPORT trial sought to determine the optimal saturation target levels of supplemental 
oxygen in preterm infants for minimizing retinopathy without increasing adverse 
outcomes, including death. The SUPPORT investigators conducted a multi-centre 
randomized controlled trial, with a 2-by-2 factorial design, comparing two target levels of 
oxygen saturation, and two ventilation approaches.278 The oxygen saturation component of 
the trial compared a lower target range of oxygen saturation, 85% to 89%, with a higher 
target range, 91% to 95%, on a composite primary outcome measure—a combination of 
multiple study endpoints—of severe retinopathy of prematurity or death.279 
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Eligible infants included those born between 24 weeks and 28 weeks of gestation for whom 
a decision to provide full resuscitation had been made.280 A total of 1316 infants were 
randomized. The study was reviewed and approved by 22 research ethics committees (the 
precise number of study sites is unclear), and written informed consent was obtained from 
the parent or guardian of each child before delivery.281 To be clear, while parents or 
guardians provided consent for trial participation, it was their premature infants who 
received the study interventions (supplemental oxygen) and were therefore the study 
participants.  
Investigators ensured that blinding, or masking, was maintained with the use of 
electronically altered-pulse oximeters.282 A pulse oximeter is a noninvasive device that 
enables clinicians to continuously monitor the level of oxygen saturation in the patient’s 
bloodstream. The altered-pulse oximeters showed saturation levels between 88% to 92% 
for both low and high target oxygen saturations arms, with a maximum variation of 3%. 
For instance, a reading of 90% corresponded to actual levels of 87% in the low-oxygen 
(85% to 89%) saturation arm, and 93% in the high-oxygen saturation arm (91% to 95%) 
of the trial.283 Clinicians were therefore told to maintain oxygen saturation levels between 
88% and 92% with the use of the altered-pulse oximeters, ensuring that they were unaware 
to which study intervention the individual patient had been randomized. In an effort to 
ensure that infants were not inadvertently exposed to oxygen saturation levels beyond the 
range usual care (85% to 95%), the algorithm used for the altered-pulse oximeters 
gradually reverted back to actual (non-altered) values when readings were less than 84%, 
or higher than 96%, in both treatment groups. As an additional safeguard, an alarm was 
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triggered when actual oxygen saturation levels reached 85% or lower, and 95% or 
higher.284  
The results of the trial showed no significant difference in the rate of the composite primary 
outcome (severe retinopathy or death before discharge) between the low- and high-oxygen 
saturation arms (28.3% and 32.1%, respectively; relative risk with lower oxygen saturation, 
0.90; 95% confidence interval, 0.76 to 1.06; P = 0.21). However, a prospective analysis 
revealed that infants in the low-oxygen saturation arm were subject to an increased risk of 
death, while survivors experienced reduced rates of severe retinopathy.285 In other words, 
while instances of severe retinopathy were significantly lower in infants administered low 
target oxygen saturation (8.6% versus 17.9%; relative risk, 0.52; 95% CI, 0.37 to 0.73; P 
< 0.001; number needed to treat, 11), mortality was significantly higher in the low target 
oxygen saturation intervention, when compared with the high target oxygen saturation 
intervention (19.9% versus 16.2% relative risk, 1.27; 95% CI, 1.01 to 1.60; P = 0.04; 
number needed to harm, 27).286  
Given the purported trend in clinical practice toward lower target ranges of oxygen 
saturation in order reduce the risk of retinopathy of prematurity, the evidence from 
SUPPORT “adds to the concern that oxygen restriction may increase the rate of death 
among preterm infants.”287 Indeed, the results of the trial suggest that there is one 
additional death for each two cases of severe retinopathy prevented. The investigators thus 
concluded by urging that “caution should be exercised regarding a strategy of targeting 
levels of oxygen saturation in the low range for preterm infants, since it may lead to 














Following the publication of the trial in the New England Journal of Medicine in 2010, an 
anonymous complaint was filed against the SUPPORT trial investigators, regarding what 
it claimed were egregious inadequacies in the content of the informed consent documents. 
In response, the U.S. Office for Human Research Protections launched a formal 
investigation into the SUPPORT trial. They sought to “evaluate allegations of 
noncompliance with the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) regulations for 
the protection of human research subjects (45 CFR part 46).”289 In conformity with a 
section of U.S. regulations, known as the Common Rule, researchers are required to provide 
research-participants with “a description of any reasonably foreseeable risks and 
discomforts” (45 CFR 46.116(a)(2)).  However, only two of the 22 approved informed 
consent documents included blindness as a risk of participation in the trial, while none of 
the informed consent documents disclosed death as a reasonably foreseeable risk of study 
participation.  
The investigators appear to have elected not to inform parents or guardians of these risks 
according to the rationale that “all of the treatments proposed in the study are standard of 
care, [and therefore] there is no predictable increase in risk for your baby.”290 The only risk 
investigators disclosed in the “possible risks” section of the 20 informed consent 
documents—those that did not list either blindness or death as research risks related to the 
use of the pulse oximeter—was “the possible risk of skin breakdown at the site.”291  
Upon investigation, the U.S. Office for Human Research Protections concluded that “the 
anticipated risks and potential benefits of being in the study were not the same as the risks 
and potential benefits of receiving standard of care.”292 They argued that, “for the infants 
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assigned to the upper range [. . .] the risk of ROP [retinopathy of prematurity] was greater, 
while for the infants assigned to the lower range the risk of ROP was lower,” and therefore 
the risks should have been disclosed to the parents or guardians of participating infants.293 
The Office for Human Research Protections therefore determined “that the conduct of this 
study was in violation of the regulatory requirements for informed consent, stemming from 
the failure to describe the reasonably foreseeable risks of blindness, neurological damage 
and death.”294 
3.3 The Debate on the SUPPORT Trial 
The U.S. Office for Human Research Protections determination incited considerable debate 
in the literature. While the determination focused on the alleged inadequacies in the content 
of the informed consent documents, the debate on the SUPPORT trial has focused 
primarily on whether infants were in fact exposed to increased risk as a result of trial 
participation. On the one hand, critics of the SUPPORT trial argue that various features of 
the study posed an a priori (as opposed to post hoc) increase in risk to enrolled infants, 
when compared with infants not so enrolled; that is, critics argue that the risks associated 
with low range oxygen supplementation in preterm infants was known before the onset of 
the trial, based on the previously mentioned preliminary data. On the other hand, defenders 
of the SUPPORT trial argue that participation in the trial did not pose an a priori increase 
in risk to enrolled infants compared to those infants treated in clinical practice as the study 
inventions were standard care.  
3.3.1 Critics of the SUPPORT Trial 
The SUPPORT trial has garnered much criticism.295 Broadly speaking, critics of the 
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relationship (or at least some of its duties), arguing that certain features of the study 
compromised the fiduciary duties the physician owes to her patient.296 They argue that 
aspects of the study design and implementation violate the physician’s duty to exercise her 
personal judgment in the best interests of the individual patient. George J. Annas and 
Catherine L. Annas, for instance, argue that “in treatment a patient has a physician who is 
bound by a fiduciary duty to act in the patient’s best interests.”297 These critics argue that 
the lack of physician judgment exposed enrolled infants to increased risk compared to 
patients who are not part of a research study; as fiduciaries, physicians are required to 
exercise their professional judgment, and discretion, when acting on behalf of their 
patient’s medical interests. Randomization to treatment protocols undermines physician 
discretion and, ostensibly, increases risk to enrolled infants. Annas and Annas thus 
conclude that, “the primary argument [that] . . . no new risks were introduced to the patient 
is explicitly rejected by this court.”298  
Second, some critics argue that the study was not appropriately designed to answer the 
primary study question.299 For instance, Charles Natanson argues that in cases in which a 
given standard of care is specified across a range, randomizing patients to the extremes of 
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that range no longer constitutes the medical standard of care.300 He argues that this creates 
“practice misalignments which carry risks and do not represent usual care.”301 This concern 
was also echoed in the U.S. Office for Human Research Protections determination. They 
argued that enrolled infants had a greater chance of receiving an oxygen saturation at the 
low, or high, extremes of the range (i.e., 85% or 95%, respectively) that comprised the 
(then-current) standard of care: 
[P]articipating in the study would have significantly increased the chance of an 
infant being assigned to oxygen levels at both the very low (85% to 88%) and the 
very high ends (92% to 95%), as opposed to the level they would have received 
[88% to 92%], had they not been in the study. (OHRP 2013, 4) 
As a result, the U.S. Office for Human Research Protections argued that it was “much more 
likely that they [i.e., enrolled infants] would be within the range in which there were 
significant concerns about increased mortality,” when compared with infants treated in 
clinical practice.302 In other words, Natanson argues that the low and high oxygen 
saturation range interventions do not reflect usual care, and therefore the SUPPORT trial 
does not compare one or more “usual care” ranges.303 
Third, and finally, some authors claim that particular features of the study design exposed 
infants to additional risk over that of routine clinical practice.304 They argue, variously, that 
randomization, treatment by protocol, and the use of altered-pulse oximeters ultimately 
exposed infants enrolled in the SUPPORT trial to increased risks of retinopathy, 
neurological damage, and death, when compared with infants not so enrolled. 
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3.3.2 Defenders of the SUPPORT Trial 
John Lantos, who is among the most prolific and forceful defenders of the SUPPORT trial, 
disagrees with the above objections.305 Lantos argues that infants enrolled in the SUPPORT 
trial were not exposed to increased risk when compared with those infants treated within 
clinical practice. Lantos claims that there are ethically relevant differences between 
ceRCTs of usual care interventions and randomized trials who compare a novel 
intervention with a control; accordingly, he argues that new regulations are needed for 
ceRCTs.  
First, Lantos claims that the purpose of so-called “innovative therapy research”—i.e., a 
clinical trial with a novel intervention—is different from that of ceRCTs of usual care 
interventions. In the former, Lantos says the risks and benefits are “truly unknown,” and 
thus the aim is to “better characterize the safety and efficacy profile of the new 
treatment.”306 In ceRCTs of usual care interventions, by contrast, he says that “both 
therapies are in widespread use and can be considered standard”;307 consequently, “much 
is known about them,” including knowledge about their potential harms and benefits.308 
Second, Lantos notes that the therapy patients receive within a ceRCT is not appreciably 
different from the therapy they would receive outside of the study. In other words, if a 
patient chose not to enroll in a ceRCT comparing usual care interventions, they would 
nonetheless “get the exact same treatment,” namely, the existing standard of care.309 Lantos 
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argues that this is unlike a scenario in which a patient opts out of a randomized controlled 
trial with a novel intervention, or, as he calls it, “innovative therapy research”; this is 
because patients that opt out of a trial with a novel intervention would no longer be exposed 
to the “innovative therapy” but would instead receive the existing standard of care. Finally, 
Lantos argues that ceRCTs involving usual care interventions do not pose an increased risk 
to study participants because the treatment arms are not appreciably different from routine 
clinical practice. 
Lantos therefore disagrees with critics who claim that the SUPPORT trial exposed infants 
to increased risk. To those critics who argue that features of the design undermine the 
physician’s fiduciary duties to her patient, Lantos responds by pointing out that “these 
criticisms of SUPPORT [. . .] can be generalized as criticisms of any prospective 
randomized clinical trial.”310 Accordingly, he suggests that we ought to consider how these 
apparently ethically problematic aspects of the design of randomized controlled trials have 
been addressed in the past.  
Furthermore, Lantos suggests that concerns about treatment by protocol and the use of 
altered-pulse oximeters are similarly misplaced. For instance, in their determination letter 
the U.S. Office for Human Research Protections argued that 
[w]hen there is a range of oxygen levels within the standard of care, clinicians (and 
their institutions) often do, in fact, make their own determinations regarding which 
oxygen levels within that range to employ in treating their patients. Some 
physicians, recognizing the particular concerns about risks near the low (85%) and 
high (95%) ends of that range, might choose to avoid one or both of those 
regions.311  
However, citing neonatologist Keith Barrington,312 Lantos claims that neonatologists do 
not, in fact, make “decisions about oxygen saturation targets for each patient based on the 
 
310 Ibid., 32. 
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patient’s particular clinical situation and their clinical judgment about whether a lower or 
higher oxygen saturation should be targeted”; rather, “neonatologists always treat babies 
by protocol.”313 Lantos thus concludes that the argument that infants were exposed to 
increased risk as a result of the physician’s inability to exercise her personal judgment on 
behalf of her patient, due to various features of the study design, “are particularly irrelevant 
to the SUPPORT controversy.”314  
Finally, Lantos rejects Natanson’s and the U.S. Office for Human Research Protection’s 
claim that practice misalignments posed increased risk to enrolled infants. He says that the 
standard of care does not fall neatly within the 85% to 95% range, and so, rather than 
imagining that the conventional treatment at the time was to target 85[%] to 95[%], 
a more accurate statement would be that, in each NICU, there was a different target 
and that most of those targets were within the range 85[%] to 95[%].315 
Furthermore, insofar as Natanson’s argument suggests that usual care involves the use of 
a physician’s judgment on behalf of the best interests of her individual patient, Lantos 
simply reiterates that the administration of oxygen for preterm infants in neonatal intensive 
care units is “provided by a predetermined protocol,” precluding the need for clinician 
discretion.316  
Lantos concludes that concerns about the design and implementation of the SUPPORT trial 
do not show that enrolled infants were exposed to increased risk. On the contrary, he argues 
that the risks and benefits associated with enrollment in the trial were not appreciably 
different from those associated with routine clinical practice. Indeed, Lantos says, “the 
primary difference is that, outside of [ceRCTs] [. . .] the choice of a treatment is [made] by 
idiosyncratic practice variation,” whereas in a ceRCT, “the treatment a patient receives is 
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determined by formal randomization.”317 What is needed, according to Lantos, are 
regulations that “acknowledge the distinctiveness” of ceRCTs involving usual care 
interventions. He says that the aforementioned aspects of the design and implementation 
of the SUPPORT trial make it “a paradigmatic case upon which to develop [such] 
regulatory policy for similar studies in the future.”318  
3.4 The Central Ethical Issue Raised by the SUPPORT 
Trial 
The debate on the SUPPORT trial has been preoccupied with interpreting U.S. regulation. 
This brief overview of the overarching arguments in the debate demonstrates that 
proponents and critics alike are predominantly focused on determining whether the 
SUPPORT trial presented “reasonably foreseeable risks” to enrolled infants, pursuant to a 
section of U.S. regulation on human participants research, known as the Common Rule (45 
CFR 46.116(a)(2)). However, insofar as pragmatic ceRCTs are a global phenomenon, the 
manifest preoccupation with U.S. regulation has made this debate largely irrelevant to an 
international audience. This is because proponents and critics alike have failed to ground 
the debate in internationally accepted ethical principles. As a result, the debate on the 
SUPPORT trial has been largely ad hoc, in that it identifies a loosely related—and not 
necessarily comprehensive—set of issues and fails to trace them to a central ethical 
principle. As a further consequence, this debate has predictably failed to provide a 
systematic analysis applicable to a broader class of pragmatic ceRCTs, based on the 
relevant underlying ethical principles.  
Our diagnosis is that the central ethical issue, or question, raised by the SUPPORT trial is 
the following: should the SUPPORT trial interventions be conceptualized as practice, or 
research? As we will see below, determining whether the trial interventions are practice or 
research turns critically on whether the fiduciary obligation of healthcare professionals 
responsible for treating enrolled infants is threatened or potentially undermined. To be 
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clear, while it is uncontroversial that the SUPPORT trial as a whole is research, the novel 
question posed by pragmatic ceRCTs involving one or more usual care interventions is 
whether the usual care intervention(s) should be conceptualized as practice, or research. 
The answer to this question will have important implications for the ethical analysis of 
ceRCTs. Indeed, how these study interventions are conceptualized will have implications 
for various downstream ethical requirements, including whether the usual care 
interventions in pragmatic ceRCTs (i) fall under the purview of research ethics, (ii) undergo 
harm–benefit analysis, and (iii) are included in informed consent procedures.  
Determining whether the usual care interventions in pragmatic ceRCTs that compare one 
or more usual care interventions constitute medical practice or clinical research is therefore 
antecedent to questions pertaining to research ethics review, analysis of study benefits and 
harms, and the content of informed consent procedures. In other words, questions 
concerning whether the study interventions in the SUPPORT trial posed additional risk to 
premature infants are subordinate to determining how the interventions ought to be 
conceptualized. Determining how the usual care interventions in pragmatic ceRCTs of 
usual care interventions ought to be conceptualized will therefore enable us to provide a 
systematic analysis of the SUPPORT trial, grounded in the relevant foundational ethical 
principles.  
3.5 The Research-Practice Distinction 
Broadly speaking, research “refers to a class of activities designed to develop or contribute 
to generalizable knowledge,” while medical practice “refers to a class of activities designed 
solely to enhance the well-being of an individual patient or client.”319 Contemporary 
research ethics, and corresponding research regulation, have evolved in response to the 
historical abuses perpetrated by researchers against research participants—including the 
German wartime experiments on prisoners, the infamous Tuskegee Study, and the Jewish 
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Chronic Disease Case320—in the name of furthering generalizable knowledge. Research 
therefore often involves the pursuit of interests that potentially undermine those of the 
individual patient: namely, the research-related interests of investigators who seek to 
“develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge,” and thereby also the interests of future 
patients, and society in general. Specifically, these competing interests have the potential 
to undermine the physician’s fiduciary obligation to remain loyal to her patient’s best 
interests, and thereby warrants prospective, and ongoing, third-party review and oversight. 
According to Fried’s seminal work in research ethics (discussed in the Introduction), the 
fiduciary relationship forms the primary basis upon which the medical practice and clinical 
research are bifurcated into distinct ethical and regulatory domains. As we explain below, 
distinguishing practice from research is the foundation upon which the current research 
ethics framework is built, and from which numerous national and international research 
ethics guidelines and regulations are derived.321 
In medical practice, the physician—qua fiduciary—is expected to exercise their 
professional knowledge, skill, and expertise, as determined by their professional judgment 
and ongoing discretion, on behalf of the patient’s best medical interests. As we have seen, 
the exercise of this “fiduciary power” is delimited by its being authorized, relational, and 
specific, and may therefore be understood as a relational capacity of the autonomous 
patient.322 Accordingly, the planning and administration of the patient’s care must involve 
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a dialogue about the patient’s will, or ends, vis-à-vis her medical interests; such a dialogue 
might concern patient values (e.g., religious, cultural, or spiritual), preferences (e.g., 
concerning treatment options or methods of delivery), medical history (e.g., 
contraindications), and any other relevant patient interests (e.g., a past trauma).323 The 
presumption that the physician is bound by the fiduciary obligation thereby obviates the 
need for prospective ethical (or legal) oversight and review of the physician-patient 
interaction. In this way, the domain of medical practice is effectively self-regulated and 
autonomous: “patient consent to care and professional autonomy are intended to ensure 
that the intervention in question is the product of joint deliberation and agreement between 
patient and doctor” (Freedman, Fuks, and Weijer 1992, 653). In other words, the 
presumption is that the medical intervention serves the patient’s interests, rather than the 
doctor’s interests. Furthermore, it is the physician’s fiduciary obligation to remain loyal to 
the patient’s interests, which protects the patient from the vulnerability inherent to the 
structure of the physician-patient relationship. Hence, it is the fiduciary nature of the 
physician-patient relationship that confers upon it its privileged (i.e., private and 
confidential) status, prohibiting any prospective third-party interference. While the 
physician-patient interaction may be reviewed retrospectively by a hospital, a council of 
peers, an administrative tribunal, or the courts (such as in a negligence or battery suit), the 
fiduciary relationship between physician and patient prohibits prior (or concurrent) review 
or oversight by third parties. 
By contrast, in clinical research the physician’s fidelity to her patient’s medical interests 
is (at least) potentially undermined by competing research-related interests, such as those 
that aim to contribute to scientific or other generalizable knowledge, the welfare of future 
patients, public health, private or institutional research agendas, and corporate affiliations 
or influence. For example, research often includes numerous interventions, or other aspects 
of a study protocol, that are performed purely for the sake of scientific validity—and thus 
in the interests of “generalizable knowledge”—such as randomization, blinding, and 
 
323 I discuss in detail below how my analysis of the fiduciary relationship as a framework for the 
physician-patient relations applies to non-autonomous beneficiaries, such as infants and children.  
131 
 
invasive or noninvasive forms of data collection (e.g., a blood draw or questionnaire). 
Hence, in the research context, there is a presumption that the physician cannot be relied 
upon to exercise her fiduciary power solely on behalf of the patient’s best medical interests. 
When the physician can no longer be entrusted or reliably depended upon to adhere to the 
demands of the fiduciary obligation, the fiduciary relationship itself dissolves, and other 
prophylactic ethical precautions are necessary and justified to protect patient-participants. 
It is the presumption that the demands of the fiduciary relationship can no longer be relied 
upon that gives rise to the separate ethical norms and rules in the context of research. The 
ethical norms and rules of research include precisely the kind of third-party oversight and 
review of physician-patient relationship that is prohibited in the medical practice context, 
such as review by RECs, ongoing oversight by data and safety monitoring committees, and 
other research specific regulations. In a word, the fiduciary relationship demarcates 
medical practical from clinical research. It is thus widely accepted that regulation, review, 
and oversight are needed in research, because the medical interests of the patient are no 
longer the sole interests at stake. Third-party review by research ethics committees, and 
research regulations, are put into place in an effort to ensure that the interests of patient-
participants are protected in the face of competing interests and in light of the consequent 
dissolution of the fiduciary relationship. 
However, the distinction between research and practice is often understood as applying to 
whether whole study protocols ought to be considered research or practice, and, 
consequently, whether they ought to be subject to review and oversight by third parties. 
But pragmatic ceRCTs that compare one or more usual care interventions introduce a new 
wrinkle on this historical problem, because they comprise elements of both practice and 
research. Indeed, as briefly mentioned above, no one denies that the SUPPORT trial as a 
whole is research, and thus ought to be subject to research review and regulation. 
Additionally, it is uncontroversial that the various features of the study design, such as 
randomization, the use of masking (or blinding) with altered-pulse oximeters, and data 
collection (except when using solely anonymized routinely collected data) are plainly and 
unabashedly research interventions. Rather, the point of contention—and the uniqueness 
of the question posed by ceRCTs, if any—is whether the usual care intervention(s) in 
pragmatic ceRCTs constitute practice or research, and, accordingly, whether the usual care 
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interventions ought to be regulated by the ethical norms and principles of medical practice, 
or those of clinical research. 
3.6 Conceptualizing the SUPPORT Trial Interventions 
as Practice 
What arguments might be proffered in favor of conceptualizing the SUPPORT trial 
interventions as practice? To begin, both the low- and high-oxygen saturation interventions 
in the SUPPORT trial fell within the range recognized as “standard of care” for the 
treatment of extremely preterm infants.324 Recall that a standard of care is a routine or 
prevailing practice pattern within a given medical community.325 Insofar as the study 
interventions in the SUPPORT trial comported with the then-current range routinely used 
in neonatal intensive care units, they appear to constitute clinical practice.  
As we saw above, clinical practice is largely self-regulated, and thus enjoys a degree of 
professional autonomy that precludes prospective third-party review by research ethics 
committees. Again, no one disputes the contention that the study as a whole is research, or 
that other features of the study protocol—such as randomization, the use of masking with 
altered-pulse oximeters, and data collection—are research interventions, and therefore 
ought to be conceptualized as such in the ethical analysis. Rather, the claim is that the 
SUPPORT trial interventions are usual care, and therefore ought to be conceived of as 
practice. It follows straightforwardly, according to this view, that both the low- and high-
oxygen saturation arms in the SUPPORT trial ought to be conceptualized as practice and 
thus governed by the rules and norms of the fiduciary relationship between physician and 
patient.  
This is not an implausible view. Indeed, it is evident that Lantos, the SUPPORT trial 
investigators, and the 22 research ethics committees that approved the trial, appear to have 
conceptualized the low- and high-oxygen saturation interventions in precisely this way, 
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that is to say, as clinical practice. At the very least, they may be reasonably understood—
for the sake of ethical coherency—as being committed to such a view. This interpretation 
is supported by the fact that the investigators elected not to disclose risks of mortality, 
retinopathy of prematurity (at least in 20 of the 22 informed consent documents), and 
neurological damage as risks of study enrollment, ostensibly because these are risks of 
routine clinical practice.326  
Indeed, the investigators appear to adopt just this rationale when they state in the template 
used for the informed consent documents that “all of the treatments proposed in the study 
are standard of care, [and therefore] there is no predictable increase in risk for your 
baby.”327 In fact, with the aforementioned exception of two study sites, the only risks 
investigators elected to disclose in the “possible risks” section of the informed consent 
documents relate to the use of the pulse oximeter, namely, “the possible risk of skin 
breakdown at the site.”328 Furthermore, it appears that all of the participating research 
ethics committees endorsed this rationale as well, at least tacitly, given that they approved 
the trial along with the informed consent documents that expound this reasoning. This also 
includes the two sites that did include blindness as a possible risk of study participation, as 
they nonetheless elected not to disclose death or neurological damage as risks of study 
participation, again ostensibly reasoning that such risks are inherent to clinical practice. 
This framework makes it plain that Lantos may also be more clearly, and productively, 
understood as arguing that the low- and high-oxygen saturation interventions in the 
SUPPORT trial ought to be considered clinical practice, and therefore ought to be exempt 
from third-party review and research regulation. 
 
326 While these risks would not need to be disclosed, according to this view, as part of clinical research, 
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Several implications follow from the contention that the SUPPORT study interventions 
ought to be conceptualized as clinical practice, and not research. First, because the 
administration of low and high supplemental oxygen in preterm infants is governed by the 
norms of the fiduciary relationship—that is, of medical practice—these components of the 
trial are appropriately exempt from research ethics committee review. Second, the 
SUPPORT study interventions do not require a systematic harm-benefit analysis. Harm-
benefit analysis is compulsory for all research protocols; if the study interventions are 
practice, and not research, then they do not enter a research ethics committee’s deliberation 
on study benefits and harms. All that remains for the research ethics committee to 
determine, then, is that the risks of the research interventions are minimized consistent with 
sound scientific design, and that they are reasonable in relation to the scientific knowledge 
to be gained.329 Third, and finally, no information about the low- or high-oxygen saturation 
interventions need be disclosed to research participants. These interventions fall within the 
norms of the physician–patient relationship, and, as a result, neither the nature of the 
interventions, nor their benefits and harms—including retinopathy, neurological damage, 
lung toxicity, or death—need be disclosed as part of the research informed consent 
procedures (of course, any “material risks” would need to be disclosed as part of the clinical 
informed consent process).  
3.7 Conceptualizing the SUPPORT Trial Interventions 
as Research 
Nevertheless, I argue here that the above view is not the correct way to conceptualize the 
SUPPORT study interventions.330 By applying the fiduciary analysis developed in the 
previous two chapters, I argue that the SUPPORT trial interventions are not practice, rather 
they are research interventions. I begin by first discussing how the fiduciary framework 
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developed in the previous chapters applies to “hard cases,” like SUPPORT, in which the 
beneficiaries are not autonomous. In the next three subsections I provide three independent 
reasons to believe that the low- and high-oxygen saturation arms in the SUPPORT trial 
ought to be conceptualized as research, and not practice. In each case, I argue that aspects 
of the study protocol (or the interventions themselves) suggest the fiduciary relationship 
between the treating neonatologist and enrolled infants is undermined. The first two 
reasons may be applicable to a broader class of ceRCTs involving one or more usual care 
interventions, whereas the third, and final, reason is likely specific to a particular type of 
ceRCT, of which the SUPPORT trial is an exemplar. However, we leave open for future 
inquiry any substantive answer to the question regarding the utility of our analysis of the 
SUPPORT trial for conceptualizing other pragmatic ceRCTs.  
3.7.1 A “Hard Case”: Infants as Nonautonomous Beneficiaries? 
The SUPPORT trial presents a “hard case” for the application of fiduciary framework 
developed in the previous two chapters. This is because I argued that the fiduciary 
relationship is essentially promoting autonomy, insofar as it functions as a relational 
capacity of the beneficiary’s autonomous will. The question then arises, how can the 
fiduciary relationship be a relational capacity that serves to effectuate the will, or self-
directed ends, of beneficiaries who cannot effectively will anything for themselves? 
Infants, children, and others lacking the “procedural” capacities often thought to be 
necessary for autonomous choice or action (and thus for responsibility for those decisions 
or actions), cannot be said to authorize the exercise of fiduciary power on their own behalf. 
This raises questions about what implications these hard cases have for the previous 
chapter’s argument that the fiduciary relationship is essential to promoting autonomy. If 
some beneficiaries lack the capacity to will anything for themselves, how is it that the 
fiduciary relationship can function as a relational capacity that effectuates the will, and thus 
autonomy, of nonautonomous beneficiaries?  
Recall that on a procedural-constitutive theory of relational autonomy the fiduciary 
relationship is essential for both the development of “autonomy skills” (during childhood, 
in particular) and for the ongoing exercise of autonomy into adulthood, as relationships 
continue to constitute the background conditions against which the pursuit of autonomous 
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ends is possible. In Chapter 2 we saw that Diana Meyers, who takes a procedural view of 
relational autonomy, argues that “autonomy competence” requires certain “agentic” or 
“autonomy skills.”331 At a minimum the “repertoire of skills” required for self-
determination include introspective skills, imaginative skills, memory skills, 
communication skills, analytical and reasoning skills, volitional skills, and interpersonal 
skills.332 Meyers also stresses the importance of “critical thinking” skills in particular. With 
this in mind, and in beginning to answer the question posed above, it is perhaps fair to say 
that on a procedural-constitutive theory of relational autonomy the fiduciary mandate of 
parents or guardians is to foster the development of these and other important autonomy 
skills in their child-beneficiaries (I will discuss infants, in particular, below). In other 
words, parent-fiduciaries are tasked with promoting their child’s future autonomy interests. 
While children are unable to authorize the exercise of their parents’ or guardians’ fiduciary 
power, as they lack the requisite autonomy to do so, the parent-child relationship 
nevertheless is (or ought to be) ultimately autonomy promoting; that is, the parent-child 
relationship is such that the parent enables and facilitates the child to foster the requisite 
autonomy skills and capacities in order to become autonomous. If the parent-fiduciary is 
successful, the child-beneficiary will develop into an adult with the capacities necessary to 
set and pursue their own practical interests (with or without the aid of other fiduciaries). 
Indeed, this idea is given some support by the fact that, in law, where parents or guardians 
fail to perform their fiduciary obligation (e.g., as a result of abuse or neglect), when the 
child comes of age, they may have cause to bring legal action against their parent(s) or 
guardian(s) for breach of fiduciary duty. In other words, once the child-beneficiary 
becomes an autonomous adult, they are in a position to do a post hoc assessment to 
determine whether their autonomy interests were promoted by their parent-fiduciaries.333 
Alternatively, through child welfare services, the state (acting as fiduciary to the child), 
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may intervene to protect and promote the child’s “best interests.” In this way, parents or 
guardians (including the state) may be said to serve as a kind of proxy for the child’s future 
autonomy interests; that is, until the child develops a minimum level of the requisite skills 
and capacities to set, determine, and pursue their own self-directed ends.  
However, while this may be true of the parent- or guardian-child relationship, it is likely 
not entirely true of the parent-infant relationship—which is of particular relevance to the 
SUPPORT trial. Infants are simply too young for parents or guardians to begin to develop 
the repertoire of skills important to the exercise of their future autonomy. How, then, can 
parent-fiduciaries be said to promote their infant-beneficiaries’ autonomy through the 
exercise of their fiduciary power? As fiduciaries, parents or guardians are clearly still 
obligated to remain loyal to their infant-beneficiary’s best interests. As with child-
beneficiaries, this will no doubt include infant-beneficiaries’ future autonomy interests. 
Parent-fiduciaries foster the child-beneficiaries future autonomy interests by developing 
important autonomy skills. With infant-beneficiaries, however, parent-fiduciaries promote 
their autonomy by making decisions for them in a way that keeps their future open to their 
own autonomous decision making.334 In this way, parent-fiduciaries are still proxy decision 
makers for infant-beneficiaries in much the same way they are for child-beneficiaries. The 
difference is that the relevant interests of the infant-beneficiaries over which parent-
fiduciaries exercise their fiduciary power are broader than those of child-beneficiaries. 
These will likely include many of those decisions relating to post-natal (and perhaps even 
pre- and peri-natal) care that have a foreseeable and/or appreciable impact on infants’ 
physical and psychological development and may therefore be said to materially affect 
(positively or negatively) infants’ future ability make important decisions relating to 
identity formation and other aspects of self-determination.335  
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While other fiduciaries in an infant or child’s life, such as caregivers, teachers, and 
healthcare professionals, no doubt also play a role in promoting the child’s future autonomy 
interests, parent- or guardian-fiduciaries appear to play a unique role as proxy to their 
infant- or child-beneficiary’s interests across all other of their fiduciary relationships. 
Namely, while the healthcare professional is no doubt a fiduciary to the infant or child 
themselves (i.e., tasked with acting on behalf of their best medical interests) as proxy to the 
child’s future autonomy interests the parent- or guardian fiduciary is tasked with engaging 
in dialogue and joint-deliberation with the healthcare professional in the infant or child’s 
stead (and on their behalf). The exercise of the parent or guardian’s fiduciary power is 
therefore more substitutive than those of other of the infant or child’s fiduciary 
relationships. As we saw in the previous chapter, fiduciary power is always substitutive—
to a degree. The substitutive nature of fiduciary power is delimited by its being authorized, 
relational, and specific. Recall also that it is the delimited nature of fiduciary power that 
ultimately renders the exercise of that power a means, or relational capacity, of the 
beneficiary’s autonomous will. The problem, again, is that infant and children (and other 
nonautonomous individuals) lack the capacity to authorize the fiduciary’s substitutive 
power. Nevertheless, the substitutive nature of fiduciary power arguably remains delimited 
in this case in both its relationality (i.e., it’s being exercised on behalf of the beneficiary) 
and its specificity (i.e., its being exercised with respect to specific interests), albeit less so 
than with autonomous beneficiaries. Accordingly, the substitutive nature of fiduciary 
 
autonomy skills to the maximum degree possible. Aside from practical constraints, such as time, economic, 
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power appears to be of a greater degree in the parent-infant (and child) relationship. In 
brief, as proxy to the infant- or child-beneficiary’s future autonomy interests, parent-
fiduciaries exercise their greater substitutive capacity, to authorize fiduciary power in the 
context of all other fiduciary relationships that the infant or child may enter into, on their 
behalf. In other words, as proxies, parent-fiduciaries consent to the exercise of fiduciary 
power on behalf of their infant child-beneficiaries’ future autonomy interests.  
This analysis suggests that the complexity of the SUPPORT trial controversy is in part 
attributable to the tripartite fiduciary relationship at play: namely, that between (i) 
physician and biological mother (qua patient); (ii) physician and infant (qua patient) and 
parent or guardian (qua proxy); and (iii) parent or guardian and infant (qua proxy and 
fiduciary). It was parents (or guardians) who were approached and solicited for study 
enrolment by their physicians. Nevertheless, it was on behalf of their infants that consent 
for trial participation was sought, and it was the infants who ultimately received the study 
interventions (i.e., low or high saturations of supplemental oxygen). Finally, it was the 
treating neonationalists, as fiduciaries, that carried out the study interventions on enrolled 
infants. Ethical analysis of the SUPPORT trial therefore must consider each of these 
relationships and the implications of each for conceptualizing elements of the study 
protocol, including the trial interventions. However, as the infants are, ultimately, the 
research-participants of the SUPPORT trial the bulk of the ethical analysis will concern 
the relationship between physician (in this case, the treating neonatologist) and enrolled 
infants. The fiduciary relationship between physician and parent (e.g., during the 
biological mother’s pre- and post-natal care) and between parent(s) or guardian(s) and 
infant appears to remain largely unchanged by the SUPPORT trial protocol—save for the 
way in which the physician solicits the parent(s) or guardian(s) consent for trial 
participation on behalf of the infant. 
As proxy to the infant, it appears that parental or guardian consent to participate in the trial 
will largely depend on how the trial interventions are presented by the enrolling physician. 
How the risks of enrollment in the SUPPORT trial are portrayed to parents or guardians 
will no doubt affect how they choose to act on behalf of their babies, such as whether to 
provide their proxy consent. As we just saw above, the parent(s) or guardian(s) proxy 
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decision will aim to promote the infant’s autonomy by attempting to ensure that the future 
remains open for his or her decision making. In this case, the proxy decision that parents 
or guardians are being asked to make on behalf of their babies concerns a trade-off between 
the possibility of blindness or death—needless to say, both of these options clearly affect 
the future of prospectively enrolled infants future autonomy.  
But, as we saw above, whether or not risks of blindness or death are disclosed as risks of 
research to parents or guardians as proxy decision makers will depend on whether study 
interventions are conceptualized as practice, or research. If the trial interventions are 
conceptualized as practice, the physician will not disclose the risks of blindness and death 
as risks of trial of participation. Alternatively, if the interventions are conceptualized as 
research, risks of blindness and death must be disclosed to parents or guardians as possible 
risks of trial participation. As we also saw, whether the interventions are conceptualized as 
research or practice depends in turn on the integrity of the fiduciary relationship between 
healthcare professional and patient; namely, whether the fiduciary’s obligation to remain 
loyal to the beneficiary’s best interests is potentially undermined by other research-related 
interests. As the relationship between physician and biological mother, and parent or 
guardian and baby, remains largely unchanged by the SUPPORT trial, the answer to this 
question must look at the way in which the SUPPORT trial does, or does not, undermine 
the treating neonatologist’s fiduciary obligation of loyalty to enrolled infants. Accordingly, 
in the next three sections, I identity three independent reasons that suggest the SUPPORT 
trial interventions should be conceptualized as research.  
3.7.2 The First Reason: Randomization Interferes with the 
Discretionary Judgment of the Physician 
The interventions in the SUPPORT trial ought to be conceptualized as research because, 
contra Lantos, the enrolled infants are deprived of the benefit and protection of the 
discretionary judgment of their physician. In the neonatal intensive care unit, very 
premature infants are prescribed oxygen therapy by their treating neonatologist who, as 
demanded by the fiduciary obligation, must rely upon her professional judgment, or 
discretionary power, to prescribe the best treatment for the child. Professional judgment, 
derived (as it is) from professional knowledge, skill, or expertise, is a portmanteau 
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comprising a multiplicity of considerations, including: an individual infant’s diagnosis and 
prognosis; the medical history of the infant’s biological parents; the values or preferences 
articulated by the infant’s parent(s), or guardian(s); the oxygen saturation range routinely 
used in the neonatal intensive care unit; the state of evidence in the literature on the benefits 
and harms of oxygen treatment; and past experience—including the experience of 
colleagues—in the treatment of similar infants. It is worth emphasizing here that, pace 
Lantos, neonatologists do—and, indeed, must—exercise their professional judgment 
whether or not that judgment is constrained by a defined protocol. As just illustrated, the 
range of oxygen saturation routinely used in a neonatal intensive care unit is but one of 
many factors that neonatologists must consider when treating extremely premature infants. 
Therefore, even if neonatologists did follow a prescribed protocol for supplemental oxygen 
blindly, this would not thereby alleviate them from their fiduciary obligation to exercise 
their discretionary judgment over other relevant aspects of their patient’s care. 
Furthermore, even within a protocolized range, neonatologists must still use their discretion 
to determine what subset of that defined range is appropriate for a given infant, again in 
light of all other relevant considerations. This argument is expounded in more detail below. 
As we saw in the previous chapter, in paradigm fiduciary relationships, it is through a 
process of joint deliberation and dialogue with the beneficiary that the fiduciary comes to 
learn the beneficiary’s beliefs, values, goals, and preferences and, ultimately, the 
beneficiary’s choice. It is important to emphasize that the fiduciary exercises their 
knowledge, skill, or expertise in pursuit of those ends chosen by the beneficiary. During 
this dialogue the fiduciary also provides the beneficiary with any information necessary or 
relevant that might aid the beneficiary in coming to an informed decision about how best 
to achieve their chosen ends or pursue their interests. In this way the fiduciary functions as 
a relational capacity through which the beneficiary effectuates their own will—it is in this 
way that the fiduciary relationship promotes autonomy. Of course, as discussed above, in 
the case of SUPPORT—where the patient-beneficiaries are nonautonomous—this dialogue 
will occur between the physician and the parent or guardian who acts simultaneously as 
both fiduciary and proxy for their baby. Again, how the SUPPORT trial interventions are 
portrayed, and thus the manner in which consent is sought, will depend on whether the low 
and high oxygen saturation arms are considered practice or research. How the study 
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interventions are conceptualized will, in turn, depend on how infants (as the study 
participants) come to receive treatment in the context of the SUPPORT trial. Specifically, 
the physician’s fiduciary obligation to exercise their discretionary power on behalf of the 
best medical interests of a premature infant under their care ought to be guided by joint 
deliberation and dialogue with the parents or guardians (as proxies) of the infant patient. 
This is what it means for the physician-fiduciary to be loyal to the medical interests of any 
patient-beneficiary. 
Applying this analysis to the SUPPORT trial, it becomes clear that very premature infants 
come to receive treatment differently than they do in usual medical practice. Infants 
enrolled in the study do not come to receive supplemental oxygen by means of the 
discretionary judgment of their treating physician. Rather, infants are allocated randomly 
to either of the low- or high-oxygen saturation arms of the trial. Indeed, one of the primary 
purposes of randomization is to prevent a physician from exercising her discretionary 
judgment—and thus fiduciary obligation—on behalf of the patient.336 Randomization is a 
feature of the study protocol designed to prevent the bias that physician judgment 
introduces, and thereby enhance the validity of the study. It therefore promotes the interests 
of research—viz., the promotion of, or contribution to, generalizable knowledge—but at 
the expense of individualized care for the patient afforded by physician discretion.  
To illustrate, suppose that the SUPPORT trial was a non-randomized study, thereby 
allowing neonatologists to exercise their discretionary judgment when assigning premature 
infants to either low- or high-oxygen saturation arms of the trial. Neonatologists are (or 
ought to be) aware of the body of research that suggests that a lower target range of oxygen 
saturation may reduce incidences of retinopathy but may also be associated with increased 
mortality.337 How then, on the basis of such knowledge, would a neonatologist make 
treatment allocation decisions for her various infant patients? Faced with an infant with a 
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337 See Win Tin, “Optimal Oxygen Saturation for Preterm Babies,” Neonatology 85, no. 4 (2004): 319–
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substantial chance of mortality, it is likely that the clinician will assign this infant to the 
high-oxygen saturation arm of the trial to maximize her chances of survival—again, based 
on the best available evidence. Conversely, faced with an infant with a relatively good 
prognosis, it is likely that the clinician will assign her to the low-oxygen saturation arm, in 
an effort to reduce the risk of retinopathy. As this non-randomized trial progresses, it is 
evident that the sickest infants will comprise a disproportionate number of the high-oxygen 
saturation arm, and the healthier infants will comprise a disproportionate number of the 
low-oxygen saturation arm. But what can be inferred about the low- and high-oxygen 
saturation interventions at the conclusion of this non-randomized trial? The answer, of 
course, is nothing. Physician judgment completely confounds the study interventions with 
respect to the study outcome. Individual physician discretionary judgment compromises 
the internal validity of the trial, and randomization is therefore necessary to allow valid 
inferences to be drawn. 
The SUPPORT study interventions therefore ought to be conceptualized as research 
because the “dose” of oxygen therapy is determined by means of randomization, not by the 
physician’s professional discretionary judgment, as required of her as a fiduciary to her 
infant patient. Randomization is a feature of the trial employed to promote internal 
scientific validity, and thus further the interests of research (i.e., to contribute to 
generalizable knowledge). The introduction of this competing interest undermines the 
physician’s duty to exercise her discretionary judgment in the interests of her patient; that 
is, to remain loyal in the exercise of her fiduciary power to her patient’s best medical 
interests.  
The introduction of this competing interest in the pursuit of scientific knowledge 
undermines physician judgement, the very knowledge, skill, or expertise that patient-
beneficiary’s employ healthcare professionals to further their chosen medical ends. The 
otherwise privileged relationship between physician and patient—indeed, whose very 
privilege is afforded by the norms and duties of the fiduciary relationship—is undermined 
by the pursuit of research related interests which aim promote generalizable knowledge 
and ultimately the interests of future patients. Thus, the physician can no longer be trusted 
or reliably depended upon to remain loyal to the best medical interests of their patient—to 
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effectuate the patient’s will. Indeed, we saw above that it is precisely for this reason that 
research, as a moral domain separate from that of medical practice, is governed by its own 
norms and rules. When the physician, qua fiduciary, can no longer be entrusted to exercise 
their discretionary judgment on behalf of the best medical interests of the patient, 
“strangers at the bedside”—in the form of research ethics committees, data and safety 
monitoring boards, and research regulations—are both warranted and necessary to protect 
the autonomy and welfare interests of those patients participating in research.338 
Accordingly, the SUPPORT study interventions must be considered research, rather than 
practice. 
3.7.3 The Second Reason: Masking in the SUPPORT Trial Impairs 
the Ability of Physicians to Exercise Discretion on Behalf of 
their Patients 
The second reason, related to the first, that the SUPPORT trial interventions ought to be 
conceptualized as research is because the physician’s ability to continuously monitor, 
reassess, and adjust the prescribed oxygen therapy administered to a premature infant is 
compromised by altered-pulse oximeters. Again, in the context of medical practice, the 
fiduciary’s obligation to remain loyal to the beneficiary’s best interests protects against the 
abuse, misuse, neglect, or exploitation of the beneficiary. Neglect, in particular, implicates 
the discretionary element of fiduciary power. It demands, among other things, that the 
fiduciary remain vigilant in the performance of their duties. Hence, in this section I suggest 
that the use of altered-pulse oximeters in the SUPPORT trial undermines—or at the very 
least, threatens—the physician’s ability to actively and continuously exercise discretion on 
behalf of the best medical interests of the infant patients entrusted to their care.  
In clinical practice, extremely premature infants are prescribed oxygen therapy by means 
of the treating neonatologist’s exercise of their professional judgment (in consultation with 
parents or guardians as proxy decision makers), which, as we saw above, takes into 
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consideration a multitude of factors. However, the neonatologist is not thereby relieved of 
her fiduciary obligations to the premature infant under her care simply through this one-
time exercise of professional judgment. In other words, a neonatologist entrusted with the 
care of a premature infant does not simply set the oxygen saturation at a certain level and 
“forget it.” Rather, the neonatologist must continue to employ their discretion as they care 
for a premature infant. In practice, the neonatologist will continuously and closely monitor 
the medical condition of a premature infant under her care. For instance, an infant may 
begin to have trouble breathing, or display other signs of respiratory distress, in which case 
the neonatologist will likely increase the level of oxygen saturation. Conversely, aware of 
the evidence that a higher range of oxygen therapy may be correlated with increased risk 
of retinopathy, the neonatologist might decrease the level of the oxygen saturation for an 
infant that appears to be doing particularly well. In fact, extremely premature infants will 
often require weeks, or even months, of such discretionary monitoring on the part the 
treating clinician.  
The fiduciary obligation requires ongoing clinician judgment—or the exercise of 
discretion—on behalf of the beneficiary’s best interests. Again, the discretionary element 
of fiduciary power demands of the treating physician that she be vigilant in the pursuit of 
the patient’s medical interests; this, in turn, requires of them to use discretion as they 
continuously assess and reassess the patient’s condition. By entrusting the pursuit of their 
medical ends to the physician, the patient is left vulnerable to the risk that the physician 
will neglect their interests by simply failing to exercise her (the physician’s) professional 
judgment, either in whole or in part. It is the patient’s vulnerability to neglect, abuse, 
misuse, or exploitation of fiduciary power that gives rise to the uniquely demanding 
fiduciary duty of loyalty to the patient’s medical interests.339 In other words, in carrying 
out the patient’s autonomously chosen ends (in this case, as decided by a proxy parent or 
guardian) the physician-fiduciary is obligated use their ongoing discretion in wielding their 
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fiduciary power on behalf of—and in their role as relational capacity of—the patient. The 
ongoing exercise of discretion, as demanded by the fiduciary obligation, prohibits the 
physician from utterly neglecting the patient’s interests, delegating their discretionary 
authority to another, or from otherwise fettering away their discretion in any way. In other 
words, the fiduciary obligation requires of the physician that she actively and continually 
exercise her discretionary powers. 
In the SUPPORT trial, by contrast, the study interventions are administered to extremely 
premature infants in a way that deprives them of the benefit and protection of the treating 
physician’s ongoing discretion. Masking with altered-pulse oximeters was employed to 
ensure that physicians were unaware of the actual oxygen saturation levels being 
administered to premature infants in the SUPPORT trial. In other words, the pulse 
oximeters were altered to impair the physician’s ability to accurately monitor, assess, and 
reassess an infant’s medical condition. Importantly, this was—yet again—done to promote 
the internal validity of the trial by seeking to ensure a clear separation between low- and 
high-oxygen saturation interventions. Indeed, a clear separation between the study 
interventions is crucial to any “good experiment.” Without masking it would have been 
extremely difficult to achieve a separation between the treatment arms. Had masking not 
been used, physicians may have tended to increase the dose of oxygen for infants in the 
low-oxygen saturation arm, with the effect of making infants’ oxygen saturation levels 
similar (Cortés-Puch et al. 2016).  
In fact, the SUPPORT trial investigators encountered precisely this problem during the 
early enrolment phases of the trial:  
When 247 infants had been enrolled, enrollment was temporarily suspended on the 
basis of the recommendation of the data and safety monitoring committee and the 
decision of the director of the National Institute of Child Health and Human 
Development because of concern that readings of levels of oxygen saturation often 
exceeded the target levels. (SUPPORT Study Group 2010, 1964)  
Altered-pulse oximeters were employed to ensure that infants enrolled in the SUPPORT 
trial received the treatment mandated by the study protocol, not physician discretion, by 
hindering neonatologists from adjusting the oxygen infants received based on continuing 
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assessments of their condition. Evidently, this feature of the SUPPORT trial serves the 
interests of research. But it does so by depriving enrolled infants of the benefit and 
protection of the clinician’s ongoing professional judgement and discretion, as she 
continues to care for, and promote, the medical best interests of her patients. The use of 
masking in the SUPPORT trial therefore also introduces a competing interest—namely, 
the promotion of reliable generalizable knowledge—that undermines the physician’s duty 
to exercise her discretion. Again, insofar as the fiduciary norms of clinical practice have 
been violated in this way, there is strong justification for conceptualizing the SUPPORT 
trial interventions as research. 
3.7.4 The Third Reason: Low- and High-Oxygen Saturation 
Interventions Are Not Usual Care 
The third, and final, reason that the low- and high-oxygen saturation arms in the SUPPORT 
trial ought to be conceptualized as research, and not practice, is that one or both of the 
study interventions are not in fact usual care. Recall that this reason is specific to a 
particular type of pragmatic ceRCT involving one or more usual care interventions, of 
which the SUPPORT trial is a token example: namely, in those cases where the usual care 
treatment is characterized by a range, or continuum, the bifurcation and subsequent 
randomization of research participants to protocolized subsets of that range, no longer 
constitutes usual care. 340 Usual care for the administration of supplemental oxygen in 
preterm infants is a range between 85% and 95%.341 However, the interventions in the 
SUPPORT trial did not comprise this full range; rather, enrolled infants were delegated to 
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subsets (i.e., 85% to 89% and 91% to 95%) of that range. The bifurcation of the range of 
supplemental oxygen routinely used in neonatal intensive care units to low and high subsets 
of that range constitutes a meaningful deviation from, or alteration to, medical practice for 
the ends of research. Indeed, this is true even if a neonatal intensive care unit follows a 
protocol that is equivalent to one of the SUPPORT trial interventions (e.g., 85% to 89%), 
as the unit of randomization is the patient, not the centre. Consequently, even if a centre’s 
protocolized range of oxygen therapy for preterm infants corresponds with one of the study 
arms, the infants in that centre would be randomized to both ranges, and thus be exposed 
to a range that is not usual care for that centre. In their Draft Guidance on Disclosing 
Reasonably Foreseeable Risks in Research Evaluating Standards of Care (2014), the U.S. 
Office for Human Research Protections makes a similar point.  
When a research study assigns the specific version of the accepted standards of care to be 
used, it is almost certain that at least some of the subjects will receive a different standard 
of care than they would have received if not participating in the research. Indeed, in the 
common study design where subjects are randomized equally between two treatments, 
approximately half of the subjects will be assigned to a treatment different from what they 
would have otherwise received. Insofar as these are alterations to clinical practice for the 
sake of contributing to generalizable knowledge—a competing interest—third-party 
review and regulatory oversight, separate from that of clinical practice, is both warranted 
and required.  
The bifurcation of the standard of care range of supplemental oxygen introduces potential 
risks and benefits distinct from those inherent to routine clinical practice. In this case, the 
risks and benefits of receiving the low-oxygen saturation arm are manifestly different from 
the risks and benefits of receiving high-oxygen saturation—as over seven decades of 
preliminary data portend (albeit evidence not strong enough to change clinical practice). In 
their determination letter, the U.S. Office for Human Research Protections pointed out that 
concerns in the research and clinical community about the differential risks and benefits of 
the low and high target ranges of supplemental oxygen on preterm infants was a “core 
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reason why the study was conducted.”342 Moreover, they stated that it was clear that the 
SUPPORT trial investigators were aware of such concerns, having “identified the 
important need for a large randomized study with sufficient power to detect differences in 
mortality rates of 5% or greater.”343 As previously mentioned, Charles Natanson provides 
a similar argument.344 It is clear that the risks and benefits of both the low- and the high-
oxygen saturation arms in the SUPPORT trial differ from the risks and benefits of the full 
range, or the de facto usual care range. This is because in routine clinical practice 
neonatologists are able to employ the full range (85% to 95%) of supplemental oxygen, 
again, subject to their professional judgment and ongoing discretion in response to the 
medical needs of each individual infant (as illustrated by Cortés-Puch and colleagues, 
below). 
To illustrate this important point, the U.S. Office for Human Research Protections provides 
a salient example: 
It is known that treatment using surgery and radiation has a high likelihood of 
curing a particular form of childhood cancer, but that the radiation produces a 
significant risk of other cancers developing later in the child’s life. Consequently, 
some doctors treating children with this cancer use a smaller amount of 
radiation. Both amounts of radiation are consistent with clinical care guidelines and 
considered to be within the standard of care. There is little evidence available 
comparing the outcomes of the two treatments in terms of their cure rates or the 
development of later cancers. A randomized clinical trial is proposed with subjects 
to be assigned to treatment with the higher or lower amount of radiation to compare 
the effectiveness of the two treatments in curing the current cancer and how often 
later cancers occur.345  
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It is plain that the different ranges of treatment routinely used for childhood cancer in this 
hypothetical example carry differential risks. Moreover, it is precisely the purpose of the 
study to empirically validate those risks. In other words, participants are exposed to risks 
that they may not otherwise have been exposed to outside of the study, precisely for the 
sake of contributing to generalizable knowledge. The Office for Human Research 
Protections agrees, stating that the “particular risks that the subjects will be exposed to 
because of being assigned to a specific standard of care are risks the subjects will be 
exposed to for the sake of the research.”346  
Recall that Lantos claims “neonatologists always treat babies by protocol,” which is 
assigned by each neonatal intensive care unit, “based on their assessment of the evidence 
about the harms and benefits of oxygen levels that are too high or too low.”347 Accordingly, 
Lantos claims a neonatologist does not in fact exercise her professional judgment over the 
medical interests of the infant over whose care she is presiding. He thus concludes that the 
risks and benefits of protocolization to either the low- or high-oxygen saturation arms in 
the SUPPORT trial are not appreciably different from risks and benefits inherent to clinical 
practice.  
Firstly, Lantos’s argument is simply orthogonal to the concern that allocating infants to 
low and high target ranges carries differential risks. While it may indeed be true that 
neonatologists treat infants according to a predefined protocol, this does not alleviate the 
concern that the bifurcation of the usual care range of supplemental oxygen into discrete 
(low and high) subsets of that range carries differential risks to enrolled infants, when 
compared to those infants not so enrolled. In other words, it may indeed be a fact that 
neonatologists treat infants according to a defined protocol, but no particular neonatal 
intensive care unit protocolizes infants to both low and high extremes of the usual care 
range in order to achieve a quasi-random distribution. 
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Secondly, and more importantly, it does not follow from the claim that neonatologists treat 
infants in neonatal intensive care units according to protocol that they consequently do not 
exercise their professional judgment, or that they therefore follow the protocol without 
exception or mindlessly. On the contrary, even if neonatologists treat infants according to 
predetermined parameters, this nonetheless does not exclude the exercise of professional 
judgment and ongoing discretion. The neonatologist’s fiduciary obligation to exercise her 
professional judgment on behalf of the medical interests of the premature infants under her 
care obviously persists within the constraints of a predefined protocol. Moreover, where 
the evidence base is weak, nonexistent, or even at odds with a centre’s standard of care, 
physicians must consider whether they ought to observe the prescriptions of the protocol 
at all. The physician’s fiduciary obligation to exercise her professional judgment on behalf 
of her patient’s best interests demands that her discretion is informed by the domain of 
“professional knowledge” and by virtue of which she is a fiduciary. Indeed, this specialized 
knowledge, skill, or expertise is the very reason for which her services are sought, and 
which help to define the scope of her fiduciary mandate. 
To illustrate, suppose a neonatal intensive care unit has mandated that neonatologists 
prescribe a range of oxygen therapy for extremely premature infants between 85% and 
89%. Suppose, further, that a neonatologist finds herself entrusted with the care of a baby 
with a particularly poor prognosis. Aware of the most recent evidence in the literature that 
suggests an association between low-oxygen saturation treatment and mortality, the 
neonatologist may reasonably judge that a higher range of oxygen saturation—outside of 
the protocolized range mandated by his neonatal intensive care unit—is appropriate in this 
case. The duty to provide individualized care—based on discretionary judgment—to her 
patient not only permits the neonatologist to act on such a judgment, it obliges her to. This 
is especially true when the state of evidence with respect to those ranges is one of 
“equipoise,” or uncertainty. It is perhaps an unhappy reality of clinical practice that 
physicians are required to make clinical decisions in the face of such uncertainty (albeit in 
collaboration with, and with consent from, their patients). Fried recognized this feature of 
medical practice, arguing that “the doctor must be given considerable latitude as he [sic] 
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works in the presumed interests of his patient.”348 As we saw above, medical practice 
requires physicians to exercise their professional discretionary judgment; this obligation 
extends even to treatments that carry substantial risk, so long as the treatments in question 
fall within the accepted standard of care, as well as the body of professional knowledge 
that defines both the scope and content of a physician’s knowledge, skill, or expertise qua 
professional. The claim that individualized physician judgment and discretion are 
somehow obviated, or negated, by the protocolization of a treatment is clearly false.  
Finally, a study by Cortés-Puch and colleagues found that the low target oxygen saturation 
arm in the SUPPORT trial (85% to 89%) was not in fact consistent with usual care.349 
Cortés-Puch and colleagues “sought to determine whether each oxygen target as studied in 
SUPPORT and four similar randomized controlled trials (RCTs) was consistent with usual 
care.”350 They conducted a literature review to establish the range that constituted usual 
care concurrent to these five clinical trials. This review uncovered a prospective, 
observational study, known as the AVIOx study. The AVIOx study collected robust data 
on oxygen exposure in extremely premature infants, who, importantly, would have 
satisfied the primary enrollment criteria for the SUPPORT trial (Hagadorn et al. 2006). The 
study enrolled 84 infants across 14 neonatal intensive care units in the U.S., U.K., and New 
Zealand; eligible infants included those who were born at less than 28 weeks gestation, and 
for whom oxygen therapy was required.351  
The comparison of low and high target ranges of supplemental oxygen in the SUPPORT 
trial with those used in the AVIOx study revealed that while the high target range (91% to 
95%) was consistent with usual care, the low target range (85% to 89%) was “lower and 
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narrower than those applied during usual care” (Cortés-Puch et al. 2016, 4). The upper limit 
of the low target range used in the SUPPORT trial was 89%, while the AVIOx study 
showed that the upper limit of usual care was between 92% and 98%. Moreover, the low 
target range in the SUPPORT trial was narrower than comparably low target ranges used 
in clinical practice (e.g., 85%); this is because, in clinical practice low target ranges are 
always coupled with higher target ranges (e.g., 98%) than the upper limit of the low-oxygen 
saturation intervention in the SUPPORT trial allowed (i.e., 89%):  
During usual care, similar lower limits (< 88%) were universally paired with higher 
upper limits ( 92%) and providers skewed achieved oxygen saturations toward the 
upper-end of these intended ranges.352  
In other words, the wider range characteristic of usual care results in achieved (i.e., median) 
values of supplemental oxygen that was higher than the upper limit of the low intervention 
arm in the SUPPORT trial. The authors conclude that, “the low range (85 to 89%) was not 
used outside of the SUPPORT trial,” and therefore was not consistent with usual care.353 
The implication of this finding is that the SUPPORT trial was not, in fact, a comparison of 
two usual care interventions, but rather it involved one (or more) novel interventions. We 
argued above that the bifurcation of a usual care range no longer constitutes usual care, as 
the benefits and harms associated with each subset of that range differ from the full range. 
Indeed, the purpose of the SUPPORT trial was to evaluate the benefits and harms 
associated with low and high ranges of supplemental oxygen. This challenges the very idea 
that the SUPPORT trial involved the comparison of any usual care interventions: rather, it 
compared two novel interventions. This analysis may apply to other pragmatic ceRCTs 
that compare subsets of a usual care treatment, characterized by a range. Moreover, 
regardless of whether one agrees with our contention that the bifurcation of a usual care 
range no longer constitutes usual care, Cortés-Puch and colleagues make it clear that the 
low-oxygen saturation arm was not, in fact, routine medical practice. We therefore 
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conclude that the SUPPORT trial interventions ought to be conceptualized as research, not 
practice. 
3.7.5 Implications of Conceptualizing the SUPPORT Trial 
Interventions as Research 
Several implications follow straightforwardly from the determination that low- and high-
oxygen saturation arms in the SUPPORT trial ought to be conceptualized as research. First, 
both the low- and high-oxygen saturation interventions require third-party review and 
regulatory oversight by research ethics committees. There is consensus among national and 
international research ethics guidelines that human participants in research be submitted 
to, and approved by, a research ethics committee. Research ethics committee review 
safeguards the autonomy and welfare interests of research participants and ensures that 
national and international ethics standards are upheld. As the SUPPORT study 
interventions clearly fall within the domain of research, a research ethics committee ought 
to review and approve them. 
Second, the study interventions must undergo harm–benefit analysis. The need for harm–
benefit analysis is grounded in the ethical principal of beneficence, which requires that the 
welfare interests of human research participants are protected, and, where possible, 
promoted. Benefit–harm analysis requires that the low- and high-oxygen saturation 
interventions satisfy clinical equipoise. Clinical equipoise is an ethical precondition for 
enrolling patients in a randomized clinical trial;354 it states that there must exist “an honest, 
professional disagreement among expert clinicians about the preferred treatment.”355 As 
discussed above, the optimal oxygen saturation range for the treatment of extremely 
premature infants is unknown, and a Cochrane review of the evidence base concluded that 
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“further research should be undertaken to resolve this important question.”356 The 
empirical evidence available before or at the start of the SUPPORT trial therefore suggests 
that the study interventions fulfill the ethical requirement of clinical equipoise. In other 
words, as far as the domain of professional knowledge is concerned—based in large part 
on the availability and robustness of empirical evidence—physicians (as professionals) 
would be uncertain as to the most effective treatment, thereby satisfying the ethical 
precondition for soliciting enrollment of patients in a clinical trial.  
Third, the details of the study interventions must be disclosed in the informed consent 
process. The principle of respect for persons underlies the doctrine of informed consent, 
and ensures that the autonomy rights of human research participants are respected: that is 
to say, patients or their substitute decision makers must be afforded the opportunity to make 
free and informed choices as to whether participation in a trial is consistent with their 
chosen ends. Disclosure of the SUPPORT trial interventions therefore must include details 
of the study procedures, any associated benefits and risks of harm, including retinopathy 
of prematurity, neurological damage, lung toxicity, and mortality.  
It is also clear from this analysis that questions concerning whether enrolled infants were 
exposed to additional risk when compared with infants not so enrolled are not central to, 
or determinative of, the substantive ethical issues to which the SUPPORT trial gives rise. 
The answers to questions about risk, disclosure, and consent are secondary to—and flow 
from—an antecedent determination as to whether the usual care interventions ought to be 
conceptualized as practice or research. In turn, inquiring into whether the demands of the 
fiduciary obligation can be upheld is the fulcrum upon which at determination is made as 
to whether an intervention falls within the ethical domain of medical practice or clinical 
research, and directs us toward systematically identifying and considering the various 
downstream ethical implications of each. 
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The debate surrounding the SUPPORT trial has focused on determining whether the low- 
and high-oxygen saturation interventions posed “reasonably foreseeable risks” to study 
participants. This manifest preoccupation with U.S. regulation has not only made this 
debate inapplicable to an international audience, it has also resulted in the failure to identify 
and engage the SUPPORT trial’s central ethical issue. 
The central ethical issue raised by the SUPPORT trial is the following: should the 
SUPPORT trial interventions be conceptualized as practice, or research? To address this 
question, we have attempted to provide a systematic analysis of the SUPPORT trial. In so 
doing, we have reframed the debate about the SUPPORT trial in a way that is both 
historically informed and ethically relevant. We have provided three reasons, largely 
grounded in a fiduciary analysis, for conceptualizing the low- and high-oxygen saturation 
arms in the SUPPORT trial as research, and not practice. First, the enrolled infants are 
deprived of the benefit and protection of the individualized judgment of their physician. 
Second, the physician’s ability to use her discretionary power to continuously monitor, 
reassess, and adjust the prescribed oxygen therapy administered to a premature infant is 
compromised by altered-pulse oximeters. Third, in those cases where a usual care treatment 
is characterized by a range, or continuum, the bifurcation and ensuing randomization of 
research participants to protocolized subsets of that range may no longer constitute usual 
care. An important implication of the third argument is that while the SUPPORT trial is a 
pragmatic ceRCT—as it compares two interventions, head-to-head, under real-world 
conditions—it is not a ceRCT that compares two usual care interventions. We propose that 
the first two reasons why the trial constitutes research are likely applicable to a broader 
class of pragmatic ceRCTs involving one or more usual care interventions, whereas the 
third reason is likely applicable to those ceRCTs where the treatment used routinely in 
clinical practice is characterized by a range; however, we leave questions regarding the 
applicability of our analysis for the broader class of pragmatic ceRCTs open for future 
inquiry. Finally, we have demonstrated that how we conceptualize these interventions has 
implications for which components of a study protocol fall within the purview of research 
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ethics committees, undergo benefit–harm analysis, and are appropriately disclosed in 
informed consent procedures.  
Nevertheless, with Lantos, we “acknowledge the distinctiveness” of pragmatic ceRCTs 
involving one or more usual care interventions, and thus recognize that important questions 
remain regarding how these socially important and, broadly speaking, low-risk studies 
ought to be regulated. For instance: should those pragmatic ceRCTs that are deemed low 
risk undergo an expedited review process, proportionate to the risks and benefits involved? 
With low-risk trials that seek to answer clinically important questions, yet would be 
infeasible if standard research informed consent procedures were required, ought there to 
be modifications to the informed consent process? Addressing these and other difficult 
questions, and the ethical challenges they give rise to, requires further investigation.  
Our fiduciary analysis makes it clear, however, that any proposed solution to these 
important questions must proceed in a clear and systematic fashion. The aim of this chapter 
was to provide insight into the ethical controversy on the SUPPORT trial and, in doing so, 
illustrate how the fiduciary relationship can be used to offer conceptual clarity to a complex 
bioethical issue. As a moral relationship, the norms and duties of the fiduciary relationship 
ethically prescribe, or prohibit, certain behaviours within the context of that relationship. 
The fiduciary obligation is what enables individuals to trust or depend on fiduciaries within 
the context of that inherently vulnerable mode of interaction, and in the pursuit of their 
autonomous ends. Specifically, the obligation that fiduciaries remain loyal to their 
beneficiaries’ interests, who have vested in them the authority to act on their behalf, is what 
protects against the exploitation of fiduciary power. As we saw in the previous chapters, 
the integrity, or continued viability, of the fiduciary relationship requires that the norms, 
values, and rules that make up its “irreducible core” are upheld. The relationship between 
healthcare professionals and their patients is fiduciary. Therefore, it is paramount that the 
fiduciary norms and obligations that define this socially and economically important 
relationship are respected and maintained. Indeed, as we saw above, it is precisely the 
presumption that fiduciary norms govern the physician-patient relationship that justifies its 
privileged and largely self-regulated status. In those relationships where the fiduciary 
obligation is threatened or undermined, the presumption that beneficiaries’ interests are 
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protected by a duty of loyalty simply dissolves, along with the fiduciary relationship itself. 
In the context of research, which introduces research-related interests that compete with 
and potentially undermine the physician-fiduciary’s strict duty of loyalty to her patient-
beneficiary’s interests, extra protections in the form of third-party oversight and research 
regulations are warranted and required. As we saw above, the norms and duties of the 
fiduciary relationship can therefore be used as the fulcrum against which research 
interventions are demarcated from those of practice. Where features of a study protocol 
function to potentially undermine the physician’s fiduciary duty of loyalty to her patient’s 
medical interests, that aspect of the physician-patient interaction is no longer protected by 
the norms and duties of the fiduciary relationship. Consequently, those aspects of the study 
protocol are properly conceptualized as research interventions and must thereby be 
afforded research protections.  
The analysis provided in this chapter therefore helps to clear a critical conceptual hurdle 
for pragmatic ceRCTs involving usual care interventions: namely, by asking how we ought 
to conceptualize study interventions involving treatments used routinely in medical 
practice and by using a fiduciary analysis to answer that question. Moreover, this analysis 
illustrates the power and utility of the fiduciary relationship for thinking clearly and 
systematically about the ethical issues that arise between healthcare professionals and their 
patients. As mentioned, the SUPPORT trial presents a “hard case” for the fiduciary 
framework developed in this dissertation. This is because, where the beneficiaries to a 
fiduciary relationship lack autonomy (such as in the case of infants and children), it remains 
to be shown how the fiduciary relationship functions to promote their autonomy. I have 
argued that the fiduciary relationship promotes the autonomy of infants and children by 
having their parents or guardians serve as proxies for their future autonomy interests (and 
subject to their post hoc autonomous review). As part of the procedural-constitutive theory 
of autonomy adopted in my fiduciary analysis, parents, guardians, and caregivers play an 
essential role in fostering the development of various skills and capacities necessary for 
autonomy. In the case of infant-beneficiaries, parent-fiduciary’s also function as proxies as 
they make decisions for the infants under their care and protection in a way that keeps their 
future open to their own future autonomous decision making. In this way, the argument 
that the fiduciary relationship is essential to promoting autonomy may apply to at least 
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some non-autonomous beneficiaries, such as children. To the extent that the analysis of the 
SUPPORT trial presented in this chapter is successful, it ought to be considered a virtue of 
the theory of fiduciary relationships developed throughout this dissertation that it can be 
used to tackle hard cases, not just easy ones. Ultimately, however, I hope to have illustrated 






The fiduciary relationship is a powerful tool that holds much promise for conceptualizing 
and offering clarity to the kinds of ethical issues that arise between healthcare professionals 
and their patients. As we saw in Chapter 3, when we recognize that the physician-patient 
relationship is fiduciary a number of things follow. The structure of the fiduciary 
relationship between power and dependence renders the patient vulnerable to the 
physician’s misuse, abuse, or neglect of her fiduciary power. From this vulnerability arises 
fiduciary duties that function to protect not only the individual patient, but also the integrity 
of the physician-patient relationship (qua fiduciary relationship) itself. As one of the most 
important social and economic relationships, touching on all facets of human experience, 
societies have an interest in maintaining the integrity, or continued viability, of this type of 
interaction. From the vital importance of the fiduciary relationship, and its inherent 
vulnerability to exploitation, we get the defining fiduciary obligation: namely, when one 
undertakes to act on behalf of another’s significant practical interests, one must do so with 
utmost loyalty to those same interests. In the case of physicians, they owe a duty of 
undivided to loyalty to the best medical interests of their patients. The duty of loyalty 
prohibits physicians from entering into conflicts of interest that could potentially 
undermine their duty to remain loyal to their patients’ best medical interests. As we also 
saw in Chapter 3, the fiduciary relationship can serve as an ethical framework that 
prescribes certain conduct to ensure the continued viability of physician-patient 
relationship, and to make possible the pursuit of interests or ends important for meaningful 
self-governance.  
I argued that the widespread application of the fiduciary relationship in bioethical analysis 
is threatened by at least two conceptual problems: namely, equivocation and paternalism. 
Worries about equivocation stem from the belief that the fiduciary relationship is a 
construct of the law, and thus applying its normative prescriptions to the ethical domain 
involves a specious kind of legal-moral equivocation. To address this problem, in Chapter 
1, I traced the history of the fiduciary obligation, illustrating that it has been a constant 
feature of human societies for the past 3000 years. The social and economic importance of 
relationships of this type have given societies throughout history good reason to 
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operationalize and enforce the normative demands of the fiduciary obligation, including 
(variously) as a moral norm, religious edict, and legal rule. I suggested that the fiduciary 
obligation responds to a specific problem “etched in human nature”: namely, how to trust 
or reliably depend on others who undertake on our behalf. Accordingly, I argued that the 
fiduciary obligation is a moral obligation that fosters social harmony by enabling 
broadscale societal cooperation. I then described the context in which the fiduciary 
obligation entered the English common law tradition, namely, as an equitable principle in 
early Chancery, and from which we gain our contemporary understanding of the fiduciary 
relationship as a legal relationship. I argued that, as a pre-existing moral principle, the 
fiduciary obligation’s operationalization through English Equity is merely the latest 
attempt by contemporary (Western) societies to protect and maintain the fiduciary 
relationship. By arguing that the fiduciary relationship is first and foremost a moral 
relationship, I therefore hope to have mitigated the problem of equivocation by pointing 
out that there simply is no such equivocation: applying the fiduciary relationship, as a moral 
principle, to the ethical issues of bioethics is sound.  
In Chapter 2, I tackled the problem of paternalism. Worries about paternalism relate to the 
concern that the fiduciary relationship is paternalistic and is therefore an inappropriate 
model for the physician-patient relationship, given the healthcare ethics ethos of patient-
centred care and the promotion of patient autonomy. I argued that the fiduciary relationship 
is not only not paternalistic, it is essential to autonomy. The critical role the fiduciary 
relationship plays in promoting autonomy also fleshes out the moral ground provided in 
Chapter 1. I made this argument by first adopting and then going beyond Matthew 
Harding’s account of Equity’s interest in governing institutions, or modes of human action. 
Harding argues that Equity’s interest in maintaining institutions is normatively justified by 
the law’s general facilitative project in promoting a liberal sense of autonomy. Harding 
argued that Equity promotes a Razian sense of autonomy by maintaining various modes of 
human interaction as distinct “options” from which individuals can choose in the pursuit 
of their self-directed plans, projects, or causes. Drawing from the historical narrative of the 
fiduciary relationship in Chapter 1, I argued that the fiduciary relationship is clearly one 
such institution that Equity has taken an interest in governing and maintaining. In this way, 
on Harding’s analysis, the fiduciary relationship plays a role in promoting autonomy in its 
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role as an “option” of choice in the process of individual self-governance. However, I 
argued that Harding’s professedly Razian theory of autonomy fails to account for the ways 
in which autonomy is fundamentally relational. As a result, I argued the Harding’s account 
of the way in which fiduciary relationship in particular promotes autonomy does not go far 
enough. By adopting a relational theory of autonomy, I went beyond Harding’s account, 
arguing that the fiduciary relationship is essentially autonomy promoting. I argued that on 
a procedural-constitutive theory of relational autonomy, the fiduciary relationship is among 
the most important modes of human action that together constitutes the very background 
conditions that make the development and continued exercise of autonomy possible. I 
adopted Paul Miller’s influential account of fiduciary power, arguing that the fiduciary 
relationship functions as a “relational capacity” by which an individual can pursue their 
autonomous will. Finally, I argued that the essential role the fiduciary relationship plays in 
promoting autonomy simultaneously gives it a foundation in morality and mitigates 
concerns about both equivocation and paternalism. When we understand autonomy 
relationally it becomes clear that the ways in which the fiduciary relationship fosters social 
harmony and promotes autonomy are coextensive: the fiduciary relationship enables 
individuals to trust and depend on one another, making possible the pursuit of certain 
autonomously chosen ends and leading to greater social cooperation. 
In Chapter 3, I illustrated the utility of the fiduciary relationship for providing clarity to 
complex ethical issues involving healthcare professionals and their patients. I showed how 
a fiduciary analysis can offer conceptual clarity to the ethical issues that arise in pragmatic 
comparative effectiveness randomized controlled trials (ceRCT)—an innovative research 
methodology designed to be conducted under real-world clinical conditions, and often 
comparing one or more “standard of care” interventions. The SUPPORT trial was a 
controversial ceRCT that compared two concentrations (low and high) of supplemental 
oxygen (both of which allegedly fell within the full “standard of care” range) on preterm 
infants on outcomes of blindness and death. The results of the trial showed that for every 
case of blindness prevented (for those infants in the low oxygen saturation arm) there were 
two infant deaths. Controversy erupted following the conclusion of the trial when it was 
discovered that blindness and death, the primary study outcomes, were not disclosed to 
study participants. Debate about the SUPPORT was largely preoccupied with domestic 
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research regulations, as opposed to ethical principles, which were not developed with 
ceRCTs in mind. By applying a fiduciary analysis to the SUPPORT trial controversy, I 
illustrated how the fiduciary relationship can be used to provide a systematic method of 
both identifying and investigating the relevant ethical issues to which the SUPPORT trial 
gives rise. I argued that ethical issue raised by SUPPORT is whether the (purportedly) 
standard of care oxygen saturation interventions ought to be conceptualized as medical 
practice or clinical research. The fiduciary relationship is critical to demarcating practice 
from research, as each comprises an ethical domain with its own norms, rules, and 
regulations. I argued that the various features of the study protocol—such as 
randomization, masking with pulse oximeters, and the bifurcation of a usual care range into 
two subsets of that range—serve to undermine the treating neonatologists fiduciary 
obligation to exercise her professional judgment on behalf of the best medical interests of 
the premature infants under her care. Accordingly, as the norms and principles of the 
fiduciary relationship can no longer be relied upon, I argued that the SUPPORT trial 
interventions ought to be conceptualized as research. Conceptualizing the interventions as 
research has various “downstream” ethical implications, such as the requirement that they 
be subject to research ethics committee review, undergo a systematic benefit-harm 
analysis, and are disclosed during informed consent procedures. I thus hope to have 
illustrated how a fiduciary analysis can provide systematic guidance and ethical clarity on 
difficult bioethical issues, such those posed by innovative research methodologies, like the 
SUPPORT trial. I hope also to have contributed to an important ethical issue in research 
ethics concerning the ethical design and conduct of novel or innovative research 
methodologies, such as pragmatic ceRCTs. 
By offering a moral foundation for the fiduciary relationship in its essential role in 
promoting a relational autonomy, I hope to have helped alleviate both the problems of 
equivocation and paternalism. With these conceptual hurdles diminished, the path ought to 
be slightly clearer for future work in both medical and research ethics to make use of a 
fiduciary analysis when thinking about those ethical issues involving relationships where 
one undertakes act on behalf of another’s best interests. To the extent that I have been 
successful, this dissertation provides the beginnings of a moral philosophical foundation 
upon which future ethical applications and analyses of the fiduciary relationship can draw.  
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Of course, this is just a beginning. Future inquiries, aside from exploring alternatives to the 
moral foundation I have provided here, might look at how (specifically) moral duties arise 
in the context of the fiduciary relationship. Drawing from Miller and others, I have merely 
assumed that fiduciary duties arise in response to the beneficiary’s vulnerability to 
exploitation. But questions remain about how precisely these duties are generated and 
specified in this way (or perhaps others) and what they actually demand of fiduciaries, 
practically speaking. Questions also remain as to whether fiduciary duties are universal 
across all fiduciary relationships, or whether there are certain vulnerabilities that are unique 
to a specific type of fiduciary relationship, and thus generate unique duties. For instance, 
perhaps there are a “core set” of fiduciary duties as well as a series of “bespoke” or tailored 
duties that address vulnerabilities specific to certain relationships. Another important area 
of inquiry concerns the nature of the duty of loyalty itself. Moral philosophical 
investigations into the nature of loyalty are limited in number, and fiduciary loyalty in 
particular appears under-theorized.357 For example, the fiduciary duty of loyalty is said to 
prohibit fiduciaries from entering into or maintaining conflicting interests, or so-called 
“divided loyalties.” But presumably some such conflicts are unavoidable, such as those 
between a physician’s loyalty to her patients and her loyalty to the medical profession, the 
institution in which she practices, her colleagues, her family, her own mental and physical 
health and wellbeing, and to the public health at large. Future ethical inquiries into the 
fiduciary relationship therefore ought to consider how much conflict or division between 
loyalties is too much.  
The fiduciary relationship is an important and exciting avenue for current and future 
bioethical research, one that some bioethicists have recently taken.358 In this dissertation, 
I hope to have contributed in some small way to this burgeoning new literature. More 
importantly, however, I hope the conceptual tools provided here serve to further the justice, 
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welfare, and autonomy interests of current and future patients and research participants. In 
the diverse relationships that together constitute the web of human interactions that give 
meaning to our lives, while enabling the satisfaction of our needs and desires—and through 
which we aid in the fulfillment of the needs and desires of others—many of us are 
simultaneously fiduciaries and beneficiaries. I therefore propose that thinking seriously 
about the fiduciary obligations we owe to one another, including the role that such 
relationships play in empowering each of us to be both authors of our own lives and critical 
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